Methods for the economic evaluation of petroleum exploration and synthetic fuels production : an application to Brazil by Gray, Dale Franklin
METHODS FOR THE ECONOMIC
EVALUATION OF PETROLEUM EXPLORATION
AND SYNTHETIC FUELS PRODUCTION:
AN APPLICATION TO BRAZIL --VO,.
by
DALE FRANKLIN GRAY
M.S. & B.S. Geophysics, Stanford University
(1976)
SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF
EARTH AND PLANETARY SCIENCES IN
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN
ENERGY AND MINERAL ECONOMICS
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
December 1981
) Dale Franklin Gray
The author hereby grants to M.I.T. permission to reproduce and
to distribute copies of this thesis document in whole or in part.
Signature of Author
Department of Earth and Plaettary Sciences
December 18, 1981
Certified by
M.A. Adelman, Thesis Co-Supervisor
Certified by
B,,C. urchfiel, Thesis Co-Supervisor
Accepted by
Chairman, Department1 Graduate Committee
Accepted by
Chairman, Interdepartmental Graduate Committee
for Thesis
MASSACHUR S
I\#~ 8BA R IE S
LIBRABIES
__ I; __r~j__ _ I ~_ _r______ ___
METHODS FOR THE ECONOMIC
EVALUATION OF PETROLEUM EXPLORATION
AND SYNTHETIC FUELS PRODUCTION:
AN APPLICATION TO BRAZIL
by
DALE FRANKLIN GRAY
Submitted to the Department of Earth and Planetary Sciences
on December 18, 1981 in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in Energy and Mineral. Economics
ABSTRACT
A Bayesian probabilistic oil exploration model was developed, using
geologic and economic parameters, to estimate the size of undiscovered
oil resources, the probability of future oil discovery and the net present
value of future oil exploration programs. This model was applied to
Brazil and the results compared to evaluations of shale oil and alcohol
production options. A framework for the public evaluation of energy
projects was developed which accounts for the benefits such projects have
to the economy and to the external debt position of the country.
After application of the evaluation framework to account for the
benefits of domestically produced fuels, the results indicate that the
current Brazilian 5-year investment plans in oil exploration, alcohol,
and shale oil are likely to be socially profitable only if real oil
prices increase 3% to 5% annually.
The results of the probabilistic model indicate that the expected
amount of undiscovered oil in Brazil is small, about 500 to 700 million
barrels. These results compare well (within several percent) to industry
based estimates. Two thirds of the undiscovered oil is expected to be
found offshore. There are diminishing expected returns to exploration
offshore and very low probabilities of large undiscovered oil deposits
onshore or in the Amazon delta. The model results indicate that the
optimal (most profitable) offshore exploration program for the state oil
company (PETROBRAS) requires less investment than current PETROBRAS plans.
If all offshore exploration were allocated to foreign oil companies,
under current contract terms, the expected outcome is of lower benefit
to Brazil than the optimal plan, but possibly of greater benefit than
the current PETROBRAS exploration plan.
Both the probabilistic exploration model and the framework for
energy program evaluation are applicable to a variety of other regions
or to other countries.
Thesis Co-Supervisor - Dr. M.A. Adelman, Professor of Economics
Thesis Co-Supervisor - Dr. B.C. Burchfiel, Professor of Earth and
Planetary Sciences
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Introduction
Many oil importing developing countries have experienced major
problems due to dependence on imported oil. The rapid rise in oil prices
and disruption of imported supplies have had a negative impact on their
economies and contributed to increased foreign indebtedness. Energy
planners in these countries face numerous uncertainties in their efforts
to increase domestic petroleum supplies and produce synthetic fuels. The
outcome and risks of oil exploration programs are particularly large,
mainly due to geologic uncertainties. Planners must also choose the
extent and terms of foreign participation in oil exploration.
Uncertainties in the production of synfuels are also large, mainly due to
uncertainties in technical production cost.
One oil importing developing country where both the magnitude of the
oil related problems and the uncertainties related to domestic liquid
fuel production are particularly large, is Brazil. Brazil imports 80
percent of the oil it consumes. The cost of oil imports increased frorm
only $375 million in 1972 to $11 billion in 1980 (current dollars). The
cost of oil imports was 55% of total export earnings in 1980. Foreign
debt has grown to $57 billion in 1980, caused in large part by heavy
borrowing to finance oil imports in the mid-1970's.
In response to these pressures the Brazilian government has launched
a massive domestic energy investment program, with plans to invest a
total of $60 billion (constant $1979) over the next 5 year period, from
1981 through 1985. Sixty percent of this investment is to be electricity,
and a third is earmarked for the liquid fuels sector. The long term
prospects for liquid fuel production depend on the success of planned
investments in oil exploration, shale oil and alcohol production.
Investment plans for these sub-sectors over the five year period from
1981 through 1985 are ambitious. They include planned expenditure of
$3.7 billion (constant $1979) in oil and gas exploration, $3.6 billion in
alcohol production (95% from sugarcane feedstock), and $1.1 billion for a
25,000 bbl/day shale plant which will later be expanded to 50,000 bbl/day.
The topic of tnis study is to develop new methods to evaluate liquid
fuel investment programs and then apply these methods to evaluate current
Brazilian investment plans in petroleum, shale oil and alcohol
production. The goals of this study can be broken down into three parts:
1) The development of a framework to evaluate public energy
programs which accounts for the primary and secondary objectives
of the program. The primary objective is the provision of
domestic liquid fuel supplies cheaper than oil. The secondary
objectives are the reduced vulnerability to oil import
disruptions, and the reduced negative impact of oil price shocks
on the economy and on the country's foreign debt position.
2) The development of a Bayesian probabilistic oil exploration
model using geologic and economic parameters, that estimates the
probability of future oil discovery and the net present value of
various investment programs in oil exploration. This
exploration model allows oil exploration programs to be compared
directly to other, more traditional projects, evaluations that
were used for shale oil and by the World Bank for the alcohol
11
program.
3) The application of the above methods to compare Brazilian
investment plans in petroleum exploration, shale oil and alcohol
production. The results are used to analyze the economic and
financial aspects of various energy investment strategies and
policies toward foreign investment.
1-1. Current Energy and Economic Situation
Recent economic history in Brazil can be divided into two periods.
During the period of rapid economic growth in Brazil between 1967 and
1972 (the so-called "Brazilian miracle"), real GDP increased at 11% per
year. The country's development strategy was based on export-lead
growth with heavy reliance on cheap imported oil and foreign
borrowing. Primary energy consumption (excluding firewood) grew by
10.3% per yar over this same period, and the share of petroleum in
total primary energy consumption increased to 41%, with imports
accounting for 80% of the oil consumed.
Since the oil price rise in 1973, the rate of growth of GDP has
declined to 7% per year, while primary energy consumption has grown by
8% per year. Oil imports, which amounted to 460,000 bbl/d in 1972,
grew to 900,000 bbl/d in 1980. The cost of the oil imports (in current
dollars) increased from only $375 million in 1972 to $11 billion, or
55% of total export earnings, in 1980 (see Table 1-1). While policies
since 1973 have maintained a high growth rate by world standards and
have resulted in heavy investment in domestic energy production, they
have also caused foreign debt to soar to $57 billion in 1980 from only
8 billion in 1972. Furthermore, the inflation rate of the general
price index in 1980 reached 109%.
One of the major porbems in the energy sector is the poor fit
between the energy resource base and the energy consumption pattern.
On the supply side (Tables 1-2 and 1-3), Brazil is well-endowed with
hydroelectric power (second largest resources in the world), shale oil
Table 1-1
Brazilian Balance of Payments Deficit
Oil Import Bill and Gross Debt
Billion US$
30
25
To
E:
20
15
10
Billion US$
70 - -
60,
40
20
*Financial Times Estimate.
Source: Financial Times, Nov. 14, 1980.
Table j2
Non-Renewable Energy Reserves and Resources
in Brazil
Fossil Fuels
Petroleum
(June 1979)
Shale Oil
(1979)
Natural Gas
(Dec. 1978)
Coal
(1977)
Cumulative Production
Proved Reserves
Estimated Total Ultimate
Discoverable (Com. Prod. Proved
Probable and Possible)
Proved Reserves
Total Resources
Proved Reserves
Cumulative Production
Estimated Additional2 /
Measured Reserves
Indicated Resources
Inferred Resources
Total
1051 mmb
1226 mmb
3300 mmb 1
4546 mmb 3/
3200-3600 mmb-
1260 mmb
842,000 mmb
44 billion cubic m 322 billion cubic m
71 billion cubic m3
1.4
2.5
15.7
19.7 billion tons
Electric Power
Hydropower
(1978)
Uranium
(1979)
Developed
Surveyed
Estimated
Total
(Planned Developed by 1990)
Proved Reserves
23,000
33,853
47,597
104,450
(33,000)
126,000 U308
!/From Adelman and Paddock 1979
/World Energy Conference estimates, 1980
2/Estimates by Gray 1980
Remaining data from the Brazilian Energy Model
Table 1-3
Brazil: Hydroelectric Potential
(Firm Megawatts)
Hydro Generating Capacity
Basin Developed Surveyed Estimated Total
Amazon Tributaries 10 2633 32461 35104
North Atlantic 10 -- 475 485
N. E. Atlantic 127 67 61 255
Tocantius 2103 8665 1892 12660
Sao Francisco 3397 4249 1391 9037
E. Atlantic 2024 4285 5274 11583
Parana 15157 7834 4930 27921
Uruguay 172 6120 1113 7405
Total (1978) 23000 33853 47597 104450
Estimated(1990) 33000
Source: Brazilian Energy Model, Ministry of Mines and Energy
1979.
vol.
Est. Developed by 1990 from World Energy Conf.
IA, 1980
UNIT COST OF THE BRAZILIAN HYDROELECTRIC POTENTIAL
AVAILABLE AFTER 1990
o7072
AVERAGE CW
Source: World Energy Conference Proceedings, 1980
deposits (second largest in the world) and biomass energy resources,
but poorly endowed with conventional oil and gas resources. Proven oil
reserves were only 1226 million barrels in 1979, or less than 4% of
recoverable oil reserves in the U.S. On the demand side (Table 1-4),
total primary energy consumption more than doubled from 1967 to 1977.
The share of petroleum in total consumption increased from 33 to 42%,
while the share of hydropower increased from 16 to 26%. These
increases were offset by a decline in the share of firewood from 38% to
20%.
The potential for hydroelectric power in Brazil is enormous.
Hydroelectric capacity was 23,000 MW of energy. The Brazilians are
planning to increase this figure to 33,000 MW by 1990 (Brazil Energy
Model, 1979). After 1990, surveys indicate that 60,000 MW of
additional capacity can be developed before substantial rises in costs
(i.e., costs greater than $1800/KW ($1979)) will occur (Table 1-3).
Much of the underdeveloped hydropower potential is located in the
north, far from industrial centers. Due to the shortage of hydropower
near industrial centers in the south, the Brazilians initiated a
vigorous program of nuclear power production in the early 1970's.
Original plans called for eight 1,300 MW reactors, a uranium enrichment
plan and reprocessing plant, all to be built by 1990. Reactors were to
be purchased from West Germany for a total of $8 billion, and Brazil
was to furnish Germany with uranium. Proven reserves of uranium are
fifth largest in the world (126,000 tons U3 08 in 1979).
The Brazilian nuclear power program has been scaled back from these
_ _... ill _I^-iilliT--l_-ll*l - -1l 1ii.--__ _ J~ilY--il.r~l
Table 14
Primary energy consumption
in tons of petroleum equivalent
NATURAL SHALE WA TER
PETROLEUM GAS ALCOHOL OIL SUBTOTAL POWER COAL FIREWOOD BAGASSE CHARCOAL URANIUM TOTAL
YEARS 1,000 IOm % 1.000 lts % .000 tons % 1.000 tons % 1.000 t000 W4 00 tontons 1.000 totons % 1.000 tons % 1.000 tons % i0.o0 tons % I 000on % 1.,000 tons %
1967.... 17,371 33.8 105 0.2 367 0.7 - - 17,843 34.7 8,465 16.5 2,048 4.0 19,291 37.4 2,825 5.5 1,003 1.9 - - 51,475 100.0
1968.... 20,279 37.9 93 0.2 160 03 - - 20,532 38.4 8,860 16.6 2,317 4.3 18,048 33.8 2,564 4.8 1,094 2.1 - - 53,415 100.0
1969.... 21,993 38.7 96 0.2 27 0.0 - - 22,116 38.9 9,481 16.7 2,342 4.0 18,999 33.4 2,762 4.9 1,191 2.1 - - 56,891 100.0
1970... 23,311 38.1 104 0.2 155 0.2 - - 23,570 38.5 11,560 18.9 2,391 3.9 18,809 30.8 3,356 5.5 1,484 2.4 - - 61,170 100.0
1971.... 26,186 39.9 140 0.2 213 0.3 - - 26,539 404 12,549 19.1 2,431 3.8 18,862 28 8 3,559 5.4 1,655 2.5 - - 65,595 100.0
1972... 28,740 41.0 166 0.2 328 0.4 - - 29,234 41. 14,918 213 2,491 3.6 17,661 25.2 3,990 5.7 1,822 2.6 - - 70,116 100.0
1973.... 34,240 439 178 0.2 260 0.3 - - 34,6/8 44.4 17,055 21.9 2,4931 32 .7,429 22.4 4,459 5.7 1,897 2.4 - - 78,011 100.0
1974... 36,947 43.8 339 0.4 160 0.2 - - 37,446 44.4 19,011 22.5 ?,469 2.9 18,541 22 0 4,361 5.2 2,536 30 - - 84,364 1000
1975.... 39,300 43.5 369 04 136 0.1 - - 39,805 44.0 21,112 237 ;,110 3,? 19,328 21.I 4,032 45 2,897 32 - - 90,324 100.0
1976 ... 42,894 43.3 367 0.4 144 0.1 - - 43,405 43.8 23,626 238 3:,435 3b 21,294 21.5 4,166 4.2 3,154 3.2 - - 99,080 100.0
1977.... 43,063 41.7 505 0.5 537 0 5 - - 44,105 42.7 26,953 26.1 4,106 4.0 20,885 20.2 4,714 4.6 2,489 2.4 - - 103,252 100.0
Source: Brazilian National Energy Balance, 1978
- --\T =_i. ..-- -.--' --~-~-rl?- r~--- l  UII-sllCCI-~-L-C--C-
initial goals, however, due to cost overruns and delays. Completion
date for the reactors has been moved back to the year 2000, and current
cost estimates of the program are $30 billion (NYT, 5/18/81). These
large cost overruns and long delays have forced the Brazilians to
emphasize the development of hydroelectric power in the north to be
transmitted to the south.
While domestic electricity demand can be satisfied by domestic
hydropower and some nuclear power for many years to come, the acute
problem in Brazil today is the low level of domestic oil production
relative to the high demand for petroleum. Oil production has been
declining at 4% per year for the last 6 years, and oil imports have
risen to 85% of oil consumption. Oil for onshore fields discovered in
the 1950's is rapidly being depleted. A large fraction fo the primary
oil reserves of these fields has been produced, and most are undergoing
secondary recovery operations at the present tim e. It is hard to
believe that a country as large as Brazil has so little oil. The
onshore cratonic basins have very poor source rocks and few structures,
and this type of onshore basin contains only 1% of the known oil
reserves worldwide.
The Brazilians launched an accelerated program of oil exploration,
concentrated in the offshore basins, in the 1970's. By 1979, 411
offshore wells were drilled, and in 1975 a significant discovery of 8
fields was made in the Campos basin. Eight offshore production
platforms are now being installed at a total cost of $4.7 billion,
$1980 Offshore, 9/80). Peak production is expected to be
around 110 million barrels per year in the late 1980's. Although the
capital coefficient is $14,000 per daily barrel (among the world's
highest), the production cost is around $10/bbl as compared to over
$30/bbl for oil imports. As a result of these discoveries, Brazil's
proven oil reserves now stand at 1226 million bbls. The combined
production from the known onshore and offshore reserves is expected to
increase from 60 million bbl/yr in 1978 to 117 million bbl/yr in 1985.
This should increase to 146 million bbl/yr in the late 1980's and then
decline rather quicky if additional resources are not discovered.
While Brazil is deficient in conventional oil deposits, shale oil
resources are substantial (842 billion bbls). Current measured shale
oil reserves at three mining sites in southern Brazil are 1.26 billion
barrels. Average oil content is only 7.4% (23 gallons/ton or 0.55
bbls/ton), which is less than the oil content of U.S. shale (30-35
gallons/ton). Most of this shale has overburden less than 30 meters
and can thus be strip mined. Petrobras, the state-owned oil company,
has been operating a pilot plant that has been producing 1000 bbls/day
for the last 8 years. Current plans call for the construction of the
first industrial scale plant, designed to produce 23,000 bbl/d, in the
late 1980's. Investment cost estimates, however, are very high, in the
range of $45,000 to 50,000 per daily barrel.
In addition to hydropower, oil and shale oil resources, Brazil has
natural gas and coal deposits. Natural gas resources are small. In
1987 they totaled 44 billion cubic meters (280 million bbls of oil
equivalent), equal to one fourth of oil reserves. Although coal
reserves are moderate (19.7 billion tons of total resources), they are
of poor quality and far from major demand centers. Coal production in
1980 was 12 million tons or 4% of total primary energy.
1-2. Brazilian Energy Policies
The primary goal of Brazilian policies today is to reduce Brazil's
overwhelming dependence on foreign oil imports. The current strategy
is two-pronged, combining an effort to increase oil production with
incentives to substitute available domestic energy rosources for
petroleum products. The main objectives of the Brazilian energy plan
are to:
* Increase oil production through development of recently
discovered offshore fields to bring total oil production up
from 60 million bbls in 1978 to 181 million bbls in 1985.
Continue a high level of exploration by Petrobras,
particularly offshore where 800 wells costing $2.4 billion are
planned between 1980 and 1985.
* Substitute fuel oil in industrial use with coal, firewood and
charcoal. Double coal production from 1980 to 1985,
substituting approximately 60 milion bbls of fuel oil with
coal and substituting 30 million bbls of fuel oil with other
sources (mainly wood and charcoal).
* Substitute alcohol, produced primarily from sugarcane, for
gasoline in automobiles. Produce 10.7 billion liters of
alcohol by 1985 to replace 63 million bbls of gasoline.
Manufacture 350,000 all-alcohol cars by 1982.
* Institute measures to conserve petroleum products and
electricity using regulation and licensing schemes desiged to
save up to 41 million bbls of petroleum by 1985.
Four major topics raised by the Brazilian energy plan will be
discussed in this introductory chapter:
* The structure of petroleum product demand
a Energy pricing policies
* Petroleum exploration
* Shale oil
* The Brazilian alcohol program
1-3. The Structure of Petroleum Product Demand
In order to appreciate the difficulty of substituting domestic
energy resources for oil, it is important to understand the structure
of Brazil's liquid fuel demand. Petroleum product consumption is
composed of roughly equal parts of gasoline, diesel and fuel oil. All
of the gasoline consumed and three-fourths of the diesel consumed is in
the transportation sector. Fuel oil is demanded primarily by
industrial users concentrated in the southeast of Brazil. Oil
consumption in residential enery use is minor, since 70% of residential
energy needs are met with firewood. Petroleum product demand is
therefore concentrated in the transportation sector, which accounts for
50% of oil consumption.
The main emphasis of the Brazilian energy plan is to reduce the
share of gasoline and fuel oil in the total consumption of petroleum
products. The share of diesel oil (used primarily in bus and truck
transport), however, may thus increase to half of petroleum product
demand, causing an imbalance in the refining sector. Since the
Brazilian energy plan was announced in 1979, a patchwork approach to
the diesel problem, characterized by investments in the refining sector
and research on vegetable oil and alcohol substitute for diesel, has
been developed. Brazil's liquid fuel problems in the future are likely
to be centered primarily on controlling the consumption of diesel fuel.
1-4. Energy Pricing Policies
The most important and effective method to manage the adjustment to
the higher cost of oil imports is to set domestic energy prices that
properly reflect the marginal cost of the energy source. Setting
proper energy prices will reduce consumption and achieve substitution
objectives more efficiently than reliance on regulatory measures to
encourage conservation and substitution. Several points are relevent
to the setting of prices that reflect marginal costs to society:
i) Non-traded domestic energy resources should be priced at the
long-run marginal cost of production. In Brazil the most
important energy source of this type is electricity.
ii) The domestic prices of tradeable energy resources, such as
petroleum, should reflect their true opportunity costs to
society and be set equal to international oil prices.
iii) The price of imported oil should reflect the fact that supply
is subject to short-term disruptions. Uncertainties in the
short-run supply are best handled with a strategic petroleum
reserve as insurance against short-term disruption. The
long-run price of oil is also subject to considerable
uncertainty. This may be handled through a mix (or portfolio)
of domestic energy investments that minimizes the risks
associated with the international oil price. Both the added
costs of maintaining a stockpile and the costs of additional
investments to encourage substitution are real costs and
should be paid for by the consumers of petroleum through a
premium or tax on petroleum products.
Brazilian energy policies rely heavily both on regulatory measures
for conservation and substitution and on investment plans for
state-owned enterprises. Serious distortions that discourage
substitution and promote wastage of energy are caused by current energy
prices.
An annual price series for petroluem products from 1970 to 1980 is
shown in Table 1-5. These prices were translated into constant terms
using the general price index for Brazil calculated by the World Bank,
with results shown in Table 1-6. As can be seen gasoline prices were
constant in real terms until they doubled in 1976 and then doubled
again by 1980. Kerosene, diesel, and fuel oil prices remained
basically constant in real terms until they doubled in the 1979-1980
period.
Real prices of electricity have declined fom 1975 to 1979 and are
considerably below long-run marginal costs. Fuel oil prices in 1980
were about one-fourth of international prices, and coal prices were
also heavily subsidized, costing only a small fraction of domestic fuel
oil prices (on a BTU basis). These subsidies have created serious
financing problems in the coal and electricity sectors. Diesel oil
prices were raised in 1979 to about four-fifths of the international
level, however and gasoline prices are at international parity.
Raising diesel and fuel oil prices would encourage substitution
with cheaper domestic substitutes. It would eliminate the need to
subsidize coal prices. Without correcting these distortions, the
current goals for substitution and conservation are unlikely to be
achieved. Current trends indicate that the goal of substituting coal
for fuel oil is likely to fall far short of current plans by 1985.
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TAOLEV 1-5'
RETAIL PRICES OF PETRCLEUM PRODUCTS
IN BRAZIL 1970 - 1980
Diesel
Cr$/L
0.35
0.47
0.59
0.66
0.73
- .13
1.73
2.70
4.00
5.40
8.70
12.00
Fuel Oil
(low boiling point
-low sulfur)
Cr$/KG .
0.08
0.11
0.14
0.16 - 0.18
0.18 - 0.22
0.27 - 0.33
0.44 - 0.52
0.61 - 0.72
0.94 - 1.1
1.40 - 1,60
2.4 - 3.0
3.6 - 4.5
r
.rP
Source: National Petroleum Council (CNP).
"A"
9
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
Regular
Gasoline
Cr$/L
0.42
0.56
0.69
0.79
1.03
2.02
3.63
5.10
7.30
9.60
14.30
26.00
January
May
May
April
January
January
January
February
February
February
October
March
Premium
Gasoline '
Cr$/L
0.55
0.71
0.87
1.01
1.39
2.67
4.53
6.30
8.90
12.50
21.50
38.00
Kerosene
Cx$/L
0.37
0.50
0.66
0.73
0.87
1.31
1.84
2.42
4.10
5.90
9.45
16.40
i
LPG
Cr$/KG
0.64
0.85
1.10
1.24
1.48
2.40
3. 5
4.10
6.30
8.40
9.30
10.70
--
4 4d
TAGLh 1-6
RETAIL PRICES OF PETROLEUM PRODUJCTS
IN BRAZIL IN CONSTANT 1970 Cr$, 1970-1980
Fuel Oil
Regular Premium (low boiling point
Gasoline "A'  Gasoline "B" Kerosene Diesel -low sulfur) LPG
Cr$/L Cr$/L Cr$/L Cr$/L Cr$/KG Cr$/KG Index
1970 January 0.42 0.55 0.37 0.35 0.08 0.64 100
1971 May 0.47 0.59 0.42 0.39 o.11 0.71 120
1972 May 0.50 0.63 0.48 0.43 0.10 0.80 138
1973 April 0.49 0.63 . 0.46 0.41 0.10-0.11 0.78 160
1974 January 0.48 0.65. 0.40 0.34 0.08-0.10 0.69 215
1975 January 0.73 0.96 0.47 0.41 0.10-0.12 0.86 278 r.
1976 January 0.89 1.11 0.45 0.43 0.11-0.13 0.80 407
1977 February 0.90 1.12 0.43 0.48 0.11-0.13 0.73 565
1978 February 0.92 1.12 0.52 0.50 0.12-0.14 0.79 796
1979 February 1.12 1.45 0.69 0.63 0.16-0.19 0.98 857
October 1.15 1.73 0.76 0.70 0.19-0.24 0.75 1246
1980 March . 1.73 2.52 1.09p 0.80 O.24-0.30 0.71 1507
1/ General Price Index (Domestic Availability).
p - preliminary, 5%/month increase in price index assumed for January - March 1980.
Source: . Retail Prices of Petroleum Products in Brazil 1970-1978 from CNP data.
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1-5. Exploration for Domestic Petroleum
The national energy plan has a stated goal of increasing oil
production from 60 million bbls in 1978 to 181 million bbls by 1985.
This short-term production can only come from recently discovered
offshore fields, not from expected future discoveries. Current
scheduling of production from the Campos fields indicate that total
onshore and offshore production in 1985 is likely to be around 117
million bbls, increasing to 150 million bbls in the late 1980's. This
production is expected to decline quickly if additional discoveries are
not made.
Petrobras (the state-owned oil company) maintained a strict
monopoly on exploration until 1975, when risk contracts for small
blocks were offered to foreign oil companies. By mid-1979, 411 wildcat
exploration wells had been drilled offshore. A total of 26 wells were
drilled by foreign oil companies, and all were dry. The number of
wildcat wells drilled in the interior basins totaled 177, and 1400 were
drilled in the coastal oil provinces. The best oil potential is still
considered offshore, and according to the Oil and Gas Journal (2/6/81),
Petrobras plans to spend $3.6 billion the next 4 years ($2.8 for 800
offshore wells, $0.8 for 975 onshore wells). Exploration contract
terms have been somewhat relaxed, but the share of exploration
completed through risk contracts is still very small.
A major portion of this thesis is devoted to the estimation of the
amount of oil expected to be discovered both in undiscovered fields in
known plays (cluster of fields) and in undiscovered plays in Brazil.
Data from exploration will be used to update initial prior estimates of
the resource base for groups of geologically similar basins. Estimates
will then be made of the expected economic return and its variance for
blocks of future exploration wells. Preliminary results indicate that
the best prospects lie offhshore and that by and large exploration has
been relatively efficient, with low probabilities that sizeable fields
have remained undiscovered.
The results of the model indicate that economic returns from future
exploration are positive even with low probabilities of occurrence
since if oil is found oil production costs are likely to be low
compared to the international oil price. However, the wide range of
possible outcomes of exploration does present risks to Petrobras. This
is particulary important to recognize, since Petrobras plans to spend
$3.6 billion over the next 4 years on exploration. Petrobras could
maintain flexibility in its investment planning by subcontracting
seismic exploration and drilling to privte Brazialian firms, rather
than continuing to build up its own in-house capability. Also, by
increasing the share of investment in exploration contributed by
foreign companies and other sources, the risk of exploration by
Petrobras could be reduced. A major issue to be looked at is the
profitability of oil exploration from the viewpoint of the foreign oil
companies as opposed to the profitability of exploration from the
viewpoint of Petrobras.
1-6. Shale Oil
As briefly described earlier, Brazil has the world's second largest
shale oil resources. There is a great deal of uncertainty in the
technical cost of production and the initial investment costs are a
large lump-sum investment. Petrobras (which currently has control over
shale oil operations) has, up to this point, decided not to move
strongly into shale oil production. A major issue to be looked into is
whether or not it is economic from a social viewpoint to invest in
shale oil.
1-7. The Brazilian Alcohol Program
Brazil has launched the largest program to produce alcohol from
biomass in the world. There are numerous advantages and disadvantages
to the proposed program, and there is much debate about the program's
impact on other agricultural production. In this thesis the economic
analysis of the alcohol program in Brazil will be taken from the
intensive study of the situation by the World Bank. The current
technological and economic aspects of the program will be highlighted
so that the alcohol production option can be compared to the oil
exploration and shale oil options.
A major advantage of alcohol is that it can be used directly in
automobile engines. If anhydrous alcohol is mixed with gasoline in
proportions up to 20%, the economic value of the alcohol is the same as
gasoline. When 100% anhydrous alcohol is used in specially designed
engines, the economic value of alcohol is 85% that of gasoline, since
pure alcohol is less efficient than gasoline or gasohol.
A second major advantage of alcohol is that it can be produced
economically from surgarcane with current oil prices, according to a
recently published World Bank study. A typical alcohol plant based on
sugarcane produces 120,000 liters/day for 180 days/yr (136,000 bbls
alcohol/yr) and has a capital cost of $7.6 million. The World Bank
report has calculated economic rates of return for alcohol plants
assuming various selling prices of gasoline and alternative sugarcane
production costs. Brazil is considered a low cost country, with oil
imports priced at about $31/bbl and sugarcane production costing about
$10/ton. Since sugarcane stalks (bagasse) can be used as an energy
source in the distillation of alcohol from fermented sugar, the process
is calculated to have a positive energy balance.
The fact that sugar producers form a strong concentrated interest
group and that sugar prices were depressed (8w/lb) between 1976 and
1979 is a major driving force behind the program to convert sugarcane
to alcohol, since the alcohol program provides a de facto price
support. Sugar prices have since increased, but Brazilian energy
planners have emphasized that while short-run losses of diverting sugar
to alcohol production may occur, they are outweighed by long-run
benefits of substituting for oil imports. Furthermore, the market
price for sugar should not be directly translated into an alcohol
production cost, since Brazil is not a price taker in the sugar market.
Alcohol production in Brazil was 4 billion liters in 1980. The
state goals of the Brazilian government is to produce 10.7 billion
liters by 1985, 3.5 for alcohol gasoline mixture, 5.7 for straight
alcohol engines and 1.5 for chemical feedstocks. This 1985 goal relies
almost completely on sugarcane and will require approximately 2.7 to
3.1 million ha of land (depending on whether yields are 3500 1/ha or
3000 1/ha) in addition to the 1.6 million ha under sugarcane
cultivation in 1979. Production of 1 liter of alcohol produces a
byproduct of 12 liters of liquid stillage waste, currently being
expelled into rivers (For. Agr., 1981). By 1985, 128 billion liters of
stillage waste must be processed (possibly as fertilizer) if production
goals are met, adding additional costs to alcohol production.
The major problem with the alcohol program based on sugarcane is
the significant rise in land costs and thus food costs that may occur
as land is diverted from food production. Concern has been expressed
that the incomaes of food consumers, particularly low income consumers,
might be reduced to the benefit of both sugarcane land owers and
automobile owners. Export earnings from cash crops may decline as
well, as prime land is diverted to alcohol production. Although it is
uncertain how much land costs could rise, it is not inconceivable that
the opportunity cost of land (currently about a fifth of sugarcane
production costs) could double. Along with increased cost of stillage
processing, this cost increase might make alcohol production from
sugarcane uneconomic by the late 1980's. This is particulary likely to
occur as alcohol production increases toward the 1987 stated target of
14 billion liters.
Sugarcane crops require the highest quality land. Due to this
potential conflict betwen using the best land for food and using it for
alcohol crops, there has been a move toward utilizing cassava and
timber for ethanol alcohol production, since they can be grown on
marginal land. The capital costs of alcohol plants based on cassava or
timber are higher (30% higher for cassava) and crop yields per ha are
lower, but these plants have longer operating seasons than plants based
on sugarcane. The economics of large-scale production of ethanol from
these sources is critically dependent on the magnitude of the costs of
clearing and irrigating marginal lands, the opportunity cost of pasture
lands and the additional costs of processing stillage. Results from
current research may help lower production costs and improve crop
yields for these alternative raw materials. Large-scale alcohol
production from these sources may eventually be feasible, but progress
will probably be slow.
Current technology does not perait the use of alcohol in diesel
engines. Even if technology permitted, ethanol currently cannot be
economically substituted for diesel oil, since test results indicate
specific ethanol consumption is 1.7 times (by volume) that of diesel.
Recent trends in Brazil are to use vegetable oils mixed with diesel oil
in a 30:70 ratio. However, vegetable oils are expensive and utilize
prime agricultural land. If the vegetable oil program is expanded
substantially, a choice will have to be made between using prime lands
for vegetable oil production or for alcohol from sugarcane.
1-8. Short Term Prospects in the Energy Sector
Brazil is in the midst of a difficult adjustment to higher oil
prices. It is being forced to deal with the problems of producing
synthetic fuels from biomass and shale earlier than most other
countries. It is further along than any other country in the research
and development of automobiles and trucks to run on alcohol fuels. In
the not too distant future it might be the first country to depend on
electricity and synfuels from shale and biomlass) for the major portion
of its energy supplies. The costs of this transition are enormous and
are becoming apparent only now. The marginal cost of most liquid fuel
sources is between $30 and $40/bbl, whether derived fom biomass, shale
oil, or imported oil. Brazilian energy plans call for a massive
investment of $60 billion from 1980 to 1985.
In the short-run it is particularly important to construct current
plans in light of the sequential nature of both oil exploration and
synfuel research and development. Future plans can be adjusted or
revised as new information about the resource base or technical
production costs becomes available. Short-run policies could
concentrate on more efficient energy pricing policies and on
investments in the coal and refinery sectors to achieve energy
substitution objectives.
The Brazilian energy plan projects oil consumption in 1985 to
increase only 4% over the 1978 level. The author estimates that oil
consumption is more likely to be 20% greater in 1985 than in 1978, as
shown in Table 1-7. These estimates are based on estimated income and
Table 1-7
Brazilian Petroleum Balance
(1978 and 1985 estimates
in millions of barrels)
1985
Goals of
1978 Brazilian 1985
(actual) Energy Plan-/ (estimates)2/
Substitution of fuel
oil with coal and with
other sources 92 70
Substitution of gasoline
with alcohol 63 57
Energy conservation 41
Petroleum product
consumption (energy uses,
with conservation and
substitution) 345 321 383
Non-energy petroleum
consumption 31 69 69
Total consumption 376 390 452
Domestic production 59 181 117
Imports 317 250 335
L/Assumes real GDP/capita up 3.5%/yr, population up 2.5%/yr.
Source: Brazilian Ministry of Mines presentation to the Financial
Times of Brazil in October 1979.
!/Authors estimates. Assumes: real GDP/capita rises at 3%/yr;
population rises 2.5%/yr; 80% of fuel and substition target met;
alcohol production of 9.2 billion liters with hydrous alcohol use
85% as efficient as gasoline. "Conservation" as such is accounted
for through income and price elasticities. Diesel consumption andjoint gasoline plus alcohol consumption are calculated using
elasticities from a cross-section time-series of 10 LDC's. Long-
run price and income elasticities are -0.4 and 1.3 respectively.
Short-run elasticities are one tenth of long-run elasticities.
Gasoline prices are assumed to be maintained at import parity.
Diesel prices assumed to be raised from 80% of international parity
in 1978 to international parity in 1980 and maintained. Joint con-
sumption of fuel oil and fuel oil substitutes projected to increase
4%/yr, without significant correction in the underpricing of fuel
oil.
International oil price assumed to increase at 3%/yr in real
terms from a base of $30/bbl in 1980.
price elasticities from a cross section study of ten LDC's. Since GDP
in Brazil is expected to rise about 45% over this period from 1978 to
1985, oil consumption growth is still a substantial achievement,
resulting in large part from lagged adjustment to higher oil prices.
The Brazilian enery plan projects oil imports by 1985 to decline 21%
from the 1978 level. A more realistic figure is a slight increase of
6% over the same period.
1-9. Major Issues of Investment in the Liquid Fuels Sector Focused on
in this Thesis
Numerous issues have been discussed in this chapter but this thesis
will concentrate only on the major liquid fuel supply options and their
assoiciated risks, summarized as follows:
1. Imported Oil - There is a chance of a short-term cutoff of oil
imports primarily caused by political events. This short term
risk is best dealt with through an adequate oil stockpile.
The cost of maintaining the stockpile should be passed on to
the consumers of oil. The longer term risks associated with
imported oil are caused by the wide range of possible oil
import prices which are dependent on actions of the OPEC
cartel.
2. Exploration and Production of Domestic Oil - The major risk
associated with supplies of domestic oil is the geological
risk assoicated with the existence of the oil, and the
uncertainty of finding the oil given it exists. A
probabilistic oil exploration model is developed in this
thesis that explicitly calculates the probabilities of the
existence of various amounts of oil and the probabilities of
oil discovery for various levels of exploration. Using some
reasonable guesses as to the cost of oil, if it is discovered,
the rate of return (or net present value) of oil exploration
can be calculated. Thus the analysis explicitly takes account
of the impact of geologic risk, exploratory risk and risks
associated with the price of oil. This approach also
facilitates analysis of the potential to share risks between
the Petrobras and multinational oil companies.
3. Shale Oil Production - The major risks associated with shale
oil production are the large uncertainties in the technical
cost of production and the risks associated wth the oil
price. The large investment level required to build an
initial shale plant may make shale too risky from the firm
point of view but not from a social point of view.
4. Alcohol Production - The rate of return on alcohol from
biomass is extremely sensitive to assumptions about the price
of oil and the raw material impact. The raw material cost is
in turn very sensitive to agricultural yield and the cost of
land (or the opportunity cost of land for other food crops).
The risks of alcohol fuel supply come primarily from the oil
price and from technical-agricultural factors.
A major objective of this thesis is the economic comparison of the
various liquid fuel options from the viewpoint of Brazilian society.
Investments in the various options over the next 5 years will be
evaluated on a common basis with the same assumptions about the price
of oil, shadow price of foreign exchange, etc. Estimates of the
socially optimal investment plan will take into account the social cost
of capital and the risk characteristics of the various options. It may
also be useful to analyze how investment undertaken by Petrobras or
foreign oil companies may differ from the socially optimal investment
plan. For example, Petrobras or a foreign company may perceive the
risk of a specific project, the work of groups of projects, or the
required rate of return on investment differently than Brazilian
society and this would lead to less than optimal investment. While
there are numerous examples of private versus social benefits to
examine, this thesis will concentrate on only a few of the more
important examples.
CHAPTER 2
METHODOLOGY FOR THE EVALUATION OF
LIQUID FUEL OPTIONS IN BRAZIL
2-1. Financial Methods of Project Evaluation: NPV vs. IRR
In order to compare the option to explore for oil to other liquid
fuel production options (shale oil and alcohol), all projects need to
have a common basis for comparison. Two of the most common evaluation
methods to compare projects are the Net Present Value method (NPV) and
the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) method. The goal of this chapter is
both to establish a method to calculate the NPV, variance of NPV, rate
of return, and variance of the rate of return for liquid fuel
production programs from the viewpoint of Brazilian society and to
clarify points where public and private evaluation may differ.
The IRR method and the NPV method both assume that cash outflows
(costs) are subtracted from the cash inflows (benefits). The NPV
method uses the appropriate discount rate, reflecting the time value of
money, to discount the annual cash flows.
n (Benefits)i - (Costs)i
NPV = 2: 1 1, r = discount rate (eq. 2-1)
i=O (1 + r)
Project NPVs can then be directly compared. The IRR method uses the
same principle, except the IRR is the rate of return, r, which brings
the NPV to zero. NPV is the preferred evaluation method, since in
certain special instances IRR may give different results in project
ranking as compared to NPV. Situations where this may occur are shown
be Iow:
* If negative cash flows follow positive cash flows, NPV may
rise with the discount rate. Thus, projects should be
accepted if their IRR is less than the cost of capital. The
IRR rule would lead incorrectly to rejection of the project.
* If there are changes in the signs of the cash flows over time,
multiple internal rates of return may occur, giving biased and
indeterminate results.
* The IRR rule may give incorrect ranking of mutually exclusive
projects which differ in scale or life of the project.
* IRR assumes that cash flows generated can be reinvested at the
same level as the IRR over the life of the project. NPV
assumes that cash flows can be reinvested at the cost of
capital. Variations in the cost of capital over time may
cause differences in the ranking of projects, depending on
whether IRR or NPV is used.
While NPV is the preferred method, IRR can be useful if special
attention is paid to the conditions above. IRR and the variance of IRR
can be used more easily than NPV when consideration is given to
portfolio analysis of investment options. In this study investments
will be compared primarily using NPV.
2-2. Private vs. Public Project Evaluation
As our goal is to calculate the NPV of a specific liquid fuel
production program by discounting cash inflows and cash outflows, the
next relevant question to ask is what the correct prices and costs to
use in the evaluation are. The correct prices and costs are those that
reflect the opportunity cost of a resource in its next best use. If we
think of planning in an economy as a linear programming problem with
the objective function being intertemporal maximization of society's
income given constraints on the available resources (labor, foreign
exchange, materials, etc.), the programming solution gives the shadow
price for each resource. These shadow prices indicate the value of the
marginal product that could be obtained if one more unit of scarce
resource were available. This increase in income that would result if
one more unit of resource were added is the relevant measure of the
opportunity cost of the resource in its next best use.
Only under very rare circumstances would the true social
opportunity costs (or shadow prices) equal the observed market prices
in a real world economy. Market prices will equal social opportunity
costs under conditions of perfect information, numerous consumers and
producers, mobile factors of production, no externalities, no barriers
to entry and no restrictions on price movements. These conditions do
not hold in any real world economy, and certainly not in Brazil. A
project can be evaluated with shadow prices (i.e., an economic
evaluation) or market prices (a financial evaluation). If the economic
evaluation produces a positive NPV and the financial evaluation
produces a negative NPV, a case can be made that the public sector
should take measures to insure that this socially beneficial project is
undertaken since the private sector is reluctant to do so. It is not
the purpose of this study to calculate the shadow price of each input
in exhaustive detail. In many instances market prices are a good
approximation to shadow prices, but it is necessary to take notice of
the most important areas in which market prices may diverge from social
prices. For the type of projects in Brazil this study is concerned
with, the most important areas where distortions may occur are the
price of oil, the cost of capital and, to a lesser extent, the price of
foreign exchange (and its impact on the cost of imported capital
items), the cost of labor and measurement of externalities caused by
pollution. The price of oil and the cost of capital have an important
effect on the outcome of the NPV calculations and will be discussed in
detail in sections 2-4 and 2-5. Evaluations using the shadow price of
foreign exchange show that it has a moderate effect on the NPV
calculations, as discussed in section C. The otnler shadow prices have
a small effect as discussed below.
The labor component of the oil production process (oil exploration
and production) and the shale oil production process is small. Even if
the shadow price of labor differs from the market price, the effect of
NPV is expected to be extremely small. The process of producing
alcohol from biomass does have a significant labor component. The
economic analysis of the alcohol program used for this report is taken
from an intensive study of the situation by the World Bank. For their
evaluation the market price of labor was set equal to the social
opportunity cost of labor in south and southeast Brazil. However, in
the northeast, labor was shadow priced at 0.7 of the market
rate due to a surplus of labor and minimum wage regulations. For the
purposes of this study the price of labor will be set at the market
rate for the oil and shale oil production processes for two reasons.
First, the labor component is very small, and second, according to the
World Bank labor prices equal the market rate in southern Brazil, where
these oil production activities are taking place.
There are potential externalities (extra costs to society) caused
by pollution from shale oil and stillage from alcohol production.
These costs are not reflected in the market prices used to evaluate the
production processes. If possible, these costs will be accounted for
by adding the estimated cost of pollution equipment to the project
costs. If these costs cannot be identified quantitatively they will at
least be identified qualitatively.
2-3. Calculation and Use of the Shadow Price of Foreign Exchange
The projects under consideration involve investments in capital
goods that are partly produced at home (in Brazil) and partly
imported. For project evaluation, all costs and benefits need to be
translated into a base currency. For simplicity, the U.S. dollar will
be the base currency (since costs measured in U.S. $ are subject to
more predictable inflation indexing than the Cr in Brazil, where
several different cost indexes prevail and inflation was 109 percent in
1980). All costs and benefits will be translated into constant US $
1979. The domestic component of the costs must be converted into US $
at the official exchange rate. The exchange rate in Brazil is a
"crawling peg" where mini-devaluations that reflect (in principle) the
high level of domestic inflation are made approximately every two
weeks. However, the official exchange rate does not accurately measure
the true opportunity cost of foreign exchange (or shadow exchange rate)
if there are significant trade barriers. Various trade policies such
as export subsidies, import tariffs, etc., are in some sense a
substitute for devaluation and make the official rate overvalued
relative to the shadow exchange rate. An economic interpretation of
the shadow exchange rate (or free trade exchange rate) is the exchange
rate which would prevail if all trade distorting tariffs, subsidies,
import deposits, export taxes, and quantitative restrictions were
eliminated. There exists a broad body of literature on the theory and
calculation of the shadow exchange rate (Bacha and Taylor 1971, Balassa
1974, Roemer and Stern 1975, D. Lal 1974). Some methods may be
theoretically superior but difficult if not impossible to apply in
practice. A method that is widely used and relatively easy to apply in
practice has been derived in Bacha and Taylor (1971) and Balassa
(1974). The methodology expresses the ratio of the shadow exchange
rate to the official exchange rate as a weighted average of the rates
of protection of imports and exports. The weights are the relevant
foreign trade elasticities, as shown below:
erX I(1+Si ) + .eM i/(1+Ti )
R 1 (eq. 2-2)
R ZeX + remM.
R = the official exchange rate
R' = the shadow exchange rate
e. = the price elasticity of foreign exchange for product i1
sx dx
e i (e i -1)
eX + e
sx = the price elasticity of export supply for product i
edx = the effective price elasticity of export demand facing product
i, defined as a positive number
= the inverse of the country's share of world exports times the
aggregate world price elasticity of demand
em = the price elasticity of demand for imports of product ii
Xi = exports of product i
Mi = imports of product i
Si = the subsidy on exports of product is as a ratio of the export
price (an export tax is considered a negative subsidy)
Ti = the total protection on imports, including the effects of
tariffs, advance import deposits, and quantitative restrictions.
This approach assumes that only goods currently traded would be
traded under the free trade situation. This "free trade" exchange rate
gives us a way to translate the costs of domestic products (which
consist of traded and non-traded goods) into a dollar equivalent that
is free of distortions caused by trade policies. This "free trade"
exchange rate is called the first best shadow exchange rate, as it
assumes free trade policies are desirable and the policies in the
country are moving toward free trade. Balassa (1974) derives a more
complicated "second best" shadow exchange rate that assumes that trade
distortions will remain permanently. This shadow exchange rate will
produce slightly different results by translating the costs of
non-traded goods at a different rate than the "free trade" rate. The
opportunity cost of traded goods is the price (in US $) they would
bring if sold internationally. This traded good price is given by the
"free trade" rate. The "free trade" shadow exchange rate will be used
for all items since: a) the investment items for the projects under
consideration consist largely of tradeable capital goods, b) the "free
trade" rate is much easier to calculate than the complex second-best
rate, and c) it is unknown what trade policies will prevail in the
future, but assumed that policies will move toward the free trade
policies.
The necessary import and price elasticities were obtained from the
World Bank Brazil group. Using these elasticities in the above
formula, calculations by both the author and World Bank staff show that
the Brazilian Cr $ (in 1977-78) was overvalued 20 percent to 40
percent, with the best estimate being 30 percent overvaluation. We
will use a shadow exchange rate equal to 1.3 times the official rate
IAs of late 1977, there was a large maxi-devaluation accompanied
by some change in tariffs and subsidies. The maxi-devaluation was
about 10 percent greater than expected cumulative mini-devaluations and
a rough calculation of the new shadow exchange rate was about 20
percent. Thus, as expected, using mid-1979 prices and a shadow rate of
1.3 times the mid-1979 official exchange rate produces the same result
as early-1980 prices and a shadow rate of 1.2 times the early 1980
official rate (which is 10 percent higher in real terms than the
mid-1979 rate).
(Cr $ per US $).
In order to apply the shadow price of foreign exchange in project
appraisal, we need to know the foreign exchange component of the
investment costs (i.e. the fraction of the investment cost which
consists of imported materials). With a relatively thorough search of
the relevant literature and personal communications with Petrobras and
Brazilian officials, the author was able to compile the foreign
exchange components of the various liquid fuel production processes
(shown in Table 2-1). In addition to the direct foreign exchange
component one must take account of the indirect component, which is a
percentage of the domestic expenditure that eventually results in
purchases of foreign goods. This indirect component is estimated to be
20 percent of domestic expenditure according to members of the World
Bank Brazil Group (see Table 2-1). We now have all the necessary
factors to calculate the cost adjustment factor. Examples are shown in
Table 2-2. The first example is for development cost. The direct
foreign exchange component is .45, the indirect component is .11 (=
(1-.45)(.2)). Thus, .56 of development costs are spent in US $, but
1-.56 is spent domestically and should be converted at 1.3 times the
official rate. This gives an adjustment factor of .9. This means that
for a social cost benefit calculation development costs reported in Cr
$ converted to U.S. $ (at the official rate) should be multiplied by .9
and then discounted as in any other project appraisal. Exploration
cost adjustment factors are given in Table 2-2, shale oil factors in
chapter 5, and alcohol factors in Chapter 6.
Table 2-1
Foreign Exchange Components of Various Liquid Fuel Production
Processes in Brazil
Petroleum Percent of Capital Investment in
Production: Foreign Exchange Directly
Offshore-Campos Basin (>50m)1  45 (Foreign labor 35)
Offshore-shallow water (<50m)1  10
Overall Production2  25
Exploration:
Overall exploration by Petrobras 2  30
Refining2  12
Overall Petrobras2  20
Shale Oil
Mining 66
Solid Preparation 30
Retorting 25
Average (weighted)3  34
Petrobras estimate4  20-25
Alcohol (from sugar cane or cassava)
Overall 5  0
Indirect foreign exchange component is taken to be 20 percent of domestic
expenditure, which is induced expenditure in foreign exchange due to
increased domestic construction. Figure is from personal communication
with World Bank Brazil group.
1Offshore, Oct. 5, 1979
2Petrobras, personal communication
3Cameron Engineers.
4
"Utilizacao do Xisto," Petrobras 1978.
5From data in "Alcohol Production from Biomass in the Developing
Countries," World Bank, Sept. 1980.
Table 2-2
Adjustment Factors for Oil Exploration and Production due to
Shadow Price of Foreign Exchange
Adjustment to Investment Cost due to Foreign Exchange Component:
Shadow price of foreign exchange = 1.3
Direct foreign exchange component = .45
Indirect foreign exchange component = (1 - .45)(.2) = .11
Development cost 1 - .11 - .45 + 11 + .45) =.9
adjustment 1.3
Adjustment to Exploration Investment due to Foreign Exchange Component:
Direct component = .3
Indirect component = (1 - .3)(.2) = .14
Exploration cost 1 - .14 - .3
adjustment( + 3 + .14) = .87
adjustment 1.3
2-4. The Cost of Imported Oil
Oil or liquid fuels are tradeable items so the value for project
appraisal is the international market price for that barrel. Supplies
of imported oil are subject to interruption due to cutoffs created by
an embargo or disruptions in the Middle East. Also, the long-term
price of oil is subject to a wide range of uncertainty depending on the
behavior of the OPEC cartel. It is important for energy policy makers
to clearly understand the difference between a potential short-term
disruption and a long-term trend in oil prices. Our example of this
confusion was published in Brazil Energy (Oct. 10, 1980):
"The Iran/Iraq war and the temporary loss of 400,000 bopd
underlines Brazil's precarious dependence on foreign oil imports
and has added a new impetus to the alcohol fuel substitution
program."
The alcohol program is incapable of providing a large amount of fuel in
a short period of time to replace disrupted supplies. A much more
effective method is to have an adequate stockpile as insurance against
disruptions and undertake long-term investments in supply only if they
are economically justified.
Brazil lost 45 percent of its oil imports when Iraqi supplies were
curtailed in mid-1980. By late 1980 much of the loss was made up with
Saudi Arabia supplying 31 percent of imports. Stocks at that time were
reported to be 120 mbbls (110 to 120 days consumption according to
Brazil Energy, Oct. 10, 1980). The question is how much of that stock
was in the refinery pipeline and how much was stored as a crude oil
stockpile. According to Brazil Energy (10/10/80):
"As it is government policy to keep the oil stocks as secret
as possible, it is not known for certain howv much stocked crude is
actually available. Normally a good proportion of the stock is
either in transit or being refined and estimates on this undisposed
stock go as high as 70 percent."
This implies that the size of the crude stockpile was 80 to 90 days
consumption. The optimal size of a stockpile depends on one's
perception of the probability, duration, and damage caused by a
cutoff. A detailed analysis of the optimal stockpile size is beyond
the scope of this paper, but the IEA recommends minimum size stockpiles
of 90 days consumption. Using this as a guide, Table 2-3 shows how the
cost of holding insurance (in the form of a 90-day stockpile) can be
calculated. The cost of holding inventories is $.50 to $.70 ($1981)
per month according to PII (9/28/81, p. 3). The cost of holding a
90-day stock is roughly $450 million to $675 million dollars per year
(translated into $1979). The cost of this "stockpile premium" is $1.50
to 2.25 per barrel of imported oil (as shown in Table 2-3). Adding
this stockpile premium to the current average oil import price
(measured in constant $1979), we get approximately $30/bbl ($1979) as
the social cost of a barrel of imported oil. For the purposes of our
social project appraisals we will take the value of produced oil to be
$30/bbl ($1979) with sensitivity analyses for oil prices increasing 0
percent, 3 percent, and 5 percent per year.
2-5. Private vs. Social Cost of Capital: The State of the Art
In order to compare investment options on a common basis, a cost of
capital (or discount rate) is needed to discount cash flows for the NPV
Table 2-3 The Price of Imported Oil
Average oil import price Mid-year price 5for Brazil (current US $/bbl) (const. 1979 US $/bbl)
1978 Dec.' 12.38
1979 Jan.2  13.30 1979 20.00
June2  20.00
1980 Jan.2  27.96 1980 27.30
June3  29.91
Sept. 3  30.00
1981 Feb.4  34.50 1981 28.40
Sept.4  34.10
Approximate Cost of Maintaining a 90-Day Stockpile in Brazil
1. Cost of carrying inventory $0.50 to 0.70 ($1981)/bbl per month (source: PIW
Sept. 28, 1981, p. 3).
2. This cost equal to $0.40 to 0.60 ($1979)/bbl month.
3. For 90 days of Brazilian consumption (1.05 mill bbl/day) then cost per year
is:
(0.4 to 0.6)(12 months)(1.05 mb/d)(90 d) = $453 to 675 million/yr.
4. For imports of about 300 mill. bbl/yr this equals:
$1.51 to $2.25/imported bbl.
5. Cost of imported oil plus insurance from stockpile = $30/bbl.
(28.40 + 1.60, 1979 US$).
1Petrobras Annual Report, 1979
2Majority of supplies until Aug. 1980 from Iraq, Basrah Light - 35 contract
price used (PIW Jan. 1980).
3Actual weighted average import price (Brazil Energy, Sept. 24, 1980).
4Estimated average import price (using import sources shown in Brazil Energy
February 24, 1981).
51nflation assumed to be 10 percent/yr from 1979 to 1980.
evaluation or to provide comparison to the calculated IRR from a
project. Many of the projects and programs considered in this thesis
have rather low rates of return. Thus the choice of discount rate may
well decide the acceptance or rejtion of the project or program. This
cost of capital should reflect the riskiness of the project under
consideration as well as the opportunity cost of capital (which may be
different for private investors as compared to the viewpoint of
society). Traditional approaches to the cost of capital calculation
have concentrated on the rate of return on capital foregone by the use
of funds by a project (Squire 1975). This traditional literature has
typically characterized the cost of capital as one rate for all
projects when the project is undertaken by the public sector and
another social discount rate for all projects undertaken by the private
sector. Modern finance theory, however, contends that the return in
the private sector is dependent on the risk of the activity being
financed. This is one principle of the Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM).1 There are compelling reasons to believe that this principle
holds for the public sector as well (as argued by Bailey and Jensen in
their article on "Risk and the Discount Rate for Public Investment,"
1972, and by Hirshleifer and Shapiro in their "Treatment of Risk and
Uncertainty," (1970)). Our goal here is to estimate social costs of
capital that reflect the public risk associated with each of the
various liquid fuel options under consideration (oil exploration, shale
1For a discussion of CAPM see Jensen, 1972.
oil and alcohol) in Brazil. Estimates of how the private sector rates
(both the foreign private sector and the Brazilian private sector) may
differ from the social rate for each project will also be made. We
will begin by discussing the current CAPM approach for private sector
evaluation and will then discuss the elegant integration as discussed
by Bailey and Jensen, of the treatment of risk and Harberger's solution
(1968) to the income tax distortion problem. An application of this
approach will be made for the relevant projects in Brazil.
The CAPM approach is a mean-variance model of asset prices under
uncertainty. It contends that the appropriate risk premium for an
asset is linear in the marginal contribution of the cfet to the
portfolio that includes it. The portfolio is considered to be the
current existing combination of all assets, whether for a firm (the
market portfolio) or for other society (in which case the portfolio is
national wealth). In particular, the present value of an additional
unit of the Kth asset included in the portfolio P is given by:
E(Vpi) - V (1 + RF) cov(VKi, VPi)
E(VKi ) - [P I
Ki a(Vpi) (Vpi) (eq. 2-3)
PVK , 1 + RF
where, RF is the riskless rate of interest, Vpi is the current value of
portfolio P, Vpi is the random total value of portfolio P one period
hence and the payoff of adding one more unit of Kth asset is VKi. This
gives the equilibrium market price of a unit of the Kth asset assuming
homogeneous investor expectations regarding the means, variance and
covariance of asset outcomes.
If the above equation is rewritten as expected return on asset (or
investment) K in the private market, where RK E[RK] = E[VKl]/PVK, then
RK = RF + [RM - RF]B (eq. 2-4)
where, RM = E[RM] = expected return on the market portfolio, where
COV(RK, RM) (eq. 2-5)
V = ar(RM)
is the coefficient of nondiversifiable or systematic risk for
investment K. This formula gives the cost of capital as the riskless
rate of interest, plus the risk premium on the market (RM - RF)
times the covariance of the returns on the project with returns on the
market portfolio divided by the variance of the market portfolio. If
we assume that the riskiness of the project under consideration is the
same as the average risk of projects undertaken by a firm, then a
measure of the firm's earnings can be used with returns on the market
to calculate a firm B or systematic risk. This firm a is routinely
calculated by financial firms such as Merrill Lynch. However, this
firm B contains the financial risk of the firm as well as project
business risk. Since we are interested only in a project B (to
calculate a project cost of capital) we need to "unlever" the firm B
for debt to get an all equity B.
BFirm (eq. 2-6)B = 1 + (1 - T)DIE
where T is the corporate income tax rate, BFirm is the observed stock
beta, D is the market value of the firm's debt, E is the market value
of the firm's equity, and B is the all equity beta which represents
average business risk of the firm's projects. If the project under
consideration has the same risk as the firm's average project risk,
then B can be used to calculate the risk adjusted cost of capital for
the project from the firm's viewpoint.
When a risk adjusted discount rate is calculated in the above
manner and used to discount cash flows, it is implicitly assumed that
risk increases as a constant rate as one looks out into the future.
This assumption is usually reasonable. However, there are cash flow
components of a project in which risk may not increase into the
future. An example is R and D expenditures or exploration
expenditures, since these expenditures resolve uncertainty at the
beginning of a project. The solution is to discount these initial cash
flows at the riskless rate and other development cash flows at the risk
adjusted rate. In practice this adjustment for oil projects makes
little difference, as exploration expenditure is a small part of the
total project and comes early in the project.
The above formulation of the CAPM assumes that perfect risk markets
exist, but Bailey and Jensen point out that in the case of imperfect
risk markets the same formulation can be used if the portfolio P is
interprested as the portfolio of the project's beneficiaries. Based on
these results, Bailey and Jensen came to the following conclusions:
1. If private risk markets are perfect and the distribution of
risk through the public sector is perfect, then the risk
allowance on any given project should be identical for both
the private and public sectors and equal to zero only for a
project whose covariance with national income is equal to
zero. The risk allowance should be less than zero for a
project with a negative covariance and greater than zero for a
project with a positive covariance.
2. If private risk markets are imperfect and the distribution of
risk through the public sector is perfect (a situation we
believe is nonexistent), then the risk allowance for a public
project should be less than that for a similar private project
but must nevertheless still depend on the covariance of the
project's returns with national income. The allowance should
be negative, zero, or positive as the project's covariance is
negative, zero, or positive.
3. If private risk markets are imperfect and if the distribution
of risk through the public sector is also imperfect, then
there must still be an allowance for risk in the public
sector. The risk of the project in this situation must be
measured by its covariance with the portfolio returns of the
project's beneficiaries and can be either positive, negative,
or zero, independently of its covariance with national income.
4. Finally, for completeness, although we believe the situation
highly unrealistic, if private risk markets were perfect
(including the ability to market all claims on the public
sector) and the distribution of risk through the public sector
were imperfect, then public projects should still bear the
same risk allowance as that for private projects. The reason,
of course, is that the imperfect risk distribution of the
public sector is easily corrected in the private markets.
Their summary points out that in no case should the risk allowance
on all public projects be zero. These conclusions run counter to the
arguments, such as those by Arrow (1966), that a riskless or
universally low discount rate be used for all public sector projects.
To hold such a viewpoint (Arrow's viewpoint) implies that the public
sector can diversify risks completely. For the variance of the
portfolio of national wealth to be reduced to zero through
diversification, it must be assumed there is zero covariance among a
large number of assets in the national wealth portfolio or large
negative covariance among some of the assets. Empirical evidence
supports the view that assets in all sectors are positively correlated
and that on the average, covariance is positive representing
non-diversifiable (or systematic) risk.
Based on evidence that equity markets are fairly efficient at
distributing risks, Bailey and Jensen argue that the government is
likely to be a poorer distributor of risks than the private sector.
They agree with Hirshleifer and Shapiro's conclusion that a public
project should be discounted at a rate at least as high as the private
sector rate for a project of comparable risk, with proper allowances
taken for distortions.
Harberger (1968) shows that the presence of taxes creates
distortions which lead to a divergence between the private cost of
capital and the social opportunity cost of capital. He advocates the
use of a weighted average social cost of capital. The capital
displaced by a government project comes partly from the capital
diverted from other investments which would have earned a before tax
rate RF/(1 - T) (T is corporate tax rate) and partly by offering an
additional inducement to savers to give up after tax savings which
would have earned RF (1 - t) where t is the tax rate on savers. Each
of these sources is weighted by the responsiveness of investors or
savers to changes in the interest rate. The weighted average cost of
capital is:
RSF = RF((1 - t)-S -  - (eq. 2-7)
where T > 0 and 1< 0 are the net impact of government borrowing on
aB aB
saving (S) and on investment (I).1
In order to integrate Harberger's solution to the tax distortion
problem and the use of risk adjusted discount rate, Bailey and Jensen
derive the following expression for the social cost of capital (RSK)
for project K.
RSK = RSF + BK[(RM - RF)((1- t)j-- - -i)-] (eq. 2-8)
Social cost Riskless Systematic Social risk premium
of capital public risk of
for project interest project K
K
1If capital markets are in equilibrium - t = 1. An equivalent
expression according to Harberger is
RSF = [(1 - t)RFSeS - (11(1 - T))RFIei]/(SeS - Ie i ]
where es is the elasticity of private-sector savings and ei is the
elasticity of private-sector investment with respect to change in the
rate of interest.
The next section will use this formulation to estimate the cost of
capital for the various liquid fuel projects in Brazil.
2-6. Estimates of the Private and Social Cost of Capital
In the Brazilian economy it is reasonable to assume that the
distribution of risks by the private markets and by the public sector
are both imperfect. If this is the case, Bailey and Jensen argue (as
presented earlier) that the risk of a particular project must be
measured by its covariance with the portfolio of returns of the
project's beneficiaries. As the income of most all citizens in Brazil
is affected by liquid fuel prices, one can argue that the beneficiaries
of an energy project are a wide segment of the Brazilian population.
One can further argue that the portfolio of returns of the Brazilian
public is national income, which is highly correlated with the
Brazilian capital market. Thus, whether a liquid fuel project is
undertaken by the Brazilian private sector or the public sector, the
risk premium should be the same (with proper allowance for distortions
caused by taxes). However, the risk premium for the project from the
viewpoint of a private foreign (U.S.) firm, may be different since the
risk depends on the correlation of returns with the U.S. market.
The national income of Brazil is expected to be less diversified
than the national income of the U.S., since Brazil is smaller and its
economy more concentrated on a few types of argiculture and light
manufacturing industries. This is another way of saying that the risk
premium on the capital markets in Brazil is higher than in the U.S. In
addition to this difference between Brazil and the U.S., the covariance
of returns of a liquid fuel project with the national income of Brazil
is likely to be different than the analogous U.S. correlation. In
other words, the beta of a liquid fuel project is probably different
and likely to be lower in Brazil than in the U.S. The share of oil
projects in Brazilian national income is lower than in the U.S., and
returns on projects composing Brazilian national income are probably
reduced more when oil prices increase (i.e., when returns on liquid
fuel projects increase) than in the U.S. The following paragraphs will
outline a method of calculating the cost of capital for a liquid fuel
project carried out by a U.S. private firm, a Brazilian private firm
and the Brazilian government.
The real riskless rate of interest can be approximated by the real
U.S. rate (1-2 percent) which is close to the real international
riskless rate. In addition to the riskless rate, however, there may be
additional risk premiums, for political risks from the viewpoint of the
multinational firm and risks associated with international borrowing
for Brazil. This will be discussed in detail later.
Social Risk Premium
In addition to estimating the return on a riskless asset in Brazil
we need a measure of the return on the Brazilian capital market. The
cost of capital for a project undertaken by a firm in the U.S. which
has an all equity beta of 1 can be calculated from equation 2-4 using
the riskless rate of interest RF and the risk premium on the market
(RM - RF). A study of interest rates in the U.S. economy from 1926
to 1975 by Ibbotson and Sinquefield estimates the real after-tax rate
on long-term U.S. government bonds to be 1.3 percent. What is needed
for the CAPM approach is an estimate of the future riskless rate over
the life of the project. Very recent real riskless rates have'been 3-4
percent, but we will use a rate of 1-2 percent based on Ibbotson and
Sinquefield's study. The real risk premium (RM - RF) on the U.S.
market (after tax) has been calculated by Lessard (1976) to be 8.2 to
8.8 percent. The cost of capital for a project beta of 1 in the U.S.
is thus estimated to be 10.2 percent.
The risk premium for the markets of 8 countries has been studied
(Lessard 1976) through empirical estimation of the correlation of an
average stock with the domestic market and with a world market
portfolio. The results are presented in Table 2-4. The differences in
the risk premiums between countries are substantial and the differences
in risk premiums from the domestic and international perspective are
even larger. The domestic risk premium for Brazil is estimated to be
10.4 percent (higher than the U.S.). Although this figure represents
only a rough estimate and the functioning of the Brazilian market is
less efficient than the U.S. market, it does represent a rough measure
of how much less diversified the Brazilian economy is relative to the
U.S. economy. Assuming a riskless real rate of interest in Brazil of 2
percent and a risk premium on the Brazilian market of 10.4 percent, the
real cost of capital is 14 percent for a Brazilian investor for a
project with a beta of 1 (measured relative to the Brazilian market).
In order to estimate the real social cost of capital, we need to
Table 2-4
Effect of International diversification on required rate of return
Brazil France Germany Italy Japan Spain Sweden U.K. U.S.
Average Correlation with
Domestic Market Portfolioa .69 .68 .67 .66 .52 .63 .65 .61 .55
Risk Premium from Domestic
Perspective (%) 10.4 10.2 10.1 9.9 7.8 9.5 9.8 9.2 8.2
Average Correlation with
World Market Portfolio', .14 .21 .31 .16 .15 .04 .19 .25 .44
Risk Premium from World
Perspective (%) 2.1 3.2 3.7 2.5 2.2 0.6 2.8 3.8 6.6
a) Figures for Brazil from Lessard (1973), others from Lessard (1976).
b) Correlations with world obtained by multiplying the correlation with domestic market portfolio by the correlation of domestic market
with the world market portfolio. This rests on the implicit assumption that the only relationship between individual securities and the
world market is through their relationships with the domestic market portfolio. Figures for Brazil are based on subjective estimates of the
correlation of the local market portfolio with the world market portfolio of .20.
Source: Multinational Business Finance, 1979 , p. 376, Appdx. A,Ch 10,
Diversification and Required rates of Return by D. Lessard.
adjust the distortions caused by taxes, according to the method
developed by Bailey and Jensen. The corporate income tax rates in
Brazil are comparable to the U.S. rates (35 percent) but in practice
the large number of tax deductions and loopholes greatly reduces the
effective tax rate. According to discussions with members of the World
Bank Brazil group, 1) the effective corporate income tax rate is
approximately 15 percent, 2) the effective marginal tax rate on income
from savings is zero (i.e. untaxed, to encourage savings) and the
estimated net impact of an increment of government borrowing on savings
is .3 and on investment -.7. These last two figures can be thought of
as the share of savings and share of investment that would have gone to
a hypothetical marginal project displaced by the government project.
A summary of the parameters for the social cost of capital
calculation in Brazil are given below (all rates are real rates, net of
inflation):
Riskless Interest Rate RF = 1.3 percent
Risk Premium on Market RM - RF = 10.4 percent
Marginal Tax Rate on Corporate Income T = 15 percent
Marginal Tax Rate on Income
from Savings t = 0 percent
Net Impact of Government Borrowing
on Savings 0.3
on Investment -0.7
Using these estimates we can use equations (2-7) and (2-8) to get:
Riskless Public Interest Rate RSF 2 percent
Social Risk Premium 12.0 percent
Social Cost of Capital (for a project
with a beta of one) 14.0 percent
Betas
The additional parameters needed in the calculation of the cost of
capital are estimates of the betas for the three types of projects
under consideration (oil exploration, development and production; and
alcohol development and production). The betas of firms measured
relative to the U.S. market are available from financial publications
(such as Value Line). If projects considered here have the same risk
characteristics as the average project undertaken by a multinational
firm (i.e., oil firm), then the observed betas can be used for the cost
of capital for a project undertaken by a foreign firm in Brazil.
All equity betas for oil companies from the Value Line Investment
Survey are given below:
Name '
Ashland 0.8
Arco 0.9
Exxon 0.95
Getty 0.9
Gulf 0.9
Husky 1.0
Marathon 0.85
Occidental 1.2
Shell 1.0
Socal 1.05
Texaco 0.9
0.95 = Average
If one believes that oil exploration and shale oil production projects
have risks that are similar to the average risk of projects undertaken
by these firms, then the cost of capital for these projects is
estimated to be 10 percent.
Empirical estimates of betas in Brazil have not been made. To
estimate the covariance of project returns with the national income and
therefore the project beta, one option is to use beta estimates for
similar projects in developed countries and then make some estimate of
how the return on markets in developed countries correlates with the
national income of Brazil. The beta of a project is composed of a
weighted sum of betas of cash flows which make up the project
(exploration, development, production). Estimates were made of asset
betas by Paddock (1980), for firms involved only in development and
production of oil in the North Sea. These can be thought of as pure
betas for the activity of oil development (Bdev = to .7) and oil
production (prod .= .7). The beta for oil exploration is almost
completely non-systematic since the discovery of oil is dependent on
technical and geological factors which are independent of economic
activity. Thus, the exploration beta can be expected to be near zero
(Bexpl = 0 to .1). Betas are weighted by the investment share in a
typical oil project. Development expenditures are the largest, being 5
to 10 times exploration expenditures. A rough breakdown of investment
share by activity in an oil project is 0.1 for exploration, 0.7 for
development and 0.2 for production. Using these weights and the betas
estimated by Paddock the beta for a North Sea oil project is about
0.70. These betas were calculated relative to the British economy.
Although the British economy has a larger share of domestic energy
production than the Brazilian economy, the correlation of Brazilian
real GDP with British real GDP has been +0.95 over the last 10 years.
Based on this similarity, the North Sea beta of 0.70 will also be used
for an oil project in the Brazilian economy. The correlation of the
return on an oil project with the return on a portfolio of assets in
the Brazilian economy would not be expected to be near one due to the
low share of oil in the Brazilian economy. This beta would not be
expected to be negative or near zero either, since changes in costs are
partially correlated with economic activity. Also, variation in
revenue streamns of an oil project is composed of variations in price
and quantity. As developed country GNP rises, so does Brazilian GDP
and increased oil consumption leads to real oil price rises. Thus,
Brazilian GDP would be expected to be at least somewhat positively
correlated with the oil price. This was confinrmed by the author, the
contemporaneous correlation of the real price of oil and real GDP in
Brazil was calculated to be 0.25. These rather loose arguments about
the likely range of the oil project beta agree with the estimated beta
of 0.70. We will use this as the beta for an oil project in Brazil.
We will also use this as an estimate of the beta of an oil shale
project as well. There are many similarities beteen the type of
revenue and cost streams in a shale oil project and those in an oil
project. The R and D expenditures in the shale project are largely
unsystematic and similar to exploration expenditures. A beta of 0.70
for an oil shale will be used.
The beta for an alcohol project is quite different. The revenue
streams of the alcohol project are composed of the alcohol price, which
is linked to the oil price and to agricultural yields. Good sugar
yields are most likely correlated with good agricultural yields
elsewhere in the economy which are in turn correlated with increased
national income. The beta of an alcohol project is most likely closer
to one than the oil project for these reasons. The beta for
agricultural and food production programs in the U.S. is estimated to
be 0.84 (Baldwin 1981). This seems to be a reasonable estimate for an
alcohol project, since the alcohol project has many similarities to
typical agricultural projects.
Risk Premiums for Borrowing on International Markets
Private investors in Brazil, the Brazilian state owned enterprises,
and the Brazilian government have borrowed heavily from foreign sources
over the last 15 years. While this borrowing has been too small to
affect the international LIBOR rate (London Interbank Offer Rate), risk
of default perceived by foreign lenders is likely to result in an
upward sloping supply curve for funds supplied from international
banks. The default risk of all borrowers in Brazil (public or private)
are perceived to be highly correlated. The country risk premium
(interest charged over the LIBOR rate) is thus largely a function of
total debt outstanding. The premium over LIBOR for loans to Brazil has
been constant at 2.25 percent over the last several years. In a recent
analysis of country risk Harberger (1976) argues that a "risk premium"
reflecting the probability of default that is charged on loans should
not be considered as a cost of borrowing if the probability of default
is accurately perceived by both borrowers and lenders. However, if the
lender is very cautious and requires the borrower to pay a higher
premium than the premium that borrower believes reflects the true
probability default, then the difference in the premia is a true cost
of borrowing. Harberger shows that the country risk premium on loans
from international banks to country borrowers such as Brazil reflect a
true cost borrowing in addition to the riskless international rate
(LIBOR rate). This country risk premium can be though of as an extra
cost to all international borrowers that reflects the dead weight
losses associated with default of a few of the borrowers. It results
from the lack of ability of international banks to enforce
international contracts (somewhat analogous to the costs of bankruptcy
within a country).
As the country risk premium increases, the interest rate on foreign
loans to Brazil rises. This has the effect of driving up the
equilibrium interest rate in Brazil. The argument has been made
(Baldwin, Lessard and Mason 1981) that this additional cost of
borrowing created by the country risk premium has the effect of
shifting the risk-return market line upward in those countries relying
heavily on foreign loans. In a study of the cost of capital in Canada,
the same authors discuss how real government borrowing rates in Canada
are generally thought to be one percent higher than the U.S. due to a
country risk premium of one-half to one percent. They argue that this
effect is carried over to other more risky transactions and this
results in an upward shift of the risk-return market line. As the
country risk premium increases, the interest rate on foreign loans
rises, which in turn drives up the equilibrium interest rate. The
marginal rate increases even faster than the average rate as borrowing
by one institution drives up the cost of borrowing to other
institutions. This marginal country risk premium (estimated to be 4
percent in Brazil) is accounted for through an upward adjustment to the
discount rate for all public projects.
If this approach is followed, the social cost of capital is the
riskless rate (1 to 2 percent), plus a country risk premium (estimated
to be 4 percent in Brazil), plus the project beta times the social risk
premium. The discount rate is adjusted to account for the country risk
premium, not by adjusting the cash flows, as the uncertainty
surrounding the country risk premium is perceived to increase in the
future.
Considering this precarious debt position in which Brazil is
caught, an additional benefit of domestic liquid fuel investments may
be to reduce the negative impact of future oil price increases on the
foreign borrowing position of the country. In a country which is
heavily in debt, a rapid rise in oil prices will not only have a
negative impact on the economy, but also may well increase the size of
the foreign debt and sharply increase the costs of further borrowing.
Thus a liquid fuel project that reduces the level of oil imports will
also reduce the oil import bill in the long-run. This may have the
effect of reducing the risk which bankers perceive when lending to
Brazil and lead to reduced real costs of borrowing. However, borrowing
costs in the short-run are likley to increase as Brazilian institutions
borrow to finance energy projects. The tradeoff to be analyzed is the
additional costs of borrowing today to finance energy projects, which
may lead to reduced costs of borrowing in the future if their energy
investments are successful, as opposed to reduced costs of borrowing
today and higher oil import bills in the future.
The country risk premium added to the discount rate is a rough
measure of the effect of increased borrowing costs to finance new
energy investments, as discussed earlier. The measurement of the
benefit of an energy project on future reduced borrowing costs is much
more difficult, whether accounted for through adjustments to the cash
flows or through adjustments to the discount rate. The magnitude of
this benefit is determined by the effect of sharply higher oil prices
on the behavior of the euromarket LIBOR interest rate and the risk of
default perceived by bankers (i.e. their reaction by increasing the
country risk premium or outright credit rationing). Uncertainty about
these events makes the calculation of this benefit very hard to make.
A thorough analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this study,
but preliminary analysis indicate that overall macroeconomic policies
have a much more important effect on country risk than specific energy
investment policies. As a first approximation, to adjust for this
effect we will assume that externalities associated with additional
liquid fuel investments (i.e. increased costs to other Brazilian
borrowers) are offset by longer-run reduced costs of borrowing due to
effect of energy projects on reduction of the oil import bill. This
implies that the discount rate should be adjusted upward by the average
country risk premium (2 percent), not the estimated marginal premium (4
percent).
Political Risk Premium
The cost of capital calculation for the multinational oil firms
also has an additional risk premium. The cost of capital could be
raised for political risk (expropriation, war, etc.). Alternatively it
could be argued that political risks to the project are not systematic
and should be accounted for by adjusting the cash flows (not adjusting
the discount rate). For example, a foreign company could postulate
that if a large oil field is discovered in Brazil the original contract
terms would be changed unilaterally by the Brazilians. But if a small
oil field is found, the original contract tenrs would hold. This
allows the potential political risks to be clearly put into the cash
flows, not just an ad hoc adjustment to the rate. Both methods will be
explored.
Cost of Capital Calculations
The cost of capital calculations can be summarized as follows:
Risk Other Social
Social Cost of Free Risk Risk
Project Capital Risk ate Premi ums Beta Premium
A. Oil 10.5 2 0 .7 12
Shale 10.5 2 0 .7 12
Alcohol 12.0 2 0 .84 12
B. Oil 12.0 2 2 .7 12
Shale 12.0 2 2 .7 12
Alcohol 14.0 2 2 .84 12
Multinational Risk Political Risk
Firm Cost of Free Risk Premium on
Project Capital Rate Premium Beta Market
A. Oil 10.0 1.3 0 .95 8.8
B. Oil 12-14 1.3 2-4 .95 8.8
Note: A - gives results when cash flows (not discount rate) are
adjusted for risks associated with borrowing abroad and
political risks
B - gives results when discount rate (not cash flows) are
adjusted for borrowing and political risks.
These calculations should be viewed as rough estimates. The specific
parameters used and possibly even the underlying assumptions are
subject to revision. This method, however, does attempt to bring in
important factors (such as the effect of high international borrowing
costs, project risk and the low level of diversification of the
Brazilian economy) into the calculation of the cost of capital for
specific projects. The author feels that although the estimates are
rough, and by no means unassailable, they are preferable to more
simplistic cost of capital calculations which ignore these important
factors.
This chapter has outlined the principles of financial and economic
(social) project appraisal. Private (or financial) evaluations use
market prices of oil, market exchange rates and firm cost of capital
for the project in question. An economic (or social) evaluation uses
the social cost of oil (which includes disruption insurance), the
shadow price of foreign exchange and the social cost of capital for the
project.
3-1. Reserves and Production
Petroleum production in Brazil declined 8.5% from the 1975 level of
64.7 m bbls to 59.25 m bbls in 1978. Production in 1979 was
59.26 m bbls, almost the same as in 1978. Reserves of petroleum
increased 46% from their level in 1975 of 782 m bbls to 1144 m-bbls in
1978.
The definitions of proved, probable and possible reserves conform
to API guidelines (according to PETROBRAS). The National petroleum
Council in the U.S. estimates that published petroleum proved-reserve
estimates in Latin America are overestimated by only 1 to 3% as
compared with true API standards. "Reserves" herein refers to
remaining recoverable proved reserves.
Onshore petroleum reserves have been declining by 4%/year since
1969. Onshore petroleum production has been declining by 5 to 8% over
the last four years. Offshore oil reserves jumped from 74 m bbls in
1975 to 513 m bbls in 1978 and were 637 m bbls in June 1979. This
increase is due to discovery of the offshore Camapos oil basin. A short
summary of reserves and production for 1975 and 1978 is given below: A
time series of reserves, production and gross reserve additions is
given in Table 3-2.
3-2. Declining Onshore Oil Production
Three-fourths of both onshore oil reserves and onshore oil
production are from the Reconcavo basin. Exploration in the Reconcavo
basin began in the 1940s. Deposit size (recoverable reserves) vary
Table 3-1: Oil and Gas Reserves and Production in 1975 and 1978
1975
Reserves Production
1978
Reserves Production
OIL (m bbls)
Onshore
Offshore
GAS (m m3 )
Onshore
Offshore
Total
708
74
782
19,564
6,372
Total 25,936
65 631
- 513
65 1,144
1,627
387
21TIT4
25,997
18,392
44,389
SOURCE: PETROBRAS
NOTE: For conversion there are 6.28 bbl/m and 35.3 ft3/m3
bbls = barrels, b/d = barrels per day, m = million,
m3 = cubic meters, f 3 = cubic feet
1,422
673
2,095
Tbl3 3-2. BRAZIL: TOTAL OIL AND GAS PROVED RESERVES AND PRODUCTION 1965-79 (JUNE)
(million cubic meters) ( Mhllh ~b 6.3 to get barrels)
Petroleum (mil. cubic meters) Gas (mil. cubic meters)
Year Reserves Production Gross Reserve Reserves Production Gross Reserve
Additions Additions
106.76
110.78
126.51
130.67
135.47
136.28
138.08
126.82
123.06
123.84
124.46
139.36
177.10
181.80
6.88
8.63
9.51
10.17
9.69
10.10
9.96
10.10
10.57
10.29
9.72
9.18
9.42
+ 10.90
+ 24.36
+ 13.67
+ 14.97
+ 10.50
+ 9.90
+ 0.70
+ 6.34
+ 11.35
+ 10.91
+ 24.61
+ 46.94
+ 14.19
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
(June)
19,037.00
24,973.76
24,476.48
26,804.02
25,573.88
26,612.13
26,210.64
26,116.63
25,862.95
26,260.63
25,936.14
33,983.31
39,454.62
44,389.50
(44,553.46)
685.40
790.24
887.08
983.31
1,247.86
1,263.00
1,176.79
1,241.56
1,179.91
1,487.83
2,014.88
1,597.22
1,800.90
2,094.55
( 757.46)
6,727.00
389.80
3,310.85
17.72
2,301.85
775.30
1,147.55
926.23
1,885.51
1,690.39
9.644.39
7,272.21
7,029.43
(921.42)(197.93) ( 4.42) (+ 20.47)
from 260 million barrels to .05 million barrels. Over 50 deposits have
been located. Exploration and production are in the mature stage of
development. Over 700 exploratory wells and over 2,200 development wells
have been drilled.
The remaining one-fourth of both onshore reserves and onshore
production are from the onshore section of the Sergipe-Alagoas basin.
This basin is also in a mature stage of development. The main producing
reservoir, as well as the seven major Reconcavo reservoirs, are all under
secondary recovery operations. The recovery factors and proved reserve
estimates reflect the fact that these reservoirs are all undergoing
secondary recovery. Since all major onshore reservoirs are in a similar
stage of declining production, future production can be approximated with
an exponential decline. An equation was fit using recent onshore
production data.
prodyction (t) = 56.51 e-0.07t R2 = 0.97
million bbls/year t 1 9 7 6 = 1
This shows a 7% per year production delcine. The equation can be used to
project continuing production decline:
Year 1980 39.80 million bbls/yr
1986 28.06
1990 19.77
1995 13.94
2000 9.82
2010 4.88
2020 2.42
The cumulative production from 1980 onward is equal to 595 million
barrels as calculated by integrating the production decline equation.
This compares well with the proved reserves reported in June 1979 of 590
million barrels.
3-3. Enhanced Recovery of Onshore Oil
The previous section described the estimation of a production decline
curve for onshore production. This decline reflects primary and
secondary recovery. The primary recovery factor is about 10% and current
secondary recovery factors average 32% for the Reconcavo basin and 15%
for the Sergipe-Alagoas onshore basin. These recovery factors vary by
field as can be seen in Tables 3-3 and 3-4 which describe the basic field
statistics for onshore fields.
While primary recovery oil flows with few additional wells the
secondary recovery oil requires the investment of more wells, pumps etc.
to get the oil out. One can think of additional annual units of enhanced
recovery production added on to the primary recovery production decline.
The sum of these additional units reduce the rate of primary production
decline, as pictured in Figure 3-1. If possible it would be helpful to
know how the cost of oil from each additional unit to determine the rate
of cost increase. We will use the cost of a barrel produced in a year
from one of these units to estimate the marginal cost of production. The
cost per barrel from an additional unit can be thought of the same way as
the cost of production from a large field derived by Adelman (1972).
Adapting this formulation we have:
6 A
Table ?3: Reconcavo Onshore Basin--Basic Field Data
OIL (Million barrels) GAS (million cubic meters)
Remaining
Primary Ultimate Cumulative Recoverable Initial Remaining
Field Initial Ultimate Recovery Recovery Production Reserves in Volume Recovery Recoverable
Namea in Place Recovery Factor Factor _ (6/1979) (6/1979) Place Recoverable Factor Reserves
Candeias 400 100 10% 25% 73 27 4,760 2,245 47% 1,200
Dom Joao 831 207 12% 25% 78 129 2,880 1,260 43% 1,125
Agua Grande 558 260 n.a. 45% 249 11 12,500 8,622 80% 3,130
Buracica 480 202 6.6% 42% 107 95 480 180 38% 51
Taquipe 215 75 n.a. 35% 69 6 2,260 1,130 50% 520
Aracas 366 126 n.a. 34% 80 46 4,840 2,060 90% 1,500
Miranga 590 180 n.a. 30.5% 140 40 12,160 7,080 58% 4,180
Others 626 150 24% (ave) 74 91 18,920 11,823 62% (ave) 9,424
Total
Basin 4066 1300 32% (ave) 870 445 58,800 34,400 58% (ave) 21,130
= 133 million
barrels oil
equivalent
aSeven largest fields account for 88% of ultimate reserves (average recovery factor is 33.4%),
91% of cumulative production and 66% of gas reserves.
bAs of 1979 ultimate recovery factor equals secondary recovery for all 7 major fields.
CRemaining recoverable gas includes 6,700 mm 3 of reinjected gas.
SOURCE: IIASA World Oil Database.
Table 3-Y: Sergipe-Alagoas Basin
Onshore (7,300 km2 )
Oil Discoveries
Initial Ultimate
In place Recoverable Remaining
reserves Reserves Primary Ultimate Cumulative Recoverable
Field Discovery (million (million Recovery Recovery Production Reserves
Name Date bbls) bbls) Factor Factor (6/1979) (6/1979)
Riachuelo 9/1961 152 19 10% 13% 8 11
Carmopolis 8/1963 1,300 185 14% 14% 91 94
Siririzinho 8/1967 240 50 11% 20% 20 30
Furado 8/1969 53 12 n.a. 20% 6 6
Others 27 4 n.a. 15% 3 0
Total
onshore 1,800 270 11% 15% 129 141
Marginal cost = MC($bbl) = N o e(r+a) dt (eq. 3-1
a = decline rate for unit of E.R.
N = number of E.R. wells
C = cost of an E.R. well
r = discount rate
qo = peak production
Since we know the rate of decline before E.R., primary recovery factor,
secondary recovery factor and reserves in place we can calculate the rate
of E.R. oil production cost increase as a function of C (cost per E.R.
well). The AAPG bull. gives the number of E.R. wells drilled each year.
The sum of the oil produced for each unit of E.R. production must
equal the difference in primary and secondary production. This holds
when a decline rate of a = .13 for each unit is used. Production by
annual E.R. unit is shown below:
Year '74 '75 '76 '77 '78
New ER wells 45 48 57 51 77
Production by 2.7 1.8 1.4 1.1 0.9
annual unit 2.4 1.6 1.5 1.3
(mmb/yr) 2.1 1.9 1.7
1.7 1.5
2.3
Using the peak production per year and wells drilled per year in eq. 3-1
jives the rate of cost increase.
Figure 3-1
REDUCTION IN PRODUCTION DECLINE
WITH ENHANCED RECOVERY
Production Decline with
Additional Units of
Enhanced Recovery
Years
This diagram shows how enhanced recovery can be
modelled as primary recovery plus additional
annual units of enhanced recovery
Production
(bbl/year)
MC ($/bbl)
1974 5.2 (C) C is cost per E.R.
1975 5 (C) wells in millions dollars
1976 6.8 (C)
1977 7.5 (C)
1978 8.1 (C)
If E.R. well costs have remained constant this implies the marginal cost
of oil production has doubled from 1974 to 1978. Although detailed well
costs are not available some average onshore well costs (from Annexes in
Chapter 5) are .3 to .5 million which give a cost per barrel of E.R. oil
of 3 to 4 $/bbl due to well costs alone.
3-4. Production and Production Costs of Oil from Recently Discovered
Petroleum Reservoirs
The major recent discoveries of oil in Brazil have been the offshore
Campos basin in 1975. Approximately 90% of oil production increases in
Brazil over the 1980-1990 period will come from the Caimpos Basin. Thus,
the acceleration of production from those fields is of top priority to
PETROBRAS and the government. In order to get the oil out quickly,
PETROBRAS has installed two early production systems. The Enchova early
production system came on stream in 1977 with 10,000 b/d which has
declined to 8,177 b/d in 1979. The second early production system has
been plagued by delays and cost overruns.
The Campos permanent production system will come on line in stages
from 1983-1989. When complete it will have 8 offshore production
platforms, 79 production wells, 55 injection wells, 2 subsea oil
Figure 3-2
INCREASE IN MARGINAL PRODUCTION COST
OF ENHANCED RECOVERY OIL (ER OIL)
Cost per
Barrel of
ER Oil MCER
1978
1977
1976
1975
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Million Barrels/Year ER Production (since 1974)
By estimating the cost of production for each of
the additional annual units of enhanced recovery
the marginal cost of enhanced recovery oil can be
plotted against quantity produced per unit time.
pipelines and 2 subsea gas pipelines. The platforms will be in 95 to 170
meters of water and approximately 85 km from shore. Depth to the oil
zone is 2000 to 3000 meters. The development has had several setbacks,
the major setback being when the first permanent production platform sank
in the North Sea on its way from Scotland in January 1979. The original
estimate of 350,000 bbl/d in 1985 has been revised downward to between
150,000 and 200,000 bbl/d, The Garoupa platform is planned to come on
line in 1983 (60,000 bbl/d), with the Namorado, Enchova and Badejo fields
adding 146,000 bbl/day by 1984. The Cherne, Pampo Bagre fields will come
on line in 1987 or 1988 adding about 200,000 bbl/d. Thus, Campos
producion is expected to be 275 to 325,000 bbl/day in the time period
1987 to 1990. Details are given in Table34.
The investment cost, platform cost and the water depth of the Campos
basin production system are given in Table 5. All water depths are
between 300 and 500 feet. The original total investment cost estimate
was 2,675 million U.S. dollars in 1978. PETROBRAS officials revised this
estimate considerably upward in 1980 to 4,700 million U.S. dollars.
Using this later investment figure and a peak produciton estimate of
300,000 bbl/day, the capital coefficient in $15,600 per daily barrel.
Capital coefficients for small fields in the Northeast and
Sergipe-Alagoas basins are $4,000 to $6,000/daily barrel.
In order to calcuate the cost per barrel the following formula is
used (as discussed earlier):
P = ,
c T e-(r+a)t
e dt
A discount rate of 12% (r) is used with a project lifetime of 25 years
(T). The optimal decline rate (a*) is calculated to be 24% (I/Q =
10,000) and 17% (I/Q = 15,000) for the Campos basin and 39% (I/Q = 5000)
in the Northeast and Sergipe-Alagoas basins. These were calculated
assuming a constant oil price of $30 per barrel (a* was also calculated
for a variety of oil prices, see Table 3-7). These optimal economic
decline rates are very high. But investment cost is an increasing
function of the decline rate and increasinginvestmentcost to increase
the decline rate will lead to a lower optimal decline rate. Thus the
true optimal decline rate is between an assumed rate of 12% per year and
17% per year when the marginal capital coefficient is taken into
account. Using an iterative procedure (see eq. 5-3, Chapter 5) the
"true" decline rate was estimated to be about .15.
In order to calculate the cost per barrel decline rates of .12 and
.15 were used. Operating costs for the Campos basin are estimated to be
$1.50 per barrel based on similar costs for North Sea platforms and Gulf
of Alaska (Adelman and Paddock, 1980, Beck, 1977). Using these factors
in the above equation an oil production cost of $10.70/bbl ($1980), for a
= .12, and $11.70/bbl for a = .15 were calculated for the Campos basin.
Similar calculations for the Northeast and Sergipe-Alagoas basins are
around $3.50 per barrel (a = .12) and $3.80/bbl (a = .15). Thus the cost
per barrel increases about 8% if a = .15 with the estimated decline rate
of a = .12. Peak production in each of these basins is 30,000 bbl per
day. PETROBRAS has estimated past exploration costs per barrel to be $2
to $3.
3-5. Minimum Economic Reservoir Size
As discovery proceeds to smaller and smaller fields a point is
reached where the discovered field sizes are no longer economic to
develop. This minimum eeconomic reservoir size (MERS--as defined by
Eckbo 1977) varies with the price of oil, production charactersitics of
the field (decline rate, etc.), and physical conditions such as water
depth whch affect the investment cost.
The net present value of a block of reserves according to Adelman
(1978) can be approximated by:
PQ
NPV = a I
P = oil price
Qp = peak production (bbl/day)
a = decline rate
r = discount rate
I = investment cost
The reserves (R) can be expressed as:
Qp T - a t
R = Q e d
as T + cthen R = Q /a or Q = Ra.
Using the expression in the net present value formula it becomes
P RaNPV = - I(a +r)
The minimum economic reservoir size results when the investment rate of
return equals r, the discount rate. Thus, if NPV = 0 we can estimate the
minimum economic reservoir size (R) which provides only a rate of
return r. This is the minimum size field one would want to develop at
oil price P.
I(a + R)
R = Pa
The offshore oil production regions of Brazil can be classified into
two similar types. The first type is the Northeast and Sergipe-Alagoas
basins both of which are in shallow water (50-100 ft) and have small
deposits. The second type is the Campos basin which has several large
fields in deep water (400-500 ft.). The development costs, as well as
platform costs and capital coefficients, for an average field in these two
types of basins are given in Table 3-7. Using the formulas above, the
MERS and optimal decline rate can be calculated for various prices of
oil. The optimal decline rate is calculated to be higher for the small
shallow reservoirs (around 39% for P = $30/bbl) as compared to lower
decline rates for the Campos fields (from 17 to 24%). It may not be
technically possible to produce oil at this optimal rate, due to
reservoir charactersitics or due to lags in the rate of field
development. The MERS is therefore calculated using the optimal rate as
well as a lower rate of 10% (shown in Table 3-7). For current oil prices
($30/bbl) the minimum economic field size for the Campos basin is around
15 million barrels and for the other shallow basins it is around
2 million barrels.
Table 3-.: Details of Planned Campos Basin Offshore Production System
Estimated Estimated
Number of Number of Initial Peak Peak Gas
Offshore Oil Production Water Depth to Production Injection Oil Production Prsduction
Platform & Pipelines Depth (ft) Oil (ft) Wells Wells bbl/day (yr.) 10 m3 /d.
Garoupa 398 11,400 7 8 60,000 (19833 380 (1985)
Namorado I 480 10,000 7 3 24,000 (1984) 200,000 420 (1984)
Namorado II 562J 9 11 36,000 (1984) to 250,000 640 (1984)
Cherne I 386 8,700 14 5 50,000 (1988) _120 (1988)
Cherne II 469 6,240 14 8 63,000 (1988 180 (1988)
Enchova 383 7,000 10 7 64,000 (1984 1500 (1981)
Badejo 309 8,800 6 5 12,000 (1984)~ 175,000 240 (1984)
Pampo 357 5,830 12 8 100,000 (1987) 350 (1985)
TOTAL 79 55 275,000
to 325,000
Garoupa Early Production
System 5-20,000 (1981)
Enchova Early Production
System 15,000 (1979)
Submarine Pipeline System (24" oil pipeline (165,000 b/d max), 22" oil pipelines (198,000 b/d max)
two 12" gas pipelines (5.4 mm 3 /d max), 85 km from fields to shore).
Onshore Pipeline System (32" oil pipeline (440,000 b/d max) - 18" gas pipeline (3.5 mm 3/d max).
SOURCE: Brazil Energy (Jan. & July 1980), World Oil, Petrobras Publications.
(Scope of Brazilian Effort in Exploration and Production of Hydrocarbons).
Offshore September 1980.
'D
Table 3C: Cost Details of Planned Campos Basin Offshore Production System
Estimated Total Updated Total
Development cost Development cost Platform
Offshore Oil Production Water (Oct. 1978 (Aug. 1980 Costb (1980
Platforms & Pipelines Depth (ft) million U.S. $) million U.S. $) million U.S. $)
Garoupa 398 304 534 45
Namorado I 480 414 730 80
Namorado II 562 80
Cherne I 386 365 641
Cherne II 4 69 83
Enchova 383 364 640 70-90
Badejo 309 188 670 110
Pampo 357 182
Garoupa Early Production
system 214 370
Enchova Early Production
system 53 93.
Submarine Pipeline
system 356 625
Onshore Pipeline
system 235 412
TOTAL (million U.S.$) 2,675 4 ,7 0 0b 560
aScope of Brazilian Effort in Exploration and Production of Hydrocarbons, Petrobras 1979.
b"Campos Cost Greater than Expected", Offshore, September 1980.
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Table 3-7 Minimum Economic Reservoir Size for Offshore Brazilian Basins
Northeast and
SeraiDe-Alaaoas basins Campos basin
Water depth (ft)
Number of platforms
per reservoir
Platform cost (million $ 1980)
Approximate total development
cost per reservoirb
(million $ 1980, without
pipelines)
Capital coefficient
(I/Q in $/daily bbl)
MERS at P = $20/bbl
In million barrelsc
MERS at P = $30/bbl
In million
MERS at p = $40/bbl
50 to 100
1 to 6
a
2 to 7
350 to 480
1 to 2
45 to 85
250
(10 to 60)
5000
4 (a=.10)
2 (a=a*=.29)
2 (a=. 10
1.5 (a=a =.39)
1.5 (a=.10)
1 (a=a* = . 47)
(200 to 500)
10,000
(8,000 to 13,000)
28 (a=.10)
21 (a=a =.17)
18 (a=. 10)
13 (a=a*=.24)
14 (a=. 10)
7 (a=a*=.29)
a-
aOffshore, September 1980, "Campos Costs Greater than Expected".
b"Scope of Brazilian Effort in Exploration and Production of Hydrocarbon" Petrobras 1978; Offshore
September 1980; Economics of Offshore Oil and Gas Supplies, Bock p138. Development cost per
reservoir for the Campos basin varies from $200 to $500 million, it is estimated that future
reservoirs found could be developed at about $250 million.
CMERS is minimum economic reservoir size (in million barrels recoverable oil) given by R - I (a+r)/Pa,
I is total development cost, the discount rate r=.12, optimql decline rate is a* = (365%Pr/I)1/ 2-r.
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Annexes
Annex Field Size for:
Distribution of Fields in Basins in Order from Largest to
Smallest Field
Campos Basin Production Plan3-2
3-1
Ane 3-1
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----- * Campos (Approximations Based
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t:- Sergipe Alagoas (U.Cret.)
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SOURCE: IIASA World Oil Database.
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4-1. Current Methods Used to Estimate Undiscovered Oil and Gas
Resources
A methodology to estimate undiscovered resources which is
applicable to all basins is desirable, but the amount of detailed
geologic and exploratory information varies considerably from frontier
to mature basins. The most detailed basin information is where oil has
been located and oil reserves have been well documented. In frontier
areas only general geologic parameters are known and only a few
exploration holes have been drilled. In certain frontier regions a few
exploration holes and general geology may be sufficient information for
some experts to dismiss the possibility of finding commercial oil.
This divergence in viewpoints represents the basic question one must
deal with in resource appraisal: Are oil and gas resources in a
particular region unknown because they are not there or because there
has been insufficient exploration to find them For those who rely on
geologic judgement, large regions may have low resource potential. For
others, who are only convinced by actual drilling results, some of
these large regions with few drill holes are expected to contain
substantial resources. During later stages of the exploration process,
quantifiable geologic and exploration statistics may produce relatively
accurate estimates of undiscovered resources. But in the early stages
of the exploration process it is necessary to use all available
information, including productive use of prior geologic judgment.
There exists an extensive body of literature on oil and gas
resource appraisal methods. Excellent summaries of various methods
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have been made by Grenon (1975), Haun (1975), Kaufman(1980), and Miller
(1980). Figure 4-1 (from Miller, 1980) summarizes methodologies used
for frontier, immature and mature regions. The main methodologies that
have been used are subjective probability, volumetric yield, discovery
rate (or exploration effort), and discovery process models with field
size distributions.
Subjective probability methods are based on expert geologic
judgment of possible resources in an area. It has the benefits of
being applicable to an area of any size and may provide very useful
insights if the geologist has had extensive experience. This method
also has serious drawbacks as it may result in a wide variation of
resource estimates which cannot be reconciled.
Volumetric yield methods utilize average yields (usually barrels of
oil per cubic foot of rock) for all basins or geologically similar
basins. These types of estimations are heavily dependent on geologic
judgment and do not give estimates of field sizes or other deposit
characteristics. Advantages of this method, when applied carefully,
are that it can be used worldwide and used for a frontier region of any
size.
Discovery rate (or exploration effort) methods are used for
immature and mature basins. Most models of this sort are based on the
fact that the number of wells needed to find the remaining (smaller)
deposits in a region increases at a rapid rate (usually assumed to be
an explonential rate). As more and more wells are drilled the
discovery rate (in barrels/well or barrels/foot) decreases in an
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Figureq-1 Resource Appraisal Methods Applicable for the Various Stages of Exploration
in a Petroleum Province with an Increasing Degree of Geologic Assurance.
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exponential fashion. Discovery rate models extrapolate this decrease
in barrels discovered per unit of exploration effort. These models do
not give expected field sizes and are poorly suited for use in frontier
areas.
Recent developments have concentrated on the use of field size
distributions in order to estimate the remaining resources in a
partially explored play. A field is defined by Nehring (1978) as
follows:
A field is defined as a producing area containing in the
subsurface (1) a single pool uninterrupted by permeability
barriers, (2) multiple pools trapped by a common geologic
feature, or (3) laterally distinct multiple pools within a
common formation and trapped by the same type of geologic
separation where the lateral separation does not exceed one-half
mile. Giant oil fields are all fields containing at least 500
million barrels of known recoverable crude oil. Super-giant oil
fields are all fields containing at least 5 billion barrels of
known recoverable crude oil.
An offshore field generally has at least one platform per field. A
group of geologically similar fields which occur close to each other
(lateral separation greater than one-half mile to several dozen miles)
that are formed by similar geologic processes are defined as a play.
The concept of a play is a very useful one for analysis. The field
size distribution within a play is usually skewed (sometimes
approximated with a lognormal distribution) such that the largest field
contains 20 to 60 percent of the total reserves in the play. Figure
4-2 (from Klemme, 1978) shows that for most basins that contain a play
with at least one giant field, the largest 5 fields contain 85 percent
of the total reserves. All types of geologic sedimentary basins show
Figure k-j Field-size spread of basins with giant fields
Figure 4-2 (cont).
There appear to be five groupings of the largest or two largest
fields in present basins:
I Presence in any type of basin of a supergiant or one
disproportionately large field. In cratonic basins this is
often related to extensive regional arches that retain
sufficient cover. In intermediate basins (mainly Types 6 and
7) the presence of supergiants appears relatively
unpredictable.
II This grouping might be considered a more average or normal
distribution.
III Represents large cratonic Type 2 and large intermediate Type
4A and 4B basins, due to absence of a single regional arch and
abundance of individual traps. It is the pattern in extremely
prolific basins.
IV Typical of deltas
V Generally from 1 to 5 percent of total reserves, this
represents the average larger field size. One can predict
reserves with more assurance from this curve. The risk for
finding one of the three or four largest fields in any basin
increases as the basin develops, because the largest fields
are usually found early in development.
On the average, a large field contains 25 percent of a basin's
reserves; fields from the 3rd to the 10th largest appear to contain
from 1 to 3 percent of basin's reserves.
Source:. Klemme (1978), see Appendix B for details of basin types.
this highly skewed distribution except for deltas which follow a more
even distribution (largest field contains around 9 percent of total
reserves). These atypical deltaic field size distributions are found
mainly in three provinces, the Mississippi Delta, Texas Gulf Coast, and
Niger Delta. Since two of the three provinces are in the U.S., some
analysts have improperly extrapolated these atypical field size
distributions and their concentrated drilling history to non-deltaic
regions outside the U.S.
Worldwide, a typical play has a skewed field size distribution.
Since a few fields are so much larger than the others, one would expect
the order of discovery to be proportional to the size of the fields.
For example, Figure 4-3 shows that the largest deposits were discovered
first in the Midland Basin and the reservoir size declined as more and
more wells were drilled. This principle is the basis for most field
size distribution models. Kaufman and Barouch (1976) have assumed that
deposits within a play are discovered proportional to size and that the
distribution of deposits is lognormal. They then assume the
exploration process is one of sampling without replacement and project
the size of future discoveries conditional on the size of reservoirs
already found. An example of this discovery size decline phenomena is
shown in Figure 4-4. This sophisticated approach developed by Kaufman
(1976) and similar work by Smith (1980) produce the best statistical
results for fields and plays where a large number of fields have
already been discovered.
It is important to distinguish the types of undiscovered resources
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that models deal with. There are two classes of undiscovered resources
which need to be estimated, first are the undiscovered oil fields in
already discovered plays and second are the undiscovered oil plays in
the sedimentary basins. Most resource appraisal models deal with the
former, such as those models described above. Since the known oil
fields in Brazil are small, remaining resources in known plays are
expected to be relatively small. Thus for Brazil, the crucial question
is the amount of oil in the second class of undiscovered resource
(undiscovered plays in a group of sedimentary basins). In this study,
two different methods will be used to estimate undiscovered resources.
The first method will be to use an exponential decay method to estimate
the undiscovered fields in known plays. This will be described in the
next section. The second method will be to develop and apply a
Bayesian exploration model to estimate the amount of undiscovered oil
in undiscovered plays, which is described in detail in section 4-3.
4-2. Method Used to Estimate Undiscovered Oil Resources in Known Plays
Work by Eckbo (1977) and by Smith (1980) have made use of the
observation that the discovery size decline curve can be approximated
with an exponential decline. This method captures the main principle
of discovery proportional to size which is the basis for the more
sophisticated models. It has proved to be a simple, relatively
accurate method to estimate the number and size of remaining reservoirs
which are larger than the minimum economic reservoir size within an oil
field or oil play. The exponential decay method will be used here (as
X~~~ IL_ ~_ICPII*___~_I__~___-~
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opposed to more sophisticated methods) to estimate the undiscovered
resources in known plays for two reasons. First, small data sets will
not produce robust results when used in the more sophisticated models
(such as those of Kaufman (1976) and that of Smith (1980)) so the
simple exponential decay method produces a good approximation. Second,
in a play that has only a few economic fields the number of remaining
undiscovered economic fields is expected to be small, whether or not
the exponential decay method or more sophisticated methods are used.
As discovery proceeds to smaller and smaller fields a point is
reached where the discovered field sizes are no longer economic to
develop. This minimum economic reservoir size (MERS--as defined by
Eckbo 1977) varies with the price of oil, production characteristics of
the field (decline rate, etc.), and physical conditions such as water
depth which affect the investment cost. This MERS is more important
offshore due to rapid cost increases as water depth increases. The
method used to calculate undiscovered resources in known plays will be
to fit an exponential decline in field size using the order of
discovery of known fields. Expected undiscovered resources in known
plays equal the sum of undiscovered fields greater than MERS.
4-3. Method Developed in This Study to Estimate Oil and Gas Resources
in Undiscovered Plays
The previous section outlined the various methods used to estimate
undiscovered oil resources in known plays. Subjective assessment of
resources or geologic analogs are the only methods commonly used to
estimate the total undiscovered resources in new plays in a frontier
~1 II__L~lr-^II~L~~ ~ E n~ i~lPn --U ~-~-
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region. These methods are subject to wide variation due to the wide
variety of subjective geologic opinion about a particular unexplored
region. The goal of this section is to develop a new method of
estimating the number and size of undiscovered plays (e.g., groups of
fields) in a partially explored basin or group of geologically similar
basins. The approach developed here contains two components:
1) Exploration data are used to update prior estimates of the
resource base in a region consisting of partially explored
basins (which have similar geologic history).
2) Estimates of the economic return to future exploration
investments (i.e., net present value (NPV)) of various
alternative exploration programs are calculated, as well as
the variance and distribution of returns of these investment
programs.
The goal of this analysis is to provide a method of evaluating oil
exploration programs which can compare directly with alternative
investments (such as synthetic fuel production). This type of
exploration modelling is designed to be particularly useful for
evaluating additional investments in exploration when initial
exploration has produced only modest results. Although the technique
developed here could be applied at a disaggregated level, the modelling
procedure developed here is to be used at an aggregate level as a
component in energy sector planning. The model will be applied to
Brazil and the results used to compare exploration with alternative
shale oil and alcohol production options.
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Summary of Model
The goal of this model is to use data from exploration to update
initial prior estimates of the resource base and project probabilities
of future discovery. The model uses prior estimates of the probability
that a certain number of plays exist in a region and revises that
initial probability based on the likelihood of occurrence of the
observed discovery pattern. The following steps describe the basic
features of the model:
1) Geologic basins are divided into groups with similar geologic
history. Based on the initial geologic assessment of the basin
charactersitics, the prior probabilities that plays with giant fields
(> 500 mill. bbls) and plans with commercial fields exist are assigned
to the basin (or group of similar basins).
2) An intial prior probability on the efficiency of the exploration
process is established. Past studies have shown that a randomly placed
exploration well can be thought of as "exhausting an area" equal to the
presumed target area (this type of random exploration is defined as
having exploration efficiency of one). Past analysis on exploration in
the U.S. has shown that exploratory wells drilled on the advice of
geologists require, on the average, 2 to 4 times fewer wells to exhaust
an area of a basin than random drilling. Based on this information,
reasonable prior values of exploration efficiency range from 1 to 4.
3) A likelihood function is developed that estimates the
probability that the actual observed discovery sequence would have
occurred if a certain number of plays exist and if the exploration
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efficiency is true efficiency. One probability is calculated for each
combination of plays and exploration efficiency. The likelihood
function is based on a model of cumulative exhaustion of basin area by
both dry and successful exploration wells.
4) The initial prior probabilities (from I and 2) are mutiplied by
the likelihood probabilities (from 3) and results normalized so that
the sum of all probabilities equals one. The resulting numbers equal
the revised (or posterior) probability that a specific number of plays
is the true state of nature and that the exploration efficiency is the
true efficiency of the exploration process. The updating process is
completed in two stages, first for the discoveries from an intital
block of wells and then for the discoveries from a second block of
wells. Updating is done in two stages because the precision of the
results increases and the range of exploration efficiency is narrowed.
An example will help clarify this point. If there have been three
plays discovered in an offshore region (several basins) with 250 wells,
it is uncertain whether exploration has been relatively efficient and
few plays remain to be discovered or whether exploration has been
inefficient and many more plays exist. The data can be broken into two
stages for analysis. Suppose it is found that 3 plays were discovered
with 100 wells and 0 plays were then discovered with the next 150
wells. Assuming that the efficiency of exploration has been constant,
it is much more likely that few (if any) plays remain to be found and
that exploration has been efficient as opposed to the unlikely event
that many more plays remain to be found and that exploraiton has been
*1I1-I1 II~CL-  --- I
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inefficient. By updating in two stages, results are more precise. In
this case the posterior probabilities are high that little oil remains
to be discovered.
5) The same model described above can be used to project expected
discoveries from future exploration wells. It makes use of the
exploration efficiency calculated by the past exploration history. By
using the size and net present values of an average play in the type of
basin in question, the model calculates a probability distribution of
economic return and barrels of oil expected to be discovered with a
block of future exploration wells. These economic return calculations
are completed in Chapter 5 based on the results from this chapter.
Several simplifications have been made in the above description,
but the basic features of the model have been covered. The model was
tested on exploration data from the three types of sedimentary basins
in Brazil. The results for the offshore basins are simalar to the
example above. A sensitivity analysis was performed and the range of
final results was relatively narrow. The final results are similar to
other available appraisals of oil resources in Brazil. (For the
results see Tables 8 and 9.) The next several sections describe the
features of the model in detail.
3-A. Steps in the Exploration Process
The exploration-production process for oil and gas can be broken
into three main components:
1) Surveying--A general geologic history is compiled, reflecting
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seismic lines and magnetic profiles completed.
2) Exploration drilling--
* Type 1 newfield wildcats are defined as exploration wells
which are searching for new plays, (i.e. fields within
undiscovered plays) in those areas where oil has not
previously been discovered.
* Type 2 newfield wildcats are exploration wells are
defined as those wells drilled to find new fields within
known plays where at least one field has already been
located.
* Exploration and extension wells drilled within and around
the edges of an already discovered field. These wells
are the new-pool, deeper-pool, shallower-pool and outpost
wells defined by the Lahee system (Figure 4-5).
3) Development wells--Wells drilled into pools within fields,
which are perceived as commercial for the purpose of
production. Offshore production entails drilling development
wells from a platform with ship loading or pipeline delivery
to shore.
3-B. A Model of the Exploration Process
There are many ways to think about modeling the exploration
process, some of which are simple, others which are very complex. We
will begin with a simplifed way of modeling exploration and then make
it more realistic. If we know that there is a target (of projected
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circular area A) that exists in a region of area B, a simple method of
exploration would be to drill wells (newfield wildcats Type 1) on a
grid spacing equal to the diameter of the target. A well would
discover the oil field sooner or later. The maximum number of wells
needed to be drilled would be B/A, which is the inverse of the
probability of finding the field with the first wildcat. In this way a
dry hole can be thought of "exhausting" a certain area. The concept of
a dry hole exhausting area has been carefully studied (Singer and Drew,
1976, and Drew and Root, 1978) for target sizes with various elliptical
shapes and orientations. It was shown that a single well will on the
average exhuast an area equal to the assumed target size (i.e.,
projected area) for non-circular as well as circular targets.
Exploration with random drilling is not used in the real world
because it is too expensive. It is cheaper to hire geologists who can
interpret seismic data and subsequent drilling data in order to reduce
the number of exploration wells that need to be drilled. The maximum
number of wells needed to find the oil field with increased exploration
efficiency would then be B/eA, where e = 1 for random drilling and e >
1 for dilling more "efficient" than random drilling. Arps and Roberts
(1959) used this formulation and estimated e to equal 2.75 based on the
following information:
According to the annual A.A.P.G. statistics on exploratory
drilling, the success ratio between wildcatting on technical
advice such as geology and/or geophysics over the period
1944-1956 is 2.75 times as good as the success ratio for
wildcats which were drilled for non-technical reasons. it is
the opinion of the authors that this ratio for the
Denver-Julesberg Basin was probably not as high as the 2.75
United States average because of the nature of the traps
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involved, and for the purposes of this estimate we have
therefore used a ratio of two.
When efficiency is modelled in this way values of e greater than one
can be interpreted as reducing the size of the sample space (effective
basin area). Kaufman (1980) points out that this interpretation does
not hold if e is not a constant function of the areal extent of the
field, i.e. if e varies from size class to size class. It will be
assumed in this model that e will be constant over the field size
classes under consideration. The estimates of e involve calculation
of success ratios. Success is defined as finding a commercial
deposit, but a commercial deposit is dependent on specific physical
and economic conditions. As the conditions vary the success ratio and
thus e may vary. We will therefore only use this estimate of e as a
rough guideline and use a wide range of possible prior values of e in
the analysis.
There are several ways in which exploration efficiency may be
greater than the efficiency of random drilling:
1) The area of the structural trap which holds the oil field
usually has a larger projected area than the area of the
field. (The structural trap area was found to be twice that
of the productive area of the oil field as measured for 30
fields in Brazil.) Seismic data can outline the location of
the structural trap or locate uplifted blocks above which oil
deposits may occur. Thus a single well may exhaust a larger
area than just the productive area of the field.
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2) Exploration in a region with uniform sedimentary layers may
have an exploration efficiency greater than random drilling,
since a small amount of information (geochemical or physical)
from one well may be able to condemn a large region as
unsuitable for oil formation or oil accumulation.
Let's now assume that there is an oil play in the region which
consists of n fields and the productive play area AT is defined as the
n
sum of all the productive field areas (AT = ~. Ai). The field size
i=1
distribution in the play is skewed with a large fraction of the total
reserves (-40 percent) are in largest field. If the productive areas of
all the fields in the oil play are touching each other then the play can
be considered one "target." A new field wildcat (Type 1) that is drilled
into the area is all that is needed to "discover" the play. The maximum
number of new field wildcats (Type 1) needed to explore the region for
oil plays is equal to B/eAT. Subsequent new field wildcats (Type 2)
2) are then drilled to discover the remaining fields in the play.
It may be necessary to adjust this simplified model since several
wells (not just one) may be needed before a well actually strikes oil
in the play since there are "dry" areas on the sides of the trap and
oil fields are usually somewhat separated although may be considered
close together when compared to the region as a whole. The efficiency
of exploration for a play (group of fields) increases in regions with
simple geology and where trap area is greater than productive oil
area. On the other hand, the overall efficiency is reduced somewhat
due to the separation of deposits within the play. The overall
XII_~;JI__IX_)____I~__IUIII_-L.~~II-U
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exploration efficiency for a play is still likely to be greater than 1
but the exact efficiency is unknown.
The description of the process so far assumed that only one play
exists. When exploration is undertaken explorationists have only a
rough guess as to the number and size of plays in a region. After
complete exploration of the region the number and size of plays is
known with certainty and a calculation of the exploration efficiency
could be made. Most (if not all) current exploration efforts are
incomplete, with basins or regions partially explored. Since our
ultimate objective is to provide estimates of the true resource state
(i.e., the number and size of plays in a region), prior assessments of
the resource state could be updated with observed exploration data to
provide a revised estimate of the resource state. A description of the
exploration process must include some measure of exploration
efficiency, and different assumptions about past exploration efficiency
will produce different estimates of the true resource state. It will
be shown that by simultaneously updating the exploration efficiency
jointly with the estimate on the resource state in a two stage process,
the revised estimates of the resource state are much more precise than
updating only in one stage. This updating process is completed in two
stages, first for the discoveries from an initial block of wells and
then for the discoveries from a second block of wells. Updating is
done in two stages because the precision of the results increases and
the range of exploration efficiencies is narrowed. An example will
help clarify this point. If there have been three plays discovered in
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an offshore region (several basins) with 250 wells, it is uncertain
whether exploration has been relatively efficient and few plays remain
to be discovered or whether exploration has been inefficient and many
more plays exist. The data are broken into two stages for analysis.
Suppose it is found that 3 plays were discovered with 100 wells and 0
plays were then discovered with the next 150 wells. Assuming that the
efficiency of exploration has been constant, it is much more likely
that few (if any) plays remain to be found and that exploration has
been efficient as opposed to the unlikely event that many more plays
remain to be found and that exploration has been inefficient. By
updating in two stages, results are more precise. In this case the
posterior probabilities are high that little oil remains to be
discovered. The process of updating involves the use of Bayes
theorem. Its application is discussed in the following section.
3-C. Bayesian Analysis Applied to the Exploration Process
The Bayesian updating process is performed frequently in the minds
of explorationists. For example, if a geologist believes with high
probability that 10 plays (which contain at least one giant field each)
exist in a certain region he will revise his probability estimates
substantially downward if the first 500 wells turn up only one play
containing a giant field. Bayes theorem quantifies this updating
process with the following formula:
P'(S i ) L(S*/Si)1 = P"(Si)
n 1
I P(Si)L(S*/Si)i=1
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where P'(Si) = prior probability that state Si is the true state
of nature
L(S*IS) = likelihood that the observed sample S* would result,
conditional on Si being the true state of nature
P"(Si) = posterior (or revised) probability that state Si is
the true state of nature.
Each state of nature Si = f(gi, ci) is defined in this study to be
the number of plays (gi) which contain at least one giant field and
number of plays (ci) which contain at least one commercial, non-giant
field. The procedure developed in this study uses a joint prior
probability P'(S i, ei) that a certain state (Si) is the true state of
nature and that the exploration efficiency (ei) is the true exploration
efficiency. The probabilities are updated in two stages with
likelihoods for the first stage determined by the sample (number of
giant field plays and number of commercial field plays discovered)
derived from the first set of exploration wells. The estimated
posteriors become the priors for the second stage. The second stage
likelihoods are determined by the sample derived from the subsequent
exploration wells. The model can be summarized as follows:
P'(Siei)L(S*,w*/Siei)
1) n- P"(Si, ei)
SP' (Si ei L(S*,w*/Si ei)i=1
P"(Sie i)L(S**,w**/Si ei) III2) n = Pi (Si'ei)
_ P"(Si ,ei)(L(S**,w**ISi ei)
i=1
s~~~_~_ i_ ~__I~~__~
where P'(S i, ei)
Si = f(gi,c i)
L(S*,w*/Si,ei)
P"(S',e )
L(S*,w*/Si,ei)
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= P'(Si)P'(ei) = prior joint probability that Si is the
true state of nature and that ei is the true
exploration efficiency. (These priors are assumed
to be independent since the actual deposits of oil
that exist are independent of the oil company's
efficiency of exploration.)
= state of nature, the number of plays with at least
one giant field (gi) and number of plays with at least
commercial field (ci).
= Likelihood that the observed sample S* (number of
giant-field plays and number of commercial-field
plays) would be discovered with w* new field wildcat
wells (Type 1) conditional on Si and ei being the true
states.
= Posterior probability that Si and ei are the true
states.
= Likelihood that the observed sample S** (additional
giant-field plays and commercial-field plays
discovered) with w** additional exploration wells
conditional on Si and ei being the true states.
P'"(S , e ) = Posterior probability after the second stage.
This section has outlined how Bayesian inference can be used to
estimate the probability that a certain resource state is the true
state of nature conditional on exploration history. To use this
approach we must obtain: 1) the prior probability that the resource
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state is the true state, 2) the prior probability that a certain
exploration efficiency is the actual efficiency, and 3) the likelihood
that the observed exploration history would occur conditional on the
prior states. Each of these will be dealt with in turn.
3-D. Prior Estimate of Oil Play and Oil Field Sizes
In order to use the updating procedure described in the previous
section a prior probability estimate on the resource state for a region
must be obtained. A resource state is defined to be the number of
plays (which contain at least one giant field) and the number of plays
(which contain at least one commercial field). A prior estimate could
be obtained from one or more expert geologists who have access to
detailed information on the area in question. Alternatively, a prior
estimate may be obtained through a worldwide comprehensive study of
basins of similar geologic type. This latter approach uses a minimum
of subjective input and allows various basins worldwide to be evaluated
and compared. The best publicly available comprehensive study of all
major basins around the world has been completed by Klemme (1975, 81).
The basin classification scheme used was developed by Halbouty, et al.
(1981) and Klemme (1975). Petroleum geologists agree with this
classification of all major basins worldwide (several hundred in total)
for 81-91 percent of the basins. The work by Klemme (1975) has
compared the field size distribution, oil trap character, degree of
exploration, richness (barrels per cubic mile), probability of finding
commercial producton and the probability of finding giant fields for
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each of the eight basin types (Figure 4-6). Appendix B gives these
details as well as the location and extent of exploration of the eight
types of basins. One of the best attributes of the Klemme (1975)
classification is that oil potential is assessed at a disaggregated
level, but not at a too disaggregated level where each basin becomes a
special case. These prior probabilities also have the advantage of
being made in the context of a globally consistent oil assessment by an
oil expert with wide international experience. Other basin
classifications put qualitative rankings on oil potential but the
Klemme study attaches quantitative estimates.
The following steps suggest a method by which rough prior estimates
could be obtained for a group of sedimentary basins:
1) Divide the basins up into groups of similar geologic type
according to the basin classification system outlined by
Klemme.
2) Use the probability of giant-field plays (pl) and
probability of commercial-field plays (p2) for each basin
as estimated by Klemme (see Figure 4-6 and Appendix B).
3) If the region consist of more than one basin the binomial
probability model is the model which gives the probability that
exactly Xi plays occur in n basins of the region. The
probability of having g "giant field" plays and c "commercial
field" plays occurring in n basins is calculated by
multiplying the binomial probability for g giant plays in n
basins and the binomial probability for c plays in n basins.
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Figure 4-6 (cont.)
Note: The probabilities for giant and commercial fields were calculated
(according to Klemme) as follows:
"In this study, the remaining nonproducing basins of each type were
plotted and the relative amount of exploration graphed [from Annex B].
All of the relatively unexplored basins together with half of the
moderately explored basins were determined and compared to the risk
[probability] for finding production and the risk of finding giants
[Table 6] for each respective type. The number of basins that might
ultimately develop were then related to the percentage of present
proven world reserves that each basin type respresents (sections, Fig.
12-3 through 12-9). In some instances, the calculated figures were
revised. In the case of Type 4 basins, the estimates were considerably
downgraded because the presence of the Mideast high reserve basin in
this category "skews" the input for calculations. In the case of Type
8 deltas, the estimates were upgraded due to the fact that giant fields
in these basins represent less than 20 percent of their total
reserves. In Type 6 and 7 basins, a higher estimate was given than
calculated because of both the size and the virgin nature of untested
offshore basins of this type which would, in effect, lower the risk of
discovery and volumetrically increase the reserves for an individual
basin. Although the present rate of giant reserves to nongiant
reserves is 75 percent and 25 percent respectively, a factor of 30
percent to 42 percent was used for nongiant reserves.
Jhese reserves [world reserves] total over 500 x 109 barrels (68
x 10 metric tons) of oil equivalent and when combined with the
additions expected in the previously discussed prolific basins or
provinces of the Mideast and West Siberia, indicate that a reasonable
figure of around 1,000 x 109 barrels (136 x 109 metron tons) of
undiscovered reserves in oil equivalent might be expected. This does
not include an estimate of the deep oceanic basins or Antarctica and
its environs. It is estimated that over 42 percent of these reserves
would come from offshore.
This estimate is about two-thirds the magnitude of those presented
at the 9th World Petroleum Congress in Tokyo in 1975 and those
estimated by Weeks in 1959. It is slightly more than one-half the
estimate of the worldwide undiscovered reserves made by the U.S.
National Academy of Sciences in 1975.
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Probability = [binomial for g in n basins] [binomial for c in n basins]
of state
f(g, c) = [ n n I p (1 - pl) ci(n c (1 - p2 ) n- cg'(n - g)F P1 c:(n -E7PP
pl = probability of giant-field play in a single basin
P2 = probability of commercial-field play in a single basin
The probabilities pl and p2 are assumed to be independent,
i.e. the occurrence of a "giant field" play is not
significantly correlated with the occurrence of a "commercial
field" play in a particular basin. This seems to be a
reasonable assumption based on data from basins worldwide.
4) If additional geological information can be obtained about the
particular basins in question then the priors may be adjusted
accordingly which provide an indication that certain basins
are richer (or poorer) than average. The sensitivity of the
results to be adjusted priors can then be determined.
3-E. Prior Estimate of Exploration Efficiency
Exploration efficiency of 1 is defined to be random drilling. An
exploration efficiency of 2 implies that only one half the number of
wells are needed to exhaust an area as compared with random drilling.
Since the exploration efficiency is unknown the initial calculations
will assume a diffuse prior such that several exploration efficiencies
are equally likely (e.g., e = 1, 2, 3 or 4). The work of Arps and
Roberts (1958) and Drew and Root (1978) suggest that the most likely
value for e is between 2 and 3. Although we may believe e is close to
i _I_ _ 1^ i_ _li~_ _IICLIIIIII_^~. ~CSI~
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2, a sensitivity analysis will be performed to test a variety of priors.
3-F. Likelihood Calculations
The goal of this section is to calculate the likelihood that the
observed sample (St, the number of giant-field plays and number of
commercial-field plays) would be discovered with w* exploration wells
conditional on a specific state of nature (Si) and a specific efficiency
of exploration (ei) being the true state. This section provides a
discussion of the key assumptions and outline of the model. A detailed
discussion of its derivation and relation to alternative models is
provided in Appendix A.
The key assumptions of the model are:
1) Fields are clustered in groups (a play) whose area is very small
relative to the exploratory area as a whole.
2) Two play sizes exist, giant-field play and conmmercial-field
plays. Each possible combination forms a resource state.
3) The area that an exploration well exhausts (whether dry or wet)
is equal to the target size. The target size can be the
productive area of the play (as in Model B) or a fraction of it
(as in model A).
4) The likelihood of any one well finding a large play is
independent of the likelihood of that well finding a small
play. The efficiency of exploration is the same for a large
play as a small play. Note that even with this assumption, a
region can be fully explored for large plays before it is fully
---- ----I----~---l~s~Y~-L311-
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explored for small plays, because the large play is a bigger
target.
5) Exploration is undertaken for region as whole. Wells are not
heavily concentrated in one small portion leaving the remaining
area unexplored.
The exploration process is modelled as sampling without replacement
from a region of area B where dry wells and wet wells exhaust an area
equal to the play productive area (Atg) times the exploration efficiency
(e). This process can be thought of as sampling from a sample space of
N (=B/eAt). Assuming one exploration well is all that is needed to
discover the target play and g* discoveries (giant-field plays) have
been discovered with w wells (type 1 wildcats). Recall that type 1
wildcats are the number of newfield wildcats up to and including the
discovery of the first field in the play. The probability that g*
discoveries would be made with w wells from a sample space of N
containing exactly gl targets (true underlying state is given by the
hypergeometric distribution.
(N - gi)! w* N - w*) gi !
L(g*,w*/giei) 
- ( g*) (N - g - w* + g*)
N = BleiAtg sample space
A = productive area of the giant-field play (equal to the sum
of all field areas).
ei  = exploration efficiency (random drilling equals one).
w* = number of wells drilled in region (type 1 new field
wildcats).
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g* = number of giant-field plays discovered with w* wells.
gi = true number of giant field plays in region.
A similar calculation can be made for commercial field plays using
the number of small plays found (c i ) with w* wells using a sample space
of N = B/eiAtc(Atc is the productive area of a small play). The
likelihood for a specific state (a state being a combination of large and
small plays) is:
L(S*, w*/S i , e i ) = L(g*, w*Ig i , ei)L(c*,w*/c i , ei )
(Likelihood (Likelihood (Likelihood
for state for large for small
S), plays) plays)
S i = f(gi', ci)
As can be seen, this utilizes the assumption that the likelihoods
in searching for large and small plays are independent. They may not
be completely independent if a large play overlaps a small play, which
becomes more likely the larger the number of plays. In the example we
are dealing with (offshore Brazil) the sample space is around
211+(=N=B/eA) and only a few sample discoveries have been made. The
assumption of independence of the likelihoods is reasonable for this
case since any bias caused by overlap would be very small since there
are so few plays for such a large region.
Two versions of the approach outlined above have been developed.
The version of the simpler model, model B, assumes that the play is one
continuous unit and that one well (type 1) is all that is needed to
discover the play. The area exhausted by a dry well is also assumed
equal to the play productive area. If we consider a sub-area of the
in
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region which is 5 times the play productive area (At), then model B
assumes that 5 wells are needed to exhaust this sub-area. The area
exhaustion per well is 5At/5 = At . The sample space for the region is
taken as N = B/e At.
In reality a play is composed of several fields in close
proximity. By assuming that dry and wet wells exhaust the same area,
the results may be biased. If there is a dry play composed of several
"dry" structures, several wells will be needed to determine that the
area is dry while we have assumed only one type 1 well is needed to
determine if it is wet. In order to correct this bias, model A assumes
a play is not a continuous unit but dispersed into several pieces.
Model A assumes that a play can be modeled as five pieces of equal
area that represent the 5 major fields (that account for 90 percent of
play reserves). These pieces are dispersed over a region about 5 times
as large as the play productive area (using field dispersion plays from
around the world from Petroconsultants data as a guide). In model B
only 5 wells were needed to "exhaust" the sub-area. In model A the
play is dispersed and more than 5 wells are needed to exhaust the
sub-area. Since the process is one of sampling without replacement the
hypothesis is an appropriate distribution. It can be shown using the
hypergeometric that there is only a 10 percent chance that none of the
5 fields would be found if 8 wells are drilled. In other words, to be
90 percent certain that a sub-area of size 5 AT does not contain a
play, only 8 wells need be drilled. The area exhausted per well is thus
5AT/8 = .63 At. Whether or not the sub-area contains a wet play (of 5
_______ , ~1_1~_1 __1 _C_____I____~~LI_____
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fields) or a dry play (of 5 dry structures), the area exhausted per well
is the same (.63 At). The factor .63 can be though of as an exploration
efficiency ep, of a field in a dispersed play just as ei is the
exploration efficiency of a play in the region. The sample space in
model A is N = B/e Ai t = B/ei(.63)At . Model A seems to be a more
realistic description of the exploration process.
3-G. Calculation of Posterior Probabilities
The previous sections described the calculation of the priors on
resource state, priors on exploration efficiency and likelihoods. Both
priors are defined so they sum to one. For example, the seven
continental margin type basins offshore Brazil can be modelled with
prior probabilities for 15 states which sum to one. Four priors on
efficiencies (which also sum to one) are multiplied by the 15 state
priors to get 60 joint priors, the sum of which is one. There are 60
likelihoods multiplied by the corresponding state priors which are then
normalized to produce 60 posterior probabilities. This whole process
is repeated for sample data from the second round of wells to get the
final posterior probabilities. By summing over efficiencies, four
posteriors on efficiency are found and by summing over states, the
posterior probabilities for 15 resource states are found. These
posteriors are multiplied by the average size of large and small plays
to get the expected amount of oil to be discovered. With such an
enormous number of calculations to be performed a detailed FORTRAN
program was developed to make the computations (see Appendix A).
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4-A. Application of Model to Estimate Undiscovered Petroleum Resources
in Brazil
4-A. Petroleum Geology of the Brazilian Sedimentary Basins
The types of basins that occur in Brazil are typical of basins
which cover large areas of South America and Africa. Thus an
understanding of oil supply from these types of basins will add to an
understanding of the potential resources of these two continents.
Two main groups of sedimentary basins exist in Brazil, large
onshore cratonic basins and small (partly onshore) marginal basins
along the eastern coast and continental shelf. The onshore cratonic
basins are the Parana (southern Brazil, 1,200,000 Km2), the Paraniba
(northeast, 600,000 Km2), the Amazon (north, 1,000,000 Km2), see
Figure 4-7, and the small far western Acre basin. These basins
generally consist of Paleozoic sediments 3,500 to 6,000 meters thick
and are classified by Klemme as Type 1 (interior) basins. The deepest
sediments are continental deposits overlain by Silurian marine rocks in
the Amazon and western Parana. Most of these basins are composed of
carboniferous marine sediments overlain by continental sediments. The
Paranp basin is very large in area but is not known to contain large
petroleum accumulations. In fact, this type of basin contains only 1
percent of known oil reserves worldwide. These staDle basins have had
little tectonic movement to form traps for oil, and the geothermal heat
flow is not conducive to oil formation. Paranp contains some
sub-commercial oil deposits, and a small gas has recently been
discovered in the Amazon (the Jurua field).
Petrobras (the Brazilian state oil company) had hoped that the Acre
IIX---~1~I~LI-CII l~rY-~-- I--- I-_I_~- 1IEi~.
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Fig.4U7 Index map of the sedimentary basins of Brazil. Open circles - Paleozoic basins; small dots -
Mesozoic-Cenozoic basins (after Ponte and Asmus, 1978).
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basin, in far western Brazil, was an extension of oil-breaing
structures in Peru, but exploration has shown the sediments to be too
thick and the structures found to consist of non-oil-bearing
precambrian ridges. Although exploration is incomplete in these large
onshore basins, it is unlikely that large commercial petroleum fields
will be found.
The petroleum potential is more encouraging in the marginal rift
(type 2) and continental margin (type 5) basins, which lie both
offshore and onshore. These basins formed when South America pulled
apart from Africa, leaving several sediment-filled rift valleys. The
deepest sediments are continential in nature, overlain by evaporites
which themselves are overlain by limestone and shallow marine
sediments. Figure 4-8 is a map of offshore marginal basins.
Evaporites and some salt diapirs with subsidence structures, as well as
limestone deposits, occur largely along the northeast and the southern
coasts (evaporites are not present along the north coast). These
structures and sediment types increase the probability of the presence
of oil formation in these continential margin basins. The formation of
horsts and tilted fault blocks allowed trapping of hydrocarbons
generated by shale source rocks of lower Cretaceous age with reservoirs
in upper Jurassic sandstones.
The major marginal basis are the Reconcavo, Caiapos and
Sergipe-Alagoas basins. The Reconcavo is a true "rift" (type 3) basin
and is mostly onshore. The Campos basin and Lower Cretaceous section
of the Sergipe-Alagoas basin are type 5, pull-apart continental margin
Cp ---ilil--- f"^t~il- Uyl~-~iYWLl~nx~n~r
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basins. These three basins are very similar structurally, with the oil
occurring mainly in traps above upflifted fault blocks. These three
basins contain 85 percent of Brazil's known recoverable reserves, as
shown below:
Basin Name Percent of Known Recoverable Reserves
Reconcavo 53 percent
Campos 32 percent
Sergipe-Alagoas 11 percent
Espirito Santo 2 percent
Potiguar-Ceara 2 percent
The Reconcavo basin is the oldest producing region in Brazil. It
is in a mature stage of development. Seven fields, of the 43 total
fields, contain 95 percent of the original reserves. Production is
declining at 8 percent/year, the secondary recovery techniques are
being applied. Uil traps are largely structural traps, and oil is
being produced from non-marine reservoir rocks. Approximately
two-thirds of the primary recoverable oil has already been produced.
The second major petroleum basin is the recently discovered
offshore Campos basin. Uil is found in structural traps related to
uplifted blocks. Major fields and recoverable reserves in Campos are:
Namorado, Cherne, Pampo, Garoupa and Enchova fields. Proved
recoverable reserves of the basin are 540 m bbls with only 6.2 m bbls
already produced (as of June 1979). The Namorado field is an unusually
large alluvial gravel fan, and it contains 160 million barrels,
one-half of the Campos reserves.
C~_~_ _ *il rr___llil~y____l_____~ 1__II_~
131
The thira major petroleum basin is Sergipe Alagoas. The main field
is Caromopolis with 186 m bbls of recoverable reserves, about one-half
of which has already been produced. Recoverable reserves of the entire
basin are 250 m bbls, about half of which has already been produced.
Most of the reserves are located in Lower Cretaceous sediments, but
four small deposts have been located in Upper Cretaceous and Tertiary
turbidite fan sediments.
The remaining marginal basins liKe the Santos, Pelotas, Espirito
Santo and Recife basin are also continental type 5 basins. The north
coast basins formed by lateral east-west transform movements. Some
very small oil deposits have been found in the eastern Espirito Santo
basin, a commercial play in the northern Ceara and Potiguar basins.
The last basin type is the Amazon delta, which is a type 8 Tertiary
delta with few rollover tectonic structures.
4-B. Estimates of Resources in Undiscovered Fields in Known Plays
The offshore oil producing regions of Brazil can be classified into
two similar types. The first type is the Northeast and Sergipe-Alagoas
basins both of which are in shallow water (50-100 ft) and have small
deposits. The second type is the Campos basin which has several large
fields in deep water (400-500 ft). The development costs, as well as
platform costs and capital coefficients, for an average field in these
two types of basins were given in Cnapter 3. A detailed discussion of
the calculation of MERS was given in Chapter 3. The MERS was
calculated using the optimal rate as well as a lower rate of 10
132
percent (shown in Table 4-1; calculated in Chapter 3). For current oil
prices ($30/bbl) the minimum economic field size for the Campos basin
is around 15 million barrels and for the other shallow basins it is
around 2 million barrels.
The amount of oil remaining within a known oil play can be
approximated with an exponential decay in the field size until the MERS
is reached. These calculations were made for the three partially
explored plays offshore Brazil (see Table 4-2). Discovery decline in
the Campos Basin is shown in Figure 4-9. Regressions were run to
explain the expected size of discovery (Sd) as a function of discovery
order. The log form of the exponential decay equation is ln(Sd) = K -
ad, where K is a constant and a is the decay rate in the field size.
Results show the decay in discovery size and show relatively good
statistical results given the small number of sample points. The decay
rate in field size is found to be 23 to 33 percent. The expected
reserves from fields greater than MERS to be discovered in these known
plays is calculated to be 170 to 200 million barrels of recoverable
oil. Another rough way to calcuate remaining reserves in known plays
using the size distribution from Klemme is to multiply the reserves of
the largest by 3 to 4 times. Using this rough rule of thumb we get 230
mmb of undiscovered oil which compares well to the result from the
exponential decay method (170 to 200 mmb). Although more sophisticated
methods than the exponential decay model could be applied, the results
from other models would likely project roughly the same expected
reserves to be found (170 to 250 million bDls - small by global
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Table f 1 Minimum Economic Reservoir Size for Offshore Brazilian Basins
Northeast and
SeraiDe-Alaaoas basins Campos basin
Water depth (ft)
Number of platforms
per reservoir
Platform cost (million $ 1980)
Approximate total development
.cost per reservoirb
(million $ 1980, without
pipelines)
Capital coefficient
(I/Q in $/daily bbl)
MERS at P = $20/bbl
In million barrelsC
MERS at P = $30/bbl
In million
MERS at p = $40/bbl
50 to 100
1 to 6
2 to 7
30
(10 to 60)
5000
4 (a=. 10)
2 (a=a*=.29)
2 (a=. 10
1.5 (a=a =.39)
1.5 (a=.10)
1 (a=a*=.47)
350 to 480
1 to 2
45 to 85
250
(200 to 500)
10,000
(8,000 to 13,000)
28 (a=.10)
21 (a=a*=.17)
18 (a=.10)
13 (a=a*=.24)
14 (a=.10)
7 (a=a =.29)
aOffshore, September 1980, "Campos Costs Greater than Expected".
b"Scope of Brazilian Effort in Exploration and Production of Hydrocarbon" Petrobras 1978; Offshore
September 1980; Economics of Offshore Oil and Gas Supplies, Bock p138. Development cost per
reservoir for the Campos basin varies from $200 to $500 million, it is estimated that future
reservoirs found could be developed at about $250 million.
CMERS is minimum economic reservoir size (in million barrels recoverable oil) given by R - I (a+r)/Pa,
I is total development cost, the discount rate r=.12, optimzl decline rate is a = (365%Pr/I)1/2-r.
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Table 4-2. Expected Sizes of Undiscovered Reservoirs in Known
Petroleum Plays in Brazil
E[Sd] = expected size of deposit d in million barrels recoverable oil
d = order of discovery
MERS = minimum economic reservoir size
Campos Basin, MERS = 15 mill. bbls.
In (E[Sd]) = 5.21 - 0.23d R2 = 0.31
(s.e.) (0.69) (0.17)
E[Sd] = 183e-0 .23d
Expected size of next discovery = E[S 7] = 36 mml. bb1s.
Remaining reserves of reservoirs greater than MERS = 120 mill. bbls,
5 reservoirs.
Sergipe-Alagoas Basin (offshore) MERS = 1.5 mill. bbls
In (EISd]) = 3.58 - 0.33d R2 = 0.60
(s.e.) (0.56) (0.12)
ELSd] = 35.8e-0-33d
Expected size of next discovery = E[S8] = 3 mill. bbls.
Remaining reserves of reservoirs greater than MERS = 6 mill. bbls,
3 reservoirs.
Northeast Basin, MERS
In (E[Sd]) =
(s.e.)
E[Sd]
Expected size of next
Remaining reserves of
9 reservoirs.
= 1.5 mill. bbls.
3.7 - 0.25d R2 = 0.63
(0.38)(0.14)
= 40e-0. 25d
discovery = D[S5] = 11 mill. bbls.
reservoirs greater than MERS = 45 mill. bbls,
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standards), since the models assume the largest fields are discovered
early in the exploration process and the largest fields found to date
are still rather small. The more important question for Brazil is the
amount of reserves expected to be found in new plays, since the amount
expected to be found in known plays is rather small.
4-C. Relevant Data and Parameters to Estimate Resources in
Undiscovered Plays
The goal of this section is to calculate the parameters needed to
estimate the expected amount of oil and gas in undiscovered fields in
the Brazilian sedimentary basin. The approach that will be use is the
Bayesian inference approach developed earlier in the first part of this
chapter (Section 3A to 3G). The result of this approach is an estimate
of the probability that a certain amount of oil exists conditional on
the observed exploration history. This result can be used to estimate
the most likely outcome of further exploration drilling and the
expected net present value of an exploration program. To use this
approach in a region (group of sedimentary basins of similar geologic
type), the prior probablity that a resource exists must be obtained as
well as the likelihood that the observed exploration history would
occur given that the resource exists. The estimation of each of these
parameters will be dealt with in turn.
A study of all sedimentary basins around the world by Klemme
estimates the probability of finding a commercial oil field and the
probability of finding a giant oil field in eight types of geologic
basins. The number of basins in Brazil of each type are shown below:
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Table 4-3
Number of basins Probability of Probability of
Type of Basin in Brazil Commercial Field Giant Hield
Continental
Margin (5) 7 (all mostly offshore) 0.3 0.2
Delta (8) 1 (offshore) 0.5 -0
Cratonic (1) 4 (all onshore) 0.3 0.2
Rift (3) 1 (onshore) 0.7 0.5
In the case of Brazil the basin types are simple and there is no
disagreement among geologists as to the classification of basins in the
types shown above. The two largest plays are the Campos and
Reconcova. The largest field in each of these basins is only around
260 million bbls so they would be classified as "commercial-field"
plays, not "giant field" plays. There are two other commercial-field
plays in other basins with total recoverable reserves of 100 to 250
million barrels. Of these 4 plays 3 are offshore in the continental
margin type basins. For the moment we will concentrate on calculating
parameters for continental margin basins. For the purposes of this
model we need the size of a play which is expected to be found. Since
we do not know what will be founo, we will approimate the average size
of a giant-field play by using the average field sizes and reserves of
plays in type 5 continental margin type basins from around the world
(see Table 4-4). The approximate size of an average giant field play
is estimated to be 1330 million bbls. The approximate size of a
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Table 4-4
Giant Fields and Producing Fields Worldwide in
Passive Continental Margin Type 5 Basins
1) Fields in Basins listed by Klemme (1977) Total Recovery
Northwest Shelf, Australia ~ 700 (nat. gas liq.)
(~ 300) (nat. gas liq.)
(250)
Angola-Congo, West Coast Basin
Malongo W 900
Malongo N-S 600
Emeraude (Congo) (420)
Loango (Congo) (300)
Gabon, West Coast
Grondin (400)
Brazil, Sergipe-Alagoas Basin
Carmopolis (onshore) (185)
Siririzinho (onshore) (50)
Camorim (30-40)
Caioba Guariceuma (20)
2) Additional Giants and Producing Fields
(details released after Klemme 1977 article)
India, West Coast
Bombay High 1500
Bassoin 450
Brazil, Campos Basin
Namorado (260)
Cherne (-120)
Garoupa (-80)
Canada, Grand Banks
Hibernia 1000 total
Source: "Giant Oil Fields of the World", Nehring, 1978
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commercial field which is likely to be found offshore Brazil is
estimated to be 275 million bbls total reserves. These are average
sizes from commercial-field plays in continental margin basins around
the world. It could be argued that the average size of a
commercial-field play around the world may be somewhat larger than the
sizes that remain to be found. A counter argument is that the
continental margin basins are largely unexplored and that sizes found
so far are representative of average sizes to be discovered. A
sensitivity analysis will be performed using a variety of play sizes.
We have already discussed using Klemme's estimates of the
probability of play existence in a single basin. We need to use these
probabilities in the binomial distribution to get the probability of
existence in a group of similar basins. If there is a 0.2 probability
of finding a giant-field play in one type 5 basin then binomial
probability distribution can be used to calculate the probability of
finding exactly one (or two, ...) giant fielas in seven type 5 basins,
as discussed in Section D. Similar calculations can be made for
commercial-field plays. The probabilities of a certain state (e.g., 1
giant-field play and 2 commercial-field plays) occurring in seven
basins is found by multiplying the respective binomial probabilities.
This is true as long as the correlation of giant-field plays and
commercial-field plays is small for the region as a whole. This
correlation appears to be small based on the data from the worldwide
basin study and classification method used by Klemme. The above
binomial calculations provide a series of prior estimates for various
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resource states which may exist in the region.
The productive area of an oil play is another parameter needed for
our model, it is defined to be equal to the sum of the productive areas
of all the fields. Table 4-5 shows the productive area of fields in
various size classes of fields. The areas of the fields are nearly the
same as the areas calculated by Arps and Roberts (1959), also given in
Table 4-5. The measured areas can be cross-checked using the fact that
the projected area of a sphere is proportional to the volume to the
two-thirds power. Indeed, there is an excellent fit using area (Km )
= 2 (reserves in mill. bbls) 2 / 3 for reservoirs from 0.5 to 1.28
million bbls. This relation does not hold as well for larger
deposits. This was also pointed out (Haun, 1976) and by Arps and
Roberts (1952) who calculate that area (Km2) = 2.1 (billion
bbls.)0 .784 It appears that ultimate recovery increases slightly
faster than areal extent since large deposits have a thicker and higher
density oil column. Table 4-5 also gives the areas of oil plays (i.e.,
a group of fields in close proximity which have a skewed
distribution). A billion barrel play such as that in the Reconcavo
basin has a productive area of 237 Km2. This is the area in which an
exploration well would actually strike oil. The productive area and
the area of the structural trap together are about 450 Km2. This is
the area in which an exploration well would strike oil or obtain a
strong indication from structural information that oil is nearby. The
productive area of an average commercial-field play is defined as the
sum of the field productive areas. The productive play area for an
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Table 4-5 Productive Areas of Fields and Plays
Field Size Calculated
(million Average Productive
bbls
recoverable)
.5 to 2
2 to 8
Size
(million bbls) 1 FieldArea (Km )
8 to 32
Previously
Calculated
Productive
Field Area (Km2 3
2.3
5
16
32 to 128
128 to 512
37
n.a.256
Giant-Field
Play:
Play Size
(million bbl
recoverable)
Productive
Area of 4
Play (Km )
Hypothetical
Play (million
bbl recoverable)
Estimated
Play
Producti e
Area (Km )
Bombay High
Region (India)
Hibernia (Canada)
Commercial-Field
Play:
Campos Basin
(offshore)
Sergipe-Alagoas
(offshore)
Northeast Basin
(offshore)
Reconcavo (onshore
rift basin, long
expl. history)
1450
1000+
810
200-400
(preliminary data)
670-880
330
110
1200
-1300
240
170
130
237
1Average size is defined as median between
2Calculated from data on 30
World Oil Data Base derived
3Arps and Roberts, 1959.
In of field size interval.
reservoirs in Brazil and Mexico (IIASA
from Petroconsultants Field Records).
4Productive area of play is defined as sum of field productive areas.
1330
275
570 (H)
380 (M)
280 (L)
200 (H)
170 (M)
130 (L)
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"average" commercial field play with the largest field containing 130
million barrels is approximately 170 Km2 based on the aress of fields
which make up the play. This figure is also approximately equal to the
average the known commercial-field plays in Brazil. In the subsequent
analysis an average commercial-field play productive area is taken to be
170 Km2 . This productive area could range from a high value of 200
Km to a low value of 130 Km2 (see Table 5). For a giant-field play
the median productive area is calculated to be 380 Km2 for a play which
is an average size giant-field play (based on the areas of fields which
make up the play, see data in Tables 4-4 and 4-5). The largest field in
this representative play is 700 million barrels. The area might range
from a high value area of 570 Km2 to a low value of 280 Km2
Prospective area of a basin is defined as the area where an
explorationist would be willing to site exploration wells. The
definition here is used in a broad sense. The entire basin area is used
except for those areas where potential oil plays are almost certainly not
to occur. For offshore basins the shelf areas with very thin sediment
cover and extensive volcanic plateaus are not counted. Offshore areas
include places where water depth is less than 200 m. Onshore the
prospective area is somewhat harder to determine. The basins have an
enormous extensive area. Prospective areas for these basins are taken
from geologic evaluations by Mesner (1964); Sanford (1960); and Pamplona
(1978). These authors define the general areas within the basins which
may contain oil. Table 4-6 summarizes basin prospective areas.
Well-data are derived from Petrobras publications and the AAPG
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journal. Type 1 newfield wildcats are used in the model. These wells
are defined as all wells up to an including the first discovery of a
field in a play. Since only 3 plays have been discovered (in the
continental margin basins), great care was taken to review drilling data
and eliminate the type 2 new-field wildcats which are clustered in the
play to drill for remaining fields in the play. See Annex 4-1 for a
listing of wells drilled by basin as listed by Petrobras. Annexes 4-2
through 4-4 give detailed type 1, type 2 and extension well data for the
continental margin type basins. Annex 4-7 shows offshore well
locations. Detailed well data from the AAPG journal point out that
almost all the wells (offshore wells particuarly) were drilled to
basement rock. Due to this fact the effect of depth on the discovery
process is assumed to be negligible. The well data in these Annexes show
that there were 100 type 1 wells drilled by 1975 in the offshore
continental margin basins, and 240 drilled by 1980. Thus, the first
block of 100 wells discovered 3 "commercial field" plays and the second
block of 140 wells found no plays. These are the key data needed for the
2 stage updating process.
At this point we have compiled all the necesary model parameters for
the offshore margin basins. Table 4-7 shows a summary of all the key
parameters which are used in the FORTRAN computer program to produce the
base case results. These parameters are for the seven continental margin
type basins, which have a calculated total prospective area of 158,000
Km2 for regions with water depth down to 200 meters (this composes most
of all of the basin area). Prior probabilities on the existence of oil
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Table 4-6. Sedimentary Basins of Brazil
Name of Basin Type of Basin 1 Prospective Area 2 (km2)
Offshore
Santos
Campos
Espirito Santo
Bahia
Sergipe-Al agaos
Potiguar
barreirinhias
Amazon Delta
100-1,000 mill.
5 (bbl. oil field )
5
5
100-200 mill.
5 (bDl. oil field )
100-200 mill.
5 (bbl. oil field )
8 (non-commercial gas field)
Onshore
Upper Amazon 1 (gas field)
Middle and Lower
Amazon
Parnaiba
Parana
Reconcavo
1 (very small oil and gas)
1
(1,200 mill.
3 bbl. oil field)
(middle, 130
200,000 lower, 70)
70,000
145,000
20,000
1Type of basin is based on classification by Klemme (1975).
2Prospective area of offshore basins (less tnan 200 meters water depth)
is area of basin minus area of very shallow shelf regions and volcanic
plateau of the Espirito Santo shelf. Exploratory area of onshore
cratonic basins were taken from geologic evaluations (Mesner, 1964;
Sanford, 196u; Pamplona, 1978).
45,000
21,100
15,600
15,600
14,000
21,250
26,000
31,500
140,000
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Table 4-7. Summary of
(Type 5) in
Number of basins
Total prospective area
Water Depth
Key Data Used for Base Case for Continental Basins
Brazil
7 (offshore)
158,000 Km2
0 to 200 meters
1975 (end) 1980 (end)
Number of exploratory wells drilled
Type 1 newfield wildcats
Type 1 + Type 2 newfield wildcats
Total exploratory wells
100
123
147
240
347
441
Number of Type 1 wells drilled in
first set (i.e. up to end 1975) 100
Number of Type 1 wells drilled in
second set (i.e. from 1976 to end 1980) 140
Giant-Field Commercial-Field
Plays Plays
Prior probability per basin 0.2 0.3
Average size (mmb) 1330 275
Productive area (Km2) 380(M) 170(M)
Discoveries until end 1975
Discoveries 1976 until end 1980
Prior Probabilities on Exploration Efficiency Efficiency
1
2
3
Prior
.25
.25
.25
.25
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plays are from Klemme. Prior probabilities on the exploration
efficiency are assumed to be equally likely for each efficiency from 1
to 4, as we believe that true efficiency should lie within this broad
range. The first set of 100 exploration wells discovered 3 small plays
and the second set of 140 wells discovered no plays. These facts allow
for the updating process to be completed in two stages. The updating
process using these parameters compose the base case. Results and
sensitivity analysis is discussed in the next section.
4-5. Estimates of Undiscovered Resources
The model described in the previous sections was applied to the 7
continental margin basins, 1 offshore delta and 4 onshore cratonic
basins. The Reconcavo rift basin was not studied because of its very
mature stage of development. Since all the recent plays discovered
(three total) have been in the continental margin basins the bulk of
the modelling effort is devoted to understanding the undiscovered
resources in these 7 continent margin offshore basins. The initial
prior probabilities for each possible resource state (states for the
groups of 7 offshore basins) were multiplied by the prior probabilities
on exploration efficiency (equal likelihood for efficiencies 1 through
4). Each of these results were multiplied by the likelihood that the
observed exploration history would occur conditional on the resource
state being the true state and the exploration efficiency being the
true efficiency. The likelihood function is based on a model of
exploration represented as areal exhaustion using sampling without
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replacement. The parameters used to calculate the likelihood function
include the play productive area, basin prospective area, number of new
field wild cats and observed play discoveries (as discussed in section
3-F). The product of the priors and the likelihoods are normalized
according to Bayes Theorem, to sum to one.
The process is repated in a second round using the results from the
first round as "priors" for the second round and using likelihoods
calculated from observed discoveries of the second block of wells. The
final posterior probabilities give the most likely probabilities of oil
occurrence and the most likely probabilities of the past exploration
efficiency.
The above process was complete for the continental margin basins.
The same process was repeated for the deltaic basin and the onshore
cratonic basins, but since there were no discoveries observed only a
one step updating process was necessary. The model was then used to
generate the probabilities of future discovery by calculating the sum
of all probabilities which generate a certain discovery pattern (i.e.
the unconditional probabilities). These probabilities of future
discovery converge to the probabilities of oil occurrence at the point
where there are enough exploration wells to exhaust the prospective
are a.
5-A. Continental Margin Basins
The prior probabilities (derived from priors calculated by Klemme)
are dispersed broadly over the 15 possible states for the 7 basins.
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They decline generally in value as the number of fields increases as
shown in Table 7. Four priors were placed on the exploration
efficiency with each efficiency from 1 to 4 equally likely. The
posterior probabilities were calculated by updating the prior in two
stages, with 3 small plays discovered with the first 100 wells and 0
plays discovered with the next 140 wells. All basic parameters for the
calculation were given in Table 4-7 with detailed computer results
given in Appendix A. Base case results are derived from the most
likely parameter values (Table 4-7) and the most realistic description
of the exploration process (model A). Base case results (Table 4-8)
show a very significant narrowing of probabilities for various states.
For example, the prior probability that no large plays and three small
plays are all that exist offshore Brazil was 0.048 (as can be seen from
Table 4-8). The posterior probability is 0.479. Since three plays
have already been found, this implies that there is a 48 percent chance
no more will be found. This together with the other results shown in
Table 4-8 imply that there is a 48 percent chance no more plays exist,
a 33 percent one small play exists, a 13 percent chance 2 more small
plays exist and a 2 percent chance one large play exists.
The prior probabilities on exploration efficiency are 0.25 for each
efficiency from 1 to 4. The posterior probabilities on the exploration
efficiency focus on the higher values, with an 80 percent chance of the
exploration efficiency being 3 or 4. This reflects the information
incorporated in the fact that 3 plays were discovered quickly and no
more discovered with the second block of wells. These results indicate
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Prior and Posterior Probabilities for
Resource States in Continental Margin Basins
Offshore Brazil
State1
no. of no. of
large small
lays plays
Prior
Probability2
.048
.020
.005
.083
.036
.009
.062
.027
.007
.026
.011
.003
.007
.003
.001
Posterior
Probability
Base Case3
(Model A)
.479
.334
.129
.023
.028
.012
.006
.007
.004
.002
.u02
.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
Posterior
Probability
(Model B)4
.797
.146
.033
.006
.008
.004
.002
.002
.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001
Exploration Efficiency
.25
.25
.25
.25
.04
.16
.28
.52
.05
.13
.31
.51
1 A large play is defined as a play with at least one giant field
(giant-field play). Average play size is 1330 million bbls (all
fields). A small play is a commercial-field play (with average size
275 million bbls).
2Prior probabilities are for the seven continental margin basins.
These probabilities are generated from Klemme's estimate for an
average continental margin basin (.2 probability of a giant-field play
and a .3 probability of a commercial-field play per basin). Priors
for states with fewer than 3 small plays are not shown, likelihoods
for these states are zero.
3Model A assumes a play composed of 5 major fields dispersed over
region that is 5 times greater than the productive area of the play.
4Model B assumes that a play is a single unit (not dispersed).
Table 4-8
__lll__t__L*LLII___L___I__ LII
f r
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that it is 14 times more likely that the exploration process has been
efficient (with an efficiency of 4 and implying little oil remaining to
be found) as opposed to inefficient exploration (with an efficiency of
1 implying large amounts of oil may remain to be found). The expected
amount of oil remaining to be discovered can be calculated using the
average expected sizes of the oil plays (1330) -million bbls for a large
play, 275 million bbls for a small play). The expected amount of oil
to be found in the continental margin basins is 250 million bbls.
Base case results just discussed are for model A, which assumes a
play is composed of 5 major fields dispersed over an area 5 times
greater than the productive area of the play. This represents an
average play as observed from Petroconsultants data. Exploration for
this type of play is a more realistic description of the exploration
process. Model B (results also shown in Table 4-8) is a simpler model
where a play is one continuous unit. As can be seen expected
probabilities of additional oil are smaller, reflecting the fact that
exploration wells exhaust more area in model B than model A. Model B
was included to give some idea of the sensitivity of the results to
continuous play model as opposed to a dispersed play model, but for the
remainder of the analysis the more realistic dispersed play model (A)
will be used.
In order to test the sensitivity of the results of model A to
changes in various parameters, 12 different sensitivity analyses were
run on the computer. The results are shown in Table 4-9. In all the
cases the posterior on the efficiency of exploration strongly indicates
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Table 4-9
State
no. of no. of
large small I
plays plays
.48
.33
.13
.02
.03
.01
Base Case A2
Case Al (deposit sizes
down
30 percent)
.48
.33
.13
.02
.03
.01
LCase A3
(prospective
area up
20 percent)
,.39
.D2
Case A4
(prospective
area down
20 percent)
.62
.27
.06
.03
.01
.01
Exploration Efficiency
E[Amt] (mmb)
E(Amt], next
50 wells
E[Amt], next
100 wells
E[Amt], next
200 wells
E[Amt], next
500 wells
.03
.16
.28
.52
250
64
125
176
237
.04
.16
.28
.52
172
88
124
167
,.05
.17
.29
.50
331
127
22-4
.04
.14
.30
.52
156
121
307 150
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Table 4-9 (cont.)
State
no. of no. of
.large small
plays plays
Case A5
(if a play is
extension of
onshore play)
.48
.32
.09
.02
.02
.01
Case A6
(if 1 large
and 2 small
discovered)
.40
.35
.18
.03
.02
.01
Case A7
(prior
on eff. 2
changed)
.44
.36
.10
.03
.03
.02
Case A8
(prior on
state down
50 percent)
.66
.26
.04
.02
.01
.01
Exploration Efficiency
1
2
3
4
E[Amt] (mmb)
E(Amt], next
50 wells
E[Amt], next
100 wells
E[Amt], next
200 wells
E[Amt], next
500 wells
1Sergipe-Alagoas mig
case additinal area
case parameters.
ht be considered extension of onshore play, in this
and additional onshore wells are added to the base
2Prior on efficiency set at p = .1 (for e = 1), p = .4 (for e = 2),
p = .4 (for e = 3), p = .1 (for e = 4).
.04
.16
.28
.52
241
.04
.17
.27
.50
318
115
.03
.23
.41
.33
275
69
131
192
268
.02
.12
.28
.58
130
33
66
95
122
180
242
306229
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Table 4-9 (cont.)
State
no. of no. of
large small
plays plays
Case A9
(prior on
state up
50 percent)
.32
.34
.15
.03
.04
.02
Case A10
(both play
areas up
25 percent)
.78
.13
.04
.02
.02
.01
Case All
(both play
areas down
25 percent
.27
.25
.11
.12
.13
.05
Case A12
(prior for
giant .1
commercial .3)
.70
.23
.06
.004
.007
.002
Exploration Efficiency
1
2
3
4
E[Amt] (mmb)
E(Amt], next
50 wells
E[Amt], next
100 wells
E[Amt], next
200 wells
E[Amt], next
500 wells
.09
.21
.26
.44
447
115
221
304
.05
.15
.29
.51
112
.03
.16
.33
.48
592
136
235
400
.03
.18
.36
.43
110
426 107 565 100
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that exploration has been efficient, 3 to 4 times that of random
drilling. The expected amount of oil remaining to be discovered varies
from 90 to 330 mmb for 10 of the cases and in the 400 to 600 mmb range
for 2 cases. The reasons why higher expected amounts may occur are when
prior,, probabilities are 50 percent higher or if the average productive
areas of plays are reduced 25 percent. For the average areas of all
plays to be lower means that remaining play areas be substantially
smaller than those found. Although this event is unlikely, it cannot be
ruled out (stranger occurrences have happened in oil exploration). There
are, however, several strong reasons to believe that the expected amount
to be discovered is in the 100 to 300 mmb range (i.e the range of the
base case and 10 of the 12 sensitivity analyses).
1) Average size (mmb) of remaining plays in this basin type may be
smaller than average sizes of already discovered plays.
2) Exploration may indeed be more efficient than the 3 to 4 range
calculated due to improved technology and high cost of offshore
drilling. This would imply little remaining to be found.
3) This model assumes that the exploration efficiency is constant
over the exploration period. It may indeed be the case that
exploration efficiency changes, but if it changes, it is more
likely to increase (rather than decrease) as the technology
improves and geologic environments become better understood. If
the efficiency increases over time, this implies there is less
undiscovered oil remaining than predicted by the constant
.efficiency model.
4) If it is believed that the priors on the state are too high, or
) I _~b_ __ _~I_ ~LI.~_III-_~--IXIIXI^-ti LI _I~--P~
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if the prospective area is actually smaller or if play areas
larger, then little oil remains to be discovered. Here is a
strong possibility that geologists who are experts on
Brazilian Basins would reduce the prospective area and may
believe priors are somewhat high.
Given all the uncertainties involved the plain fact that all the
various sensitivity analyses produce results in the rather narrow range
of 100 to 600 mmb is encouraging for the validity of the model. This
amount of oil is small by global standards. But to look at the
expected value of oil remaining to be found can itself be misleading.
It is more useful to look at the probabilities calculated. For most
all the cases there is a 50 percent chance nothing remains to be found,
33 percent chance one small play remains, 13 percent chance 2 small
plays remain and 4 percent chance a giant-field play remains.
The results indicate that exploration by Petrobras has been
relatively efficient and the majority of offshore oil has been found.
This has some valuable policy implications for Petrobras. Petrobras is
in a dilemma if it claims to be efficient in oil exploration and
simultaneously claims that large undiscovered fields remain to be
discovered. The extensive exploration program Petrobras has undertaken
has served to reduce the uncertainty surrounding the resource base and
thus reduce their bargaining strength with major oil companies
interested in exploration risk contracts. (More analysis of this
problem will be done later.)
The analysis of oil resources in the Amazon delta and onshore
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basins is somewhat simpler since no plays have been discovered. Deltas
typically contain numerous small oil fields instead of a skewed
distribution. Given that 57 wells have not located a single oil
deposit the model implies only an 11 percent chance of 650 mmbs (see
Annex 4-5). Onshore basins are enormous in area and the chances are 80
percent that hydrocarDons are gas (instead of oil). The model projects
a 15 percent chance of 250 mmb and a 10 percent chance of 1400 mmb with
discoveries slow to be found due to the large areas involved (see Annex
4-6).
A summary of all production reserve and resource data is compiled
in Table 4-10. Cumulative production has been 1051 mmb (6/79) and
remaining proved and probable reserves are 1467 mmb. This study
calculates 176 mmb left to be discovered in fields in known plays and
500 mmb expected to be found in new plays (with a range from 0 to 1600
mmb). The results from this study are compared to other available
resource estimates for Brazil, in Table 4-11. The results from this
study compare reasonably well (within 3 percent) to industry estimates
provided in Adelman-Paddock (1979). This study estimates 1817 mmb
onshore and 1377 offshore. The industry estimates are 1700 onshore and
1600 offshore. World Energy Report (1980) estimates are based heavily
on Brazilian government estimates are put at 4546 mmb total resources.
II ~I i_ __^____~~_r~l ^ IU_ I^_~ ~L_ _ ~_~_(_L~i~
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Table 4-10 Summary of Production, Reserve and Resource Data for Brazil
(million bbls)
Cumu-
lative
Production
Region 6/79
Proved
Recover-
able
Reserves
6/79
Remaining
Proved +
Probable
Recoverable
Reserves
Estimate of
Resources
in Fields
in Known
Plays
Estimate of
Resources in
in Undis-
covered
Plays
Reconcavo
(onshore)
Segipe-Al agoas
onshore
offshore
Northeast Basin
(oofshore)
Campos Basin
Other
Continental Margin
(offshore)
Basins
.48 chance of
.33 chance of
.13 chance of
.05 chance of
E(V) = 245
Amazon Delta (offshore)
0
275
550
1605
.89 chance of 0
.11 chance of 650
E(V) = 67
Onshore Cratonic Basins .75 chance of
.15 chance of
.10 chance of
E(V) = 188
0
250
1400
Totals
Total
Production,
Reserves
and Resources
1051
3194
1226 1467
onshore-1817
offshore 1377
Source: Cumulative production and proved reserves from Petrobras; proved
and probable reserves from IIASA world oil database based on
Petroconsultants data; resource estimates calculated in this study.
870
129
41
445
141
50
475
150
95
87
660
5
6
45
120541
176 500
158
Table 4-10 Comparison of Alternative Estimates of Oil Reserves
and Resources in Brazil
(million barrels)
Gray (1981, this study):
Cumulative Production (6/79) 1051
Proved Recoverable Reserves (6/79) 1226
Probable Reserves 241
Resources from Undiscovered Fields in Known Plays 176
Expected Resources in Undiscovered Plays 533
TOTAL 3194
Adelman and Paddock (1980):
Cumulative Production (1975)
Proved Reserves (1975)
Total Ultimate Discoverable
World Energy Conference (1980):
Cumulative Production (1978)
Proved Reserves (1978)
Estimated Additional Resources
- Known Petroleum Regions
- Other Regions
(1817 onshore,
1377 offshore)
900
700
3300
(1700 onshore,
1600 offshore)
1031
1140
1818
557
4546
'"'~~~""~--^ "~~'-" ~' ~'~~- ~I~T~
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4-7. Application of Model to Project the Probability of Future Oil
Discoveries as a Function of Future Exploration Wells.
In the previous sections historical discovery data were used to
estimate the probabilities that a certain resource state and a certain
exploration efficiency were the true underlying state of nature. In
this section the model was run for blocks of future exploration wells
using the base case results. The new discovery likelihoods were
multiplied by each of the state probabilities and the results added to
produce the "unconditional" probabilities for all the various possible
future discoveries. The results for the offshore marginal basins are
given in Table 4-11. As can be seen from the Table, the probability
that 100 more wells (type 1 wildcats) will discover 1 small play is
0.26, and a 0.68 chance that no plays will be found. As more and more
wells are drilled, the prospective area becomes exhausted and the
probabilities eventually equal the base case posterior probabilities
calculated earlier (in Tables 4-7 and 4-8). In the case of the
offshore marginal basins, 500 more wells "exhaust" the prospective
area. An expected amount of oil discovered can then be calculated for
each level of future exploration (as shown earlier in the sensitivity
analysis in Table 4-8).
The rate at which oil is expected to be discovered is important
information for evaluating an exploration program. The returns to
exploration diminish rather rapidly for the offshore marginal basins
(Table 4-11). Returns are greater for 500 to 200 wells as compared to
200 to 500 wells.
LIIU- _LI~I .1ii~-11^1111-113111
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Table 4-11
Number
of Wells
100
200
300
400
500
Probabilities of Discovery of Oil Plays Offshore Brazill
Probability of discovery of:
No Plays
.68
.56
.53
.50
.48
1 small play3(~ 275 mmb)
.26
.32
.32
.33
.33
2 small plays
(~ 550 mmb)
.04
1 large
1 small
(~ 1330 +
.02
.09
.11
.12
.13
and
play
275 mmb)
.03
.04
.05
.05
1These
margin
are the probabilities of new plays discovered in all continental
basins of Brazil, which includes all basins except the Amazon delta.
2Wells are type 1 wildcat wells exploring for unknown plays, which do not
include wildcat wells exploring for new fields in the immediate vicinity of
know oil plays.
3The average size of small (commercial field) plays is estimated to be
275 mmb, and 1330 mmb the average size of large (giant field) plays in this
geologic type of basin.
~I_ _I_ _ X~_^r 1_1_ II-*I~~-XYI_-II~.I ..~LI-I--IYICX_^IC I IW-Il llli
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The probabilities of discovery as a function of future exploration
wells for the onshore cratonic basins are given in Table 4-12. The
returns to exploration onshore diminish rather slowly, but the number
of wells required is very large (1200 wells to "exhaust" the
prospective area). This is due to the enormously large basin areas to
explore. This was calculated using an assumed exploration efficiency
of 3 (using theefficiencyof offshore basins, 3-4, as a guide). Since
no oil plays in cratonic basins have been found, the two-stage updating
procedure was unable to refine our prior estimate of efficiency. The
efficiency in onshore basins may be higher for structural traps than
stratigraphic traps, and if the overall efficiency is greater than 3,
the rate of expected discovery would be somewhat grater than shown in
Table 4-12.
The probability of oil discovery in the Amazon delta is shown in
Table 4-13. It is assumed here that if there is any oil found in the
delta it will be'found in one play which consists of roughly 10 fields
of equal size. Deltas typically contain more uniform field size
distributions than other basins. The example probabilities in Table
4-13 are the probabilities of discovery of a certain number of fields.
As the number of wells drilled approaches 300 the probability
approaches 1 that all 10 fields will be found conditional on one play
existing. The probability that one play exists in the light of past
dry holes, however, was estimated earlier in this chapter to be only
0.11.
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Table 4-12 Probabilities of Discovery of Oil Plays in the Onshore
Cratonic Basins 1 of Brazil
Probability of Discovery
1 Small Play
(~ 250 mmb)
0.04
0.12
0.14
0.15
of:
1 Large and I Small
Play (1250-1400 mmb)
0.025
0.07
0.09
0.109O.D?
10nshore cratonic basins are the Amazon, Maranhao and Parana basins. These
probabilities were calculated with the model and basic parameters from
Annex 4-6.
Number
of Wells
No Plays
(0 mmb)
100
500
1000
1200
0.93
0.81
0.76
0.75
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Table 4-13 Probability of Discovery of Oil in the Amazon Delta, 1
Offshore Brazil
No plays or
fields
(o mmb)
0.98
0.95
0.92
0.89
Probability of Discovery of:
One oil
play
0.02
0.05
0.08
0.11
Number of fields
found
2 (~ 130 mmb)
3 (~ 165 mmb)
6 (~ 390 mmb)
10 (~ 650 mmb)
1A delta, if it contains any oil is expected to have one play wih fields of
roughly equal size. Here it is assumed that if oil is found, up to 10 fields
of average size (65 mmb per field based on average sizes worldwide-- Nehring)
may be discovered. Probabilities were calculated from model and parameters
shown in Annex 4-5.
Number
of Wells
100
200
300
~~___1^ _ )lr_~___*1_ CX
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The probabilities of oil discovery for the groups of basins shown
in the previous three tables are calculated for various blocks of
fuvture exploration wells. An equivalent method of calculating the
expected value of future exploration is to assume 100 more wells are
drilled and recalculate the posterior probabilities for each possible
9utcome. The results from this approach are shown in in Table 4-14
(for the offshore marginal basins). The probabilities of discovery
with 100 additional wells (i.e. 200 wells total) are calculated
conditional on the outcome of the first 100 wells. By folding back
this probability tree, the expected value for 200 wells (mmb
discovered) is the same as calculated by the first method. This form
of presenting the probabilities does have advantages for decision
makers in formulating an exploration strategy, once costs and benefits
are attached the various options can be weighed. Since exploration is
sequential in nature it can be stopped at any point. This approach
allows a decision maker to formulate plans, such as - If 100 more wells
produce no discoveries, exploration will be stopped, if 100 more wells
find one small play, exploration will be continued, etc. The next
chapter will use the probabilities (Tables 4-11, 4-12, 4-13) and
conditional probabilities (Table 4-14) to calculate net present values
and strategies for exploration programs.
At this point it is useful to summarize the expected rate of oil
discovery for the various basin groups in Brazil, as shown in Table
4-15. These are expected amounts but previous Tables give a more
accurate -picture of the skewed distribution of possible outcomes. In
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Table 4-14 Conditional Probabilities of Oil Play
Marginal Basins in Brazil
Discovery in Offshore
Probability of Discovery of:
1 small play 2 small plays
(-275 mmb) (-550 mmb)
.26 .04
1 large play
(-1330 mmb)
.02
Conditional on
plays discovered
with first 100 wells
No plays discovered
One small discovered
Two small discovered
One large discovered
After 100 wells drilled, conditional
probabilities of discovery with 100
additional wells (i.e. 200 total) are:
Plays
.83
.89
.995
1 small
play
.14
.10
.004
2 small
plays
.027
.006
.0005
1 large
play
.003
.001
.001
.825 .135
Number
of wells
100
No plays
.68
.026 .007
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Table 4-15 Summary of Expected Amount of Oil (million bbls) to be
Discovered as a Function of Wildcat Exploration Wells
(cumulative wells and cumulative amounts)
1. Offshore - Continental Margin Basins
Undiscovered Plays
Wells(type 1) Amount(mb)
50
100
200
500
64
125
176
237
Undiscovered Fields in Known Plays2
Wells(type 2) Amount(mmb)
72
112
133
2. Offshore - Amazon Delta
Undiscovered Plays
Wells(type 1) Amount(mmb)
100
200
300
3. Onshore - Cratonic Basins
Undiscovered Plays
Wells(type 2) Amount(mmb)
100
500
1000
1200
130
170
180
1From Tables 4-11, 4-12, 4-13.
290 percent in Campos Basin, 10 percent in Northeast and S-A Basin.
Calculated from discovery rate trends in Figure 4-9.
_--IX-C-^~I~I-~I -~ -_-.l^i-~i~-i-~ . i.  ~-~ ^(-~ P YY^~I~
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order to translate these results into a meaningful geologic and
economic evaluation, costs and benefits must be assessed and then
discounted at the appropriate cost of capital. This is the subject of
the next chapter.
ANNEXES
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Listing of Oil Wells Drilled in Brazil up to April 30, 1979
Extention & Total drilledBasin Wildcats Development in ineters
Acre 11 - / 25,384
Upper Amazonas 20 - 32,558
Middle and Lower Amazonas 126 - 232,419
Maraj6 14 - 31,125
Braganga-Vizeu 2 - 4,168
Sio Luiz 13 - 26,842
O Barreirinhas 58 - 137,013
N Maranhio 24 - 47,999
S Potiguar 5 - 7,280
H Coastline PB/PE 1 - 406
O Sergipe - Alagoas 420 741 1,231,817
R Jatobi 2 - 3,586
E Tucano North 2 - 8,366
Tucano Central 13 - 30,950
Tucano South 79 15 196,982
Rec6ncavo 710 2,208 3,529,575
Almada 3 - 4,160
Jequitinhonha 3 - 12,005
Cumuruxatiba 3 - 4,030
Mucuri 1 - 590
Espirito Santo 77 27 194,421
Campos 1 - 2,620
Parani 71 - 163,489
Pantanal - MT 12 - 2,624
Pelotas 7 - 3,570
Onshore total 1,678 2,991 5,933,979
Amapi/ Pari 36 - 122,546
Barreirinhas 8 - 21,531
Piaui/Ceari 32 - 78,986
O Potiguar 31 24 133,481
F Sergipe/Alagoas 98 83 383,676
F Rec6ncavo 7 - 14,375
S Camamu 2 - 6,945
H Almada 6 - 14,416
O Jequitinhonha 6 - 18,855
R Cumuruxatiba 24 - 70,263
E Mucuri 3 - 7,581
Espirito Santo 35 - 113,332
RJ - Campos 112 8 342,047
SP/PR - Santos 10 - 32,793
Pelotas I - 5,200
Offshore total 411 115 1,366,027
Source: Petrobrs - DEPEX.
A 1ZM e ~ 4--1
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Campos Basin
Annex 4-2
Exploratory Wells Drilled in Continential Margin
Type Basins Offshore Brazil (by end 1975)
New-Field Wildcats Total Exploratory Wells 1
Type 1 Type 1
+
Type 2
-16 25 29
Sergipe-Alagaos
Basin -18
Northeast Basin
(Ceara and Potiguar) -10
Other Basins2  -56
Total -100
12
56
123
12
56
147
1New-field wildcats plus new-pool tests plus extension wells.
2Other includes all remaining offshore basins except Amazon Delta
Source: Derived from data from Brazil Energy (Dec. 5, 1979), APPG World
Development Issues (1968-1979).
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Annex 4-3
Exploratory Wells Drilled in
Type Basins Offshore Brazil
New-Field Wildcats
Type 1 Type 1
Continential Margin
(by end May 1979)
Total Exploratory Wells 1
Type 2
Campos Basin -30
Sergipe-Alagaos
Basin -35
Northeast Basin
(Ceara and Potiguar) -24
Other Basins2 -94
Total -183
94
274
112
94
344
1New-field wildcats plus new-pool tests plus extension wells.
7ther includes all remaining offshore basins except Amazon Delta
Source: Derived from data from Brazil Energy (Dec. 5, 1979), APPG World
Development Issues (1968-1979).
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Annex 4-4
Exploratory Wells Drilled in Continental Margin
Type Basins Offshore Brazil (by end 1980)
Wildcats
Type 1
Total Exploratory Wells 1
Type 2
Campos Basin
Sergipe-Al agaos
Basin
-36
-35
142
104
Northeast Basin
(Ceara and Potiguar) -34
Other Basins2
Total
-139
-240
139
347
139
441
1New-field wildcats plus new-pool tests plus extension wells.
ZOther includes all remaining offshore basins except Amazon Delta
Source: Derived from data from Brazil Energy (Dec. 5, 1979 and March 24,
1980, August 10, 1980), APPG World Development Issues
(1968-1979). Data for 1980 are from estimates of drilling to be
completed made in the first six months of 1980.
New-Field
Type 1
_ii~-ll~--_ll_ ~-L--_---_
I
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Annex 4-5
Summary of Key Data for Amazon Delta Offshore Brazil
Number of basins 1 (type 8)
Deposit size distribution largest field 9-10 percent of total reserves
appoximately 10 of equal size
Average field size 65 million barrels
Productive area 36 Km2
Prior probability 0.5 of 10 commercial fields
0 of any giant fields
Prospective areas 31,500 Km2 (delta only)
62,000 Km2 (delta and surrounding
carbonate shelf)
Discoveries (up to end 1980) 0 commercial fields
Wells drilled (up to end 1980)
By Petrobras 50
By Foreign Oil Companies 11
61 (57 in delta only)
Likelihood
L(w = 57, c - O, e = 3, B = 31,500, ci = 10)= .11 chance of 650 mmb
.89 chance of 0 mmb
E[amt] = .5(.11)(65)(10) = 72 mmb
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Annex 4-6
Summary of Key Data and Results for Onshore Cratonic Basins (Type 1)
Four basins with total prospective area1 555,000 Km2
Probability of large play .1 to .2 per basin (productive are 360 Km2
small play .2 to .3 per basin 2 (productive area 150
Km2 )
Probability of gas3 .8, probability of oil .2
Number of newfield wildcats drilled 227, end 1980
Exploration efficiency = 3
Number of oil plays discovered 0
Average size of commercial-field play in type 1 basin 250 mmb
giant field play in type 1 basin 1000 mmb
Results
.75 chance of 0 mmb
.15 chance of 250 mmb E(V) = 188
.10 chance of 1400 mmb
E(Amt. discovered)
100 wells 47 mmb
500 wells 130 mmb
1000 wells 170 mmb
1From Table 4-6.
2From Klemme 1978.
3Eighty percent of Paleozoic hydrocarbons are gas. Onshore basins are
large Paleozoic and have characteristics more conducive to gas formation,
not oil.
Annexr
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APPENDIX A - DERIVATION AND DISCUSSION OF LIKELIHOOD
CALCULATION AND BAYESIAN UPDATING METHODOLOGY
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1) Empirical Approach to Calculate Likelihood
The first is an empirical calculation using exploration data around
the world, the second approach makes use of a probabilistic exploration
process model. To maKe an empirical calculation of the number of wells
it takes to find a play of a given size the minimum we need to know is
the total number of fields in the basin, field size, and the area of the
basin. Examples from a few basins are given below:
Number of wells
Offshore until field Area of 2 Field Size
Basin discovered Basin Km (mill. bbls)
Sergipe-Alagaos (Brazil) 2 14,000 -180
Campos (Brazil 18 23,000 -800-1000
Grand Banks (Canada) 41 102,000 -1500-5000
(Hibernia)
Scotia Shelf (Canada) -18 -45,000 -200
One procedure to calculate the likelihood would be to estimate the
number of wells to discovery divided by basin area (W/B = x). This
could then be used as the mean Poisson "arrival time" of the field
discovery where the probability of discovery would be a Poisson
distribution
p = e (-).
There are several problems with this empirical approach. The
exploration process is different onshore vs. offshore and it is
different today as compared with the past. If we are trying to model
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the modern exploration process then data from partially explored basins
is truncated because we do not know how many fields will ultimately be
found. If we use data from well explored basins (mostly onshore) then
these do not give an accurate representation of the modern exploration
process (particularly offshore exploration). This empirical approach
will be abandoned at this point in favor of a more comprehensive
exploration process that is used in this study.
2) Probabilistic Exploration Model to Calculate Likelihood
The second approach is to measure the probability of the observed
discovery history occurring given that a certain state of nature
exists. In order to do this it is assumed that a field consists of
numerous fields in close proximity and similar geologic origin. The
productive area of the oil of all the fields in the play is defined to
be the productive area of the play. For the moment the play is
considered to be one continuous target such that one well (type one
exploration well) drilled into the target will discovery the play. It
is also assumed that the area that a dry hole exhausts is the area of
the target play area
(A.), which lies within a basin of area B (as shown by Drew and Root,
1978). If we begin with the assumption that exploration can be modelled
by random drilling, then the probability of hitting an oil field of area
Aj on the first well (Hlj) in a basin of area B, conditional on state i
(Si) existing is:
njAj
P(Hj/Si) .B
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where state Si consists of nj plays each of area Aj.
The probability of a dry hole occurring on the first well (Di) is:
p(Di/S i ) = 1 - P(Hlj/Si)
The probability of hitting a play of area A. on the second well,
conditional on the first well being dry is:
n Aj Area of oil size class j
P(H2j/S1' D1) = B-A. - Total Area - area exhausted by first dry well
Similarly, the probability of the second well being dry, conditional on
the first being dry is:
p(D2/S i , D1) = 1- p(H2j/, D1) =
More generally, the probability of well w being dry, conditional on Si
existing and all previous wells being dry is:
p(D/S w Si ) = 1 - p(H w/Si, Dwl)
where,
n.A.
p(H /Si Dw ) -P(Hwji' w-1 B-(w-1)A.
These probabilities can be multiplied to give the probability that all
wells from 1 to k will be dry:
(all wells w=1 k nAj
through K dry/S = w= jB-wA
It also can be expanded to give the probability of any discovery sequence
occurring. For example, the probability of k dry wells occurring, then a
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discovery of size Ai, then M dry wells occurring is:
p(k dry, 1 size All/Si) T (1 T j-n x ( n A1
M dry 1 J-A X 1X
k+l+M n(1-A .- 1A1
-I (1 B - (k+1+M)A
w--K+1 jj
The above formulation gives the likelihood for the discovery sequence
occurring conditional on the existence of ni fields are area Aj.
The approach described above explicitly accounts for sampling without
replacement with area being exhausted by both dry wells and discoveries.
The exact sequence of dry and wet wells is not usually known but it is
usually easy to find out that a certain number of plays were discovered
by a specific number of wells (e.g., 3 plays discovered with 1200 type
one wildcat exploration wells). The formulation above can be shown to
reduce to a hypergeometric'distribution which accounts for sampling
without replacement. Consider a region of area B where w* wildcat wells
(type 1) have discovered g* plays, each of productive area AT. The
likelihood that g* dicoveries would have been found conditional on
gi tagets being the true underlying state is given by the hypergeometric
distribution.
(N - gi ) ! w*' (N - w*)! gi
L(g*w*/gi'ei) N (w* - g*) (N - gi - w* + g*)! g*
N = sample space = B/eiAtg
A = productive area of the giant-field play (equal to the sum
of all field areas).
ei = exploration efficiency (random drilling equals one).
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w* number of wells drilled in region (type 1 new field
wildcats).
number of giant-field plays discovered with w* wells.
true number of giant field plays in region.
BASE CASE RESULTS
Play is defined as productive area At. Mo
that play is composed of five pieces (fiel
over an area 5 x At. Sample space is thus
Area/e( .63)At.
del A assumes
ds) dispersed
Basin
Updating - Stage 1
0 giant-field plays,
with 100 wells (type
Case 1 e = 1
Case 2 e = 2
Case 3 e = 3
Case 4 e = 4
3 commercial-field plays discovered
1 newfield wildcats)
Updating - Stage 2
no plays foundin next 140 wells
Case 5 e = 1
Case
Case
e=2
e= 3
Case 8 e = 4
Posterior probabilities from Stage 2 are final results
NOTE:
A2 is likelihood of giant-field play discovery conditional on state
Al is likelihood of commercial-field play discoveries conditional on
state
Fields on computer printout actually refer to plays
g*
gi
Model A -
.FILEt OILEX5 FORTRAN A CONVERSATIONAL MONITOR SYSTEM PAGE 001
DIMENSION A(4) .PROBA(4.6,6), PRIOR(50) .AC(6) ,APRI (50), PRC(15), OIL00010
S1PRG(15).APRO(50).POST PO(50 ) PRIOR2(5) .AX(10) I0L00020
DIMENSION W(4),ND(4),SPTL(10),APTL(10.50).APTLF(10,50) O1L00030
READ(5,*) B.LOM.WTBD,(A(1).I1 ,2),LOM2 OI L00040
READ(5,*) (ACIJ), I1=1,6) 0IL00050
READ(5,*) (AX (),I=1.6) IL00060
READ(5,*) BAS.PPG, PPC 01L00070
READ(5,*) BADS,SADS.BADS2,SADS2 OIL00080
READ(5,*) IY,IX.IZ.IW,JN OIL00090
READ (5,*) PVB,PVS,PCW,D OIL00100
5 FORMAT (IX,6(F4.1,1X)) OIL0 0110
A81=A(1)*1000. 0IL00120
AB2=A(2)*1000. OIL00130
WRITE(6,4) B,A81,AB2,LOM,BAS,PPG,PPC OIL00140
1 FORMAT(1X,F10.3,1X,I3,1X,2(F7.31X) ) OIL00150
4 FORMAT(IX,24HAREA OF BASIN(IOEO3KM2):,FIO.3./,IX, OIL001GO
139HPRODUCTIVE AREA OF LARGE DEPOSITS(KM2)I,F7.3,/,IX, O1L00170
239HPPODUCTIVE AREA OF SMALL DEPOSITS(KM2):F7.3,/,X. 01IL00180
332HNUMBER OF WELLS ALREADY DRILLED:,2X,13,/,1X, OIL00190
439HNUMBER OF SEDIMENTARY BASINS IN REGION: ,X,F7.3./.IX, OIL00200
541HPRIOR PROBABILITY OF BIG FIELD PER BASIN:,1X,F7.3./,1X, OIL00210
643HPRIOR PROBASILITY OF SMALL FIELD PER BASIN:,1X,F7.3,/) 0IL00220
50 rORMAT (F10.5) OIL00230
ANR=1 . OIL00240
LP=1 01L00250 I.
DO 7 NGFL=1,5 OIL00260 CO
GFLD=NGFL-1. OIL00270
CALL FACT(GFLD,GFT) OIL00280
CALL FACM(BAS,GFLDGFTM) 01L00290
PRG(NGFL)=(GFTM/GFT) * (PPG**GFLD)* OIL00300
1((1-PPG)**(BAS-GFLD)) O1L00310
DO 8 NCFL=1,6 OIL00320
CFLD=NCFL-1. OIL00330
CALL FACT(CFLD.CFT) OIL00340
CALL F ACTM( BAS.CFLD,CFTM) 01LO0350
PRC(NCFL)=(CFTM/CFT)*(PPC**CFLD) 0003LOO30
1((1-PPC)**(BAS-CFLD)) OIL00370
PRIOR(LP)=PRG(NGFL)*PRC(NCFL) 01L00300
PRIOR2 (LP)=PRIOR(LP) OIL00390
LP=LP+1 OIL00400
8 CONTINUE OIL100410
7 CONTINUE OIL00420
NB=O OILC0430
ALOMS=LO1 . 0CIL00440
MD1 S=BADS+1 OIL00450
MG2S=SADS+t 01L00460
00 400 KX*1.2 OIL00470
IF(KX.EQ.1) GO TO 946 OIL00480
IF(KX.EQ.2)GO TO 999 OIL00490
999 00 937 KZ=I,30 01L00500
LOM=LOM2 OIL00510
BADS= BADS2 OIL00520
SADS=SADS2 01L00530
937 CONTINUE OIL00540
946 CONTINUE OIL00550
4 4
FILE: OILEX5 FORTRAN A CONVERSATIONAL MONITOR SYSTEM PAGE 002
MOImBADS+1 OIL005OG
MD2=SADS+1 01L00570
NDlrMDI-1 01L00580
ND2=MD2-1 OI010590
NO(1).M1 OIL0O600
ND(2)=MD2 OILG0060
ND(3)=MDI 0IL00620
ND(4)=MD2 OIL00630
A(3)=A(1) OIL00640
A(4)=A(2) OIL00650
ALOM2=LOM2 OIL006GO
ALOM=LOM OIL00G70
SMPTL=0 OIL00680
DO 40 ILM=1,IY OIL00690
ABC=ILM*WTBD OIL00700
DO 40 IK=1,IX OIL00710
C=AC(IK) OIL00720
KN=1 OIL00730
NB=NB+ 1 01L00740
IF(NB. LT.IW)WRITE(6,11) NB,ND1,ND2.C 01L00750
11 FORMAT(50X,12HCASE NUMBER:,13,/,50X,19HALREAOY DISCOVERED:, OIL007GO
114,2X,IOHBIG FIELDS,/,65X,4HAND:,I4.2X,12HSMALL FIELDS,/.SOX, OIL00770
223HEKPLORATION EFFICIENCY:,F4.1) 0IL00780
DO 23 J=1,JN OILOC790
IF(KX.EQ.1)AN=B/(C*A(d)) OIL00800
IF(KX.EQ.2)AN=8/(C*A(J))-ALOMS OIL00810 l
IF(J.EQ.3.OR.J.EQ.4)AN=(B/(C*A(d)))-ALOM-ALOMS OIL00820
IF(AN.LT.8.) AN=8. OIL00630
AN=AINT(AN) OIL00040
IF(J.EQ.3.OR.J.EQ.4) W(J)-ABC OIL0050
IF(J.EQ.1.OR.J.EQ.2)W(J)=ALOM OILOCBGO
DES=W(J) OI010070
IF(AN.LT.DES) GO TO 43 OILOOP80
GO TO 44 OILC0090
43 W(J)=AN OIL00900
44 CONTINUE OIL00910
DO 23 JK=1,6 OIL00920
ALD=JK-1. OIL00930
DO 23 KL-JK.6 OIL00940
ALS=KL-1. 0ILC0950
CALL FACTM(AN.ALS.ANS) OILOOSGO
CALL FACTM(W(J),ALO,AOMD) OIL00970
ANOM=AN-W(J) OIL00980
ALSD=ALS-ALD 0IL00990
CALL FACTM(ANCM,ALSD,ANSWD) 01L01000
CALL FACT(ALSD,ASO) OILO1010
CALL FACT(ALS,AS) OIL01020
CALL FACT(ALD,AD) OIL1030
DIV=AD*ASO*ANS 01LC1040
PROBA(J,JK,KL)=AOMD*ANSWD*AS/DIV OIL01050
23 CONTINUE OIL01060
10 FORMAT(15X,E12.5) OIL01070
IF(NB.LT.IW)WRITE(6,31) OIL01080
31 FORMAT(1X,112(1H-)) OIL01090
IF(NB.LT.IW)WRITE(6,32) 01L01100
II
' FILE: OILEX5 FORTRAN A CONVERSATIONAL MONITOR SYSTEM PAGE 003
32 FORMAT(1X,1H+,2(13H NUM3ER OF +),5X,SHPRIOR,6X,IH+,4X, OIL01110
19HA2(W2/A2),3X4X,1H,4X,9HA(WI/A),3X1H+3X,11HPRIOR TIMES, 0IL01120
22X,1H+,3X,1 HPROBABILITY ,2X,1H+) OIL01130
LWI-INT(W(1)) OIL01140
LW2=INT(W(2)) OIL01150
IF(NB.LT.Iw)wqITE(6,33) LW1,LW2 0IL01160
33 FORMAT(1X,1H+,26H BIG FIELDS +SMALL FIELDS+,16X,1H+,3X, 0IL01170
14H(w2=.I4,1H+,4X,1H+,3X,4H(Wis,14,1H),4X,1H+,3X, OIL01160
210HLIKELIHOOD,3X,1H+,2X,10H POSTERIOR,2X,IH+) OIL01190
IF(NB.LT.IW)WRITE(6,3I) OIL01200
SOM1=0 0IL01210
DO 25 LF=MD1S,5 OIL01220
DO 25 LG=MD25.6 01L01230
KL=6*(LF-1)+LG OIL01240
LY=LF-MD1S+I OIL01250
LH=LG-MD2S+1 OIL01260
IF(KX.EQ.1)PRIOR(KL)aPRIOR2(KL)*AX(IK) 0IL01270
IF(KX.EQ.2)PRIOR(KL)=APTLF(IK,KL) OIL01280
IF(KX.EQ.1)APRI(KL)3PRIOR(KL)*PROBA(1,MDIS.LF)*PROBA(2,MD2S,LO) 01L01290
IF(KX.EO.2)APRI(KL)=PRIOR(KL)*PROBA(1,MD1,LY)*PROBA(2.MD2,LH) OIL01300
SOM=SOM+APRI (KL) 0IL01310
SPTL(IK)=SOM 01L01320 0O
APTL(IK,KL)=APRI(KL) OIL01330 C3
25 CONTINUE 0IL01340
SMPTL=SMPTL+ STL( IK) 01350
DO 26 LF=MDS,5 OIL01360
DO 26 LG=MD2S,6 OIL01370
KL=6*(LF-I)+LG 01L01380
LY=LF-MOI1S+l 0IL01390
Lf4=L3-fM-D2S+I OIL01400
APRO(KL)=APRI(KL)/SOM 0IL01410
KN=KN+1 0IL01420
KF=Lr-1 0IL01430
KG=LG-1 OIL01440
IF(NB. LT.IW.AND.KX.EQ.2)WRITE(6,35) KF,KG,PRIOR(KL). 01L01450
1PROBA(1,MDI,LY),PROBA(2,MD2.LH),APRI(KL),APRO(KL) 01L01460
IF(NB. LT.IW.AND.KX.EO.1)WRITE(6,35) KF,.KG,PRIOR(KL), OIL01470
IPROBA(1,MDo1SLF), PROA(2.MD2S, LG),APRI(KL),APRO(KL) OIL01480
26 CONTINUE 01LO1490
35 FORMAT(IX.1H+,2(5X,12,5XIH+),5(3X,FIO.8,3X.,H+)) OIL01500
IF(NB.LT.IW)WRITE(6,31) OIL01510
IF(NB.LT.IW)WRITE(6,36)SOM OIL01520
36 FORMAT ( I+,2(12X,H+,2 H+) ,2(16X,1H+),5X,5HTOTAL,6X,1H+.3X,FIO.8. OIL01530
13X,1H+,16X,1H+) OIL01540
!F(NB.LT.IW)WRITE(6,38) OIL01550
40 CONTINUE 01L01560
WRITE(6,789)SMPTL OIL01570
789 FORMAT(34HPRIOR X LIKELIHOOD, POSTERIOR.SUMu.2X,F10.5) OIL01590
DO 792 LR=1,IX 01L01590
SMDD=O OIL01600
WRITE(6,770)AC(LR) OIL01610
770 FORMAT(13HEXPLOR. EFF.,2X,F4.1) OIL01620
DO 791 LK=MDIS.5 01L01630
SDO 791 LI=hiD2S,6 01L01640
LQ=6*(LK-1)+LI 0IL01650
FILE: OILEX5 FORTRAN A
APTLF(LR.LQ) APTL( LRLQ)/SMPTL
SMDD=SMDD+APTLF(LR.LQ)
791 WRITE(6,7B8) APTL(LR,LQ).APTLF(LR,LO)
WRITE(6,709) SMDD
709 FORMAT(24HPOSTERIOR ON EFFICIENCYw,2X.F1O.8)
788 FORMAT(2(5XFI0.8,5X))
792 CONTINUE
GO TO 400
998 SUMUP=0
PRODEC=O
TVL=0O
VARPV=O
VAR=0O
VARD=O
SD=O
IF(NB. LT.IZ)WRITE(6,69)
IF(NB. LT.IZ)WRITE(6.70)
IF(NO. LT.IZ)WRITE(6.71)
IF(NB. LT.IZ)WRITE(6,69)
DO 66 IL=1,4
DO 66 IdJ1,5
NBF=IL-1
NSF=IJ-1
DEC=O.+NBF*1600.+NSF*310.
VL=N8F*PVB+NSF*PVS-(PCW/100.)*ABC
SUMDO 0
DO 67 LF=IL,4
DO 67 LG=IJ.5
KL=5*(LF-I)+LG
SUMD=SUMD+(PROBA(3,IL,LF)*PROBA(4,1dJ,LG)POST(KL))
85 FORMAT (3X,6(FIO.5,2X))
67 CONTINUE
SUMUP=SUMUP+SUMD
PRODEC=PRODEC+SUMD*DEC
TV=TVL=TVL+SUD*VL
VAR=VAR+(SUMD*((OEC-PRODEC)**2))
SD=SQRT(VAR)
VARD=SD**2
AVL=AINT(VL)
VARPV VARPV+ (SUMO*( (VL-TVL)*2))
SDPV=SQRT(VARPV)
IF(ND.LT.IZ)WRITE(6,68) NBF,NSF,SUMD,AVL
69 FORMAT(30X,61(1H-))
70 (ORMAT(30X,'+ADDITIONAL FIELDS DISCOVERED + PROBABILITY + ,
I'AMIOUNT OF OI1L+')
71 FORMAT (30X,1H+,6X,3HBIG,5X.5HSMALL.4X,1H+,14X,1MH+.
11X.12H(10E06 BBLS),IX,1H+)
68 FORMAT(30X,1H+.2(6X,12.6X,IH+),2X,FIO.5,2X,IH+,IXFI2.3,IX,1H+)
66 CONTINUE
IF(NB. LT.IZ)WRITE(6.69)
IF(NB.LT.IZ)WRITE(6.72)SUMUP
IF(NB. LT.IZ)WRITE(6.69)
PRODEC=PRODEC
NABC=ABC
VARD=VARD
1 /
OIL01660
OIL01670
OIL01680
OIL01690
OIL01700
01L01710
OIL01720
OIL01730
OIL01740
OIL01750
01L01760
OIL01770
OIL01780
OIL01790
OIL01800
OIL01810
OIL01O820
OIL01830
OIL01840
OIL01850
OIL01860
OIL01870
OIL01880
OIL01890
OIL01900
OIL01910
OIL01920
0IL01930
OIL01940
OIL01950
OIL01960
OIL01970
OIL01980
OIL01990
OIL02000
OIL02010
OIL02020
OIL02030
OIL02040
OIL02050
OIL02060
0IL02070
OIL02080
01L02090
OIL02100
OIL02110
OIL02120
OIL02130
0IL02140
OIL02150
01L02160
01L02170
OIL02180
0IL02190
OIL02200 F
I,
A6 #*
e
CONVERSATIONAL MONITOR SYSTEM
t ;
'
PAGE 004
'.,
• FILE: OILEX5 FORTRAN A CONVERSATIONAL MONITOR SYSTEM PAGE 005
TVL-TVL 01L02210
' VARPV.VARPV 01L02220
SDPV=SDPV 01L02230
J 1 WRITE(6,73) PRODEC,NABC 0IL02240
WRITE(6,98)VARD,SDC 01L02250
WRITE(6,901) TVL,VARPV,SDPV,D 0ILC2260
901 FORMAT(IOHTOTAL NPV:.F12.3.2X,BHVAR NPV:,F12.3,2X, 0IL02270
17HSD NPV:,F12.3,2X,14HDISCOUNT RATE:,F1O.5,/) 0IL02260
98 FORMAT(3HVAR,F10O.5,2X,6HST DEV,F10.5,7HEX EFF:,F4.1,/) OIL02290
73 FORMAT(30X,37HTOTAL AMOUNT OF OIL TO BE DISCOVEREO:,F12.3,2X, 0IL02300
110H10E06 BBLS,/30X,5HWITH:,I4,10HMORE WELLS) 01L02310
72 FORMAT(30X,1 XIH+,5X,5HTOTAL.4X.1H+,2X,FIO.5,2X,1H+,14X,IH+) 0IL02320
38 FOR?.AT(1X,112(1H-)/) OIL02330
400 CONTINUE 01L02340
410 CONTINUE OIL02350
STOP OIL023GO
END 01L02370
SUBROUTINE FACTM(A,B,C) OIL02380
LB=INT(B) 01L02390
LA=INT(A) OIL02400
IF (LB.EQ.1) GO TO 15 OIL02410
IF(LA.LT.1.AND.LB.GT.0) GO TO 18 OIL02420
IF(LB.LT.1.0R.LA.LT.1) GO TO 17 0IL02430
LF=INT(B-1.) 01L02440
C-A OIL02450 c0
00DO 2 1=1,LF OIL02460 00
AI=I 01L02470
2 C=C*(A-AI) OIL024680
GO TO 16 OIL02490
15 C=A OIL02500
GO TO 16 0IL02510
17 C=1. 0IL02520
GO TO 16 0IL02530
18 C=O. OIL02540
16 CONTINUE OIL02550
RETURN CIL02560
END OIL02570
SUBROUTINE FACT(A,C) 0IL02580
LA=INT(A) OIL02590
IF(LA.LT.2) GO TO 20 01L02600
C=1 0IL02610
MA-INT(A) OIL02620
DO 3 I-I,MA 0IL02530
3 C=C*I OIL02640
GO TO 21 OIL02650
20 C-I. 0IL02660
21 CONTINUE 0IL02670
RETURN 01L02680
END 01L02690
I
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BASE CASE RESULTS
Play is defined as productive area At. Model A assumes
that play is composed of five pieces (fields dispersed over
an area 5 x At. Sample space is thus Basin Areale(.63)At.
Updating - Stage 1
0 giant-field plays, 3 commercial-field plays discovered
with 100 wells (type 1 newfield wildcats)
Case 1
Case 2
Case 3
Case 4
e=1
e= 2
e= 3
e= 4
Updating - Stage 2
no plays found in next 140 wells
Case 5
Case 6
Case 7
Case 8
e=1
e= 2
e= 3
e=4
Posterior probabilities from Stage 2 are final results
NOTE:
A2 is likelihood of giant-field play discovery conditional
on state
Al is likelihood of commercial-field play discoveries
conditional on state
Fields on computer printout actually refer to plays
Model A -
1AREA OF BASIN(IOE03KM2
PRODUCTIVE AREA OF LARC
PRODUCTIVE AREA OF SMIAL
NUMBER OF WELLS ALREADY
NUMBER OF SEDIMENTARY E
PRIOR PROBABILITY OF BI
PRIOR PROBABILITY OF SrA
1
jiS
s,' 2
- , jiit
Ij
t1
i
i~I c
r
i
t1
r1
r
.d
i
'r;I
i:i
CASE NUMBER: 2
ALREADY DISCOVEREL,: 0 BIG FIELDS
AND: 3 SMALL FIELDS
EXPLORATION EFFICIENCY: 2.0
-- ---------------------------------------- 
----- -------
+ NUMOER OF + NUMBER OF + PRIOR + A2(W2/A2) + AI(WI/A1) + PRIOR TIMES + PROBABILITY +
+ BIG FIELDS +SMALL FIELDS+ + (W2= 100+ + (W1= 100) + LIKELIHOOD + POSTERIOR +
- - - -- - - - - - - ------------------ ------- --------------- -
+ 0 + 3 + 0.01189580 + 1.00000000 + 0.0263211 + 0.00003131 + 10.01238993 +
+ 0 + 4 + 0.00509820 + 1.00000000 + 0.00910012 + 0.00004639 + 0.01835840 +
+ 0 + 5 + 0.00131097 + 1.o000ooo + 0.01905956 + 0.00002577 + 0.01019849 +
+ 1 + 3 + 0.02081764 + 0.69604862 + 0.00203211 + 0.00003814 + 0.01509199 +
+ 1 + 4 + 0.00692185 + 0.59604862 + 0.C0910012 + 0.00005651 + 0.0223r208 +
+ 1 + 5 + 0.00229419 + 0,69604862 + 0.01965956 + 0.00003139 + 0.01242262 +
+ 2 + 3 + 0.01561324 + 0.48383808 + 0.00263211 + 0.00001988 + 0.00786808 +
* 2 + 4 + 0.00669139 + 0.48383868 + 0.00910o12 + 0.00002946 + 0.0115828 +
+ 2 + 5 + 0.00172064 + 0.483e3868 + 0.01965956 + 0.00001637 + 0.00647642 +
* 3 + 3 , + 0.00650551 + 0.33587581 + 0.00263211 + 0.00000575 + 0.00227581 +
+ 3 + 4 + 0.00276808 + 0.33587581 + 0.00910012 + 0.00000852 + 0.00337211 +
+ 3 + 5 + 0.00071693 + 0.33587581 + 0.01965956 + 0.00000473 + 0.00187329 +
+ 4 + 3 + 0.00162638 + 0.23234644 + 0.00263211 + 0.00000100 + 0.00039443 +
+ 4 + 4 + 0.CC069702 + 0.23284644 + 0.00910012 + 0.00000148 + 0.00058443 +
+ 4 + 5 + 0.00017923 + 0.23284044 + 0.01965956 + 0.00000082 + 0.00032466 +
+ + ------- OTAL + 0.00031754 + 0.256507+--------------------------------
+ + + + 4 1OTAL + 0.00031*754 + 0.12565070 4
--------------------------------------------------------
): 158.000
GE DEPOSITS(KM2):240.000
L DEPOSITS(KM2):110.O00
DRILLED: 100BASINS IN REGION: 7.000
IG FIELD PER BASIN: 0.200
IALL FIELD PER BASIN: 0.300
i .
I
r
I
r
CASE NUMBER: 1
ALREADY DISCOVERED: 0 BIG FIELDS
AND: 3 SMALL FIELDS
EXPLORATION EFFICIENCY: 1.0
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- -----------------
+ NUMBER OF + NUMBER OF + PRIOR + A2(W2/A2) + A1(WI/A1) + PRIOR TIMES + PROBABILITY +
+ BIG FIELDS +SMALL FIELDS+ + (W2= 100+ + (W12 100) + LIKELIHOOD + POSTERIOR +
---------------------------------------- -------------------------
+ 0 + 3 + 0.01189580 + 1.00000000 + 0.00032833 + 0.00000391 + 0.00154550 +
+ 0 + 4 + 0.00509820 + 1.00000000 + 0.00122441 + 0.00000624 + 0.00247010 +
+ 0 + 5 + 0.00131097 + 1.00000000 + 0.00285368 + 0.00000374 + 0.00148036 +
+ 1 + 3 + 0.02081764 + 0.84802431 + 0.00032833 + 0.00000580 + 0.00229359 +
+ 1 + 4 + 0.00892185 + 0.84802431 + 0.00122441 + 0.00000926 + 0.00366573 +
+ 1 + 5 + 0.00229419 + 0.84802431 + 0.00285368 + 0.00000555 + 0.00219691 4
+ 2 + 3 + 0.01561324 + 0.71804902 + 0.00032833 + 0.00000369 + 0.00145U37 +
+ 2 + 4 + 0.00669139 + 0.71894902 + 0.00122441 + 0.00000589 + 0.00233063 4
+ 2 + 5 + 0.00172064 + 0.71894902 + 0.00285368 + 0.00000353 + 0.00139090 +
+ 3 + 3 + 0.00650551 + 0.60935313 + 0.00032333 + 0.00000130 + 0.00051502 +
+ 3 + 4 + 0.00278808 + 0.60935313 + 0.00122441 + 0.00000208 + 0.00082313 4
+ 3 + 5 + 0.00071693 + 0.60935313 + 0.00285368 + 0.00000125 + 0.00049331 +
+ 4 + 3 + 0.00162638 + 0.51632190 + 0.00032833 + 0.00000028 + 0.00010910 +
+ 4 + 4 + 0.00069702 + 0.51632190 + 0.00122441 + 0.00000044 + 0.00017437 4
+ 4 + 5 + 0.00017923 + 0.51632190 + 0.00285368 + 0.00000026 + 0.00010450 +
-- + ----------------------- OTAL + 0.00005322 + 0.02105770---------------- + -----
+ + + + + TOTAL 4 0.00005322 + 0.02105770 *
--------------------------------------------------------
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CASE NUMBER: 5
ALREADY DISCOVERED: 0 BIG FIELDS
AND: 0 SMALL FIELDS
EXPLORATION EFFIC!ENCY: 1.0
------------------------------ - ----------
+ NUMBER OF + NUMBER OF 4 PRIOR + A2(W2/A2) + Al(WI/A1) + PRIOR TIMES + PROBABILITY *
+ BIG FIELDS +SMALL FIELDS+ * (W2= 140+ + (W1i 140) + LIKELIHOOD + POSTERIOR +
- ------------------------------- ---------------------------
+ 0 + 3 + 0.00154550 + 1.00000000 + 1.00000000 + 0.00154550 + 0.00476858 +
+ 0 + 4 + 0.00247010 + 1.00000000 + 0.89520955 + 0.00221125 + 0.00682272 +
+ 0 + 5 + 0.00148036 + 1.00000000 + 0.80132991 + 0.00118625 + 0.C00366013 +
+ 1 + 3 + 0.00229359 + 0.74910390 + 1.00000000 + 0.00171814 + 0.00530123 +
+ 1 + 4 + 0.00366573 + 0.74910390 + 0.89520955 + 0.00245825 + 0.00751483 +
+ 1 + 5 + 0.00219691 + 0.74910390 + 0.80132991 + 0.00131876 + 0.004038697 +
+ 2 + 3 + 0.00145937 + 0.56081927 + 1.00000000 + 0.00081788 + 0.00252353 +
+ 2 + 4 + 0.00233083 + 0.56081927 + 0.89520955 + 0.00117020 + 0.00361058 +
+ 2 + 5 + 0.00139690 + 0.56081927 + 0.80132991 + 0.00062777 + 0.00193694 +
+ 3 + 3 + 0.00051502 + 0.41960573 + 1.00000000 + 0.00021611 + 0.0006679 +
+ 3 + 4 + 0.00082313 + 0.41960573 + 0.89520955 + 0.00030920 + 0.00095401 +
+ 3 + 5 + 0.00049331 + 0.41960573 + 0.80132991 + 0.00016587 + 0.00051179 +
+ 4 + 3 + 0.00010910 + 0.31375945 + 1.00000000 + 0.00003423 + 0.000105C2 +
+ 4 -+ 4 + 0.00017437 + 0.31375945 + 0.89520955 + 0.00004898 + 0.00015111 + I
+ 4 + 5 + 0.00010450 + 0.31375945 + 0.10132991 + 0.00002627 + 0.00008107 +
+ + + + + TOTAL + 0.01385464 + 0.04274790 +
CASE NUMBER: 6
ALREADY DISCOVERED: 0 BIG FIELDS
AND: 0 SMALL FIELDS
EXPLORATION EFFICIENCY: 2.0
+ NUMBER OF + NUMBER OF + PRIOR + A2(W2/A2) + A1(W1/A1) + PRIOR TIMES + PROBABILITY +
+ BIG FIELDS +SMALL FIELDS+ + (W2= 140+ + (Wl- 140) + LIKELIHOOD + POSTERIOR +
- ------------ --- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ 0 + 3 + 0.01238993 + 1.00000000 + 1.00000000 + 0.01238993 + 0.03822855 +
+ 0 + 4 + 0.01835840 + 1.00000000 + 0.77346277 + 0.01419954 + 0.04381200 +
+ 0 + 5 + 0.01019849 + 1.00000000 + 0.59796065 + 0.00609929 + 0.01881599 +
+ 1 + 3 + 0.01509199 + 0.38864625 + 1.00000000 + 0.005e6544 + 0.01609753 +
+ 1 + 4 + 0.02236208 + 0.38864625 + 0.77346277 + 0.00672211 + 0.02071075 +
+ 1 + 5 + 0.01242262 + C.38864625 + 0.f,9796065 + 0.00288696 + 0.00893757 +
+ 2 + 3 + 0.00786808 + 0.15000379 + 1.00000000 + 0.00118024 + 0.003641158 +
+ 2 + 4 + 0.01165828 + 0.15000379 + 0.77346277 + 0.00135262 + 0.00417345 +
+ 2 + 5 + 0.00647642 - + 0.15000379 + 0.o9796065 + 0.00058091 + 0.00179237 +
+ 3 + 3 + 0.00227581 + 0.05749046 + 1.00000000 + 0.00013084 + 0.00040369 +
+ 3 + 4 + 0.00337211 + 0.05749046 + 0.77346277 + 0.00014995 + 0.00046265 +
+ 3 + 5 + 0.00187328 + 0.05749046 + 0.',9796065 + 0.00006440 + 0.00019870 + t
+ 4 + 3 + 0.00039443 + 0.02187690 + 1.0000000 + 0.00000863 + 0.00002662. +
+ 4 + 4 + C.00058443 + 0.02187690 + 0.77346277 + 0.00000989 + 0.000030511 +
+ 4 + 5 + 0.00032466 + 0.02187690 + 0.!,9796065 + 0.00000425 + 0.00001310. +
-- -- --- --- --------------------------------------------------
A& * 4,AciP~
CASE NUMBER! 7
ALREADY DISCOVERE': 0 BIG FIELDS
AND: 0 SMALL FIELDS
EXPLORATION EFFIC!ENCY: 3.0
- ---------.-------------------------- - ------- mm------------------------------------------------ ---------
+ NUMBER OF + NUMBER OF + PRIOR + A2(W2/A2) + A1(W1/A1) + PRIOR TIMES + PROBABILITY +
* BIG FIELDS +SMALL FIELDS+ + (W2m 119+ + (WIw 140) + LIKELIHOOD + POSTERIOR +
+ 0 + 3 + 0.04207969 + 1.00000000 + 1.00000000 + 0.04207969 + 0.12983483 +
+ 0 + 4 + 0.05740553 + 1.00000000 + 0. '62961 + 0.03614422 + 0.11152124 +4
+ 0 + 5 + 0.02935156 + 1.00000000 + 0.- ,81490 + 0.01161778 + 0.03584612 +
+ I + 3 + 0.04001409 + 0.0 + 1.00000000 + 0.0 + 0.0 +
+ 1 + 4 + 0.05458764 + 0.0 + 0.02962961 + 0.0 + 0.0 +
+ 1 + 5 + 0.02791080 + 0.0 + 0.39581490 + 0.0 + 0.0 +
+ 2 + 3 + 0.01624425 + 0.0 + 1.00000000 + 0.0 + 0.0 +
+ 2 + 4 + 0.02216059 + 0.0 + 0.62962961 + 0.0 + 0.0 +
+ 2 + 5 + 0.01133075 + 0.0 + 0.:39591490 + 0.0 + 0.0 +
+ 3 + 3 + 0.00364934 + 0.0 + 1.00000000 + 0.0 + 0.0 + 1,
+ 3 + 4 + 0.00497847 + 0.0 + 0.c2962961 + 0.0 + 0.0 +
+ 3 + 5 + 0.00254550 + 0.0 + 0.3a581490 + 0.0 + 0.0 +
+ 4 + 3 + 0.00048996 + 0.0 + 1.00000000 + 0.0 + 0.0 +
+ 4 + 4 + 0.00066841 + 0.0 + 0.02962961 + 0.0 + 0.0 0
+ 4 + 5 + 0.00034176 + 0.0 + 0.39591490 + 0.0 + 0.0 + .
--------- -- -r r----------------- - - - - - - - - - - - -m - m-- - - - - -m - m- - - - - - -
4 + + + + TOTAL + 0.08984166 + 0.27720219 4-
- ---- -- -- --- - ---- -- - -----r - -- -------- -- -- -- ---- , -- -
CASE NUMBER: 8
ALREADY DISCOVERED: 0 810G FIELDS
AND: 0 SMALL FIELDS I:
EXPLORATION EFFICIENCY: 4.0
--- ----------------------------------------- - ----------------------------------------
+ NUMBER OF + NUMBER OF + PRIOR + A2(W2/A2) + AI(W1/A1) + PRIOR TIMES + PROBABILITY +
+ BIG FIELDS +SMALL FIELOS+ + (W2m 64+ + (WIn 140) + LIKELIHOOD + POSTERIOR +
+ 0 + 3 + 0.09953600 + 1.00000000 + 1.00000000 + 0.09953600 + 0.30711359 +
+ 0 + 4 + 0.12414044 + 1.00000000 + 0.45945942 + 0.05703750 + 0.17598647 +
+ 0 + 5 + 0.05799874 + 1.00000000 + 0.21014035 + 0.01218787 + 0.03760510 +
+ 1 + 3 + 0.06797570 + 0.0 + 1.00000000 + 0.0 + 0.0 +
+ 1 + 4 + 0.08477879 + 0.0 + 0.45945942 + 0.0 + 0.0 + .
+ 1 + 5 + 0.03960889 + 0.0 + 0.21014035 + 0.0 + 0.0 +
+ 2 + 3 + 0.01970464 + 0.0 + 1.00000000 + 0.0 + 0.0 +
+ 2 + 4 + 0.02457545 + 0.0 + 0.45945942 + 0.0 + 0.0 +
+ 2 + 5 + 0.01148171 + 0.0 + 0.21014035 + 0.0 + 0.0 +
+ 3 + 3 + 0.00314220 + 0.0 + 1.00000000 + 0.0 + 0.0 +
+4 3 + 4 + 0.00391892 + 0.0 + 0.45945942 + 0.0 4+ 0.0 4+
+ 3 + 5 + 0.00183093 + 0.0 + 0.21014035 + 0.0 + 0.0 +
+ 4 + 3 + 0.00029763 + 0.0 + 1.00000000 + 0.0 + 0.0 +
+ 4 + 4 + 0.00037120 + 0.0 + 0.45945942 + 0.0 + 0.0 +
+. 4 . + 5 + 0.00017343 + 0.0 + 0.21014035 + 0.0 + 0.0 +
+---+ 
+ OTA +0--1---------6--- 
-
- - -
+6 - -+ + + + TOTAL + 0.16876131  0.5270510-- wr------------------------------------------------------
L -r ICII r rr- -r- -rl .---
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Results from Model B
Resutls that follwo are of the same form as the previous results
from Model A, except a play is considered one homogenous unit (target
size At). Regional sample space is Basin Area
e At
Se 
-40
1AREA OF BASIN(10E03KM2): 158.000
PRODUCTIVE AREA OF LARGE DEPOSI
T
S(KM2):380.000
'PRODUCTIVE AREA OF SMALL DEPOSITS(KM2):170.000
NUMBER OF WELLS ALREADY DRILLED: 100
NUMBER OF SEDIMENTARY eBSINS IN REGION: 7.000
PRIOR PPCBABILITY OF BIG FIELD PER BASIN: 0.200
i PRIOR PROBABILITY OF SMALL FIELD PER BASIN: 0.300
NUMBER:
ALREADY DISCOVERED: 0 BIG FIELDS
AND: 3 SMALL FIELDS
EXPLORATION EFFICIENCY: 1.0
--- --------------------- ----------------------------------  ---------------- --- -
+ NUMBER OF +R OF ER OF + PRIOR + A2(W2/A2) + A1(W1/A1) + PRIOR TIMES + PROBABILITY +
+ BIG FIELDS +SMALL FIELDS+ + (W2= 100+ + (W1= 100) + LIKELIHOOD + POSTERIOR +
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------
+ 0 + 3 + 0.01189590 + 1.00000000 + 0.00121400 + 0.00001444 + 0.00289016 +
+ 0 + 4 + 0.00509020 + 1.00000000 + 0.00434732 + 0.00002216 + 0.00443556 +
+ 0 + 5 + 0.00131097 + 1.00000000 + 0.00972860 + 0.00001275 + 0.00255242 +
+ 1 + 3 + 0.02081764 + 0.75903GI2 + 0.00121400 + 0.00001.918 + 0.00383904 +-1
, + 1 + 4 + 0.00892185 + 0.75903612 + 0.00434732 + 0.00002944 + 0.00589181 +
+ 1 + 5 + 0.00229419 + 0.75903612 + 0.00972U60 + 0.00001694 + 0.00330041 +
+ 2 + 3 + 0.01561324 + 0.57569402 + 0.00121400 + 0.00001091 + 0.002183@0 +
+ 2 + 4 + 0.00669139 + 0.57569402 + 0.00434732 + 0.00001G75 + 0.00335150 +
+ 2 + 5 + 0.00172064 + 0.57569402 + 0.00972860 + 0.00000964 + 0.00192 60 +
+ 3 + 3 + 0.00650551 + 0.43630093 + 0.00121400 + 0.00000345 + 0.00068960 +
+ 3 4 + 0.00278808 + 0.43630093 + 0.00434732 + 0.00000529 + 0.00105433 +
+ 3 + 5 + 0.00071693 + 0.43630093 + 0.00972860 + 0.00000304 + 0.00060901 +
+ 4 + 3 + 0.00162638 + 0.33040243 + 0.00121400 + 0.00000065 + 0.00013056 +
+; 4 + 4 + 0.00069702 + 0.33040243 + 0.00434732 + 0.00000100 + 0.00020035 +
+ 4 + 5 + 0.00017923 + 0.33040243 + 0.00972860 + -0.00000058 + 0.00011530 4
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
--------------
+ + + + + TOTAL + 0.00016622 + 0.03326645 +
NUMBER: 2
ALREADY DISCOVERED: 0 BIG FIELDS
AND: 3 SMALL FIELDS
EXPLORATION EFFICIENCY: 2.0
-------------------------- ~-------~------ ------------------- -------------------
+ NUMBER OF + NUMBER OF + PRIOR + A2(W2/A2) + AI(WI/A1) + PRIOR TIMES + PROBABILITY +
+ BIG FIELDS +SMALL FIELDS+ + (W2= 100+ + (Wl. 100) + LIKELIHOOD + POSTERIOR +
------------------------------------- 
++ 0 + 3 + 0.01189580 + 1.0000000000 + 0.00977508 + 0.00011628 + • 0.02327152 +
+ 0 + 4 + 0.00509920 + 1.00000000 + 0.03087313 + 0.00015740 + 0.03149984 +
+ 0 + 5 + 0.00131097 + 1.00000000 + 0.00890734 + 0.00007985 + 0.01597980 +
+ 1 + 3 + 0.02081764 + 0.51690617 4 0.00977508 + 0.00010519 + 0.02105115 +
+ 1 + 4 + 0.00892185 + 0.51690817 + 0.03007313 + 0.00014238 + 0.02C49439 +
+ 1 + , 5 + 0.00229419 + 0.51690817 + 0.06090734 + 0.00007223 + 0.01445516 +
+ 2 + 3 + 0.01561324 + 0.26598185 + 0.0C977508 + 0.00004059 + 0.00812411 +
+ 2 + 4 + 0.00669139 + 0.26593183 + 0.03097313 + 0.00005495 + 0.01099662 +
+ 2 + 5 + 0.C0172064 + 0.20598185 + 0.0,090734 + 0.00002787 + 0.00557856 +
+ 3 + 3 + 0.00650551 + 0.13623464 + 0.00977508 + 0.00000866 + 0.00173380 +
+ 3 + 4 ' 0.00273908 + 0.13623t164 + 0.03087313 + 0.00001173 + 0.00234684 +
+ 3 + 5 + , 0.00071693 + 0.13623464 + 0.06090734 + 0.00000595 + 0.00119055 +
S + 4 + 3 + 0.00162638 + 0.06945294 + 0.009775C8 + 0.00000110 + 0.00022099 +
+ 4 + 4 + 0.00069702 + 0.06945294 + 0.03087319 + 0.00000149 + 0.00029911 +
+ 4 + 5 + 0.00017923 + 0.06945294 + 0.06090734 + 0.00000076 + 0.00015174 +
+ + + + + TOTAL + 0.00002644 + 0.16539377 +
----------- ,,--- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - -&- - - - - - - - - ----------- - - - - -
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Appendix B - Basin Classification by Klemme
from: World Oil and Gas Reserves from
Analysis of Giant Fields and Petroleum
Basins - H.D. Klemme,
200
Type 1 Basins
Type 1 basins (Fig. 12-3) lie in the interior of cratonic areas.
They are flat, single-cycle, saucer-shaped basins generally located
near precambrian shield areas. The sediments consist primarily of
Paleozoic platform deposits which display basement-controlled
structural and sedimentary traps. Only two basins, the Illinois and
the Eromango or Cooper, contain giant fields. In this type of basin,
reservoir rocks include both sandstones and carbonates. In general,
Type 1 interior basins have low hydrocarbon-recovery rates and entry
into them as a 50 percent or less probability of commercial success.
The basins are typified by low-sulfur, high-gravity crude oil.
Type 2 Basins
Outward from the interior basins, near the margins of cratons, Type
2 intracontinental composite basins are present (Fig. 12-4). They
range in size from subcontinental miogeosynclines to small intermontane
basins. Like the interior basins, these multicycle types usually have
an intial cycle of Paleozoic platform sediments. In some of them this
cycle has been tectonized by Hercynian orogeny; orogenic clastics are
often deposited unconformably upon the first-cycle sediments. There
are 24 intracontinental basins with 120 giant fields, which represent
nearly a quarter of the world's oil and gas reserves. Reservoirs in
Type 2 basins are about equally divided between Paleozoic and Mesozoic
ages, and are dominantly sandstones. The crude oil types are similar
to those in Type 1 basins.
201
Where giant fields are present, large basins of this type average
120,000 barrels of recoverable oil or gas-equivalent per mi3 of
sediments, while the smaller bains average 40,000 barrels. Basins of
this type have better than a 50 percent chance of commercial discovery,
and two of three contain giant fields. Most of the world's reserves of
Paleozoic oil and gas are found in basins of this type.
Field sizes in the Type 1 basins occur in two general patterns:
either one giant or supergiant field which contains over 50 percent of
the basins' reserves, or in small fields, the largest of which is
rarely more than 10 percent of the basin's reserves. Either kind may
be relatively rich. The supergiants are associated with the major
tectonic arches preserved in many of these basins and this, plus
long-distance migration, may account for their presence whereas
abundant structural traps with many stratigraphic variations seem to
account for the basins with small fields.
Type 3 Basins
Another type of cratonic basin is the Type 3 graben or rift-type
basin (Fig. 12-5), which may represent an area of incipient seafloor
spreading that has remained dormant. Such basins are of small to
medium size, linear, and down-faulted. There are six basins of this
type, with a total of 40 giant fields which contain 10 percent of the
world's reserves. Reservoirs are about equally divided between
standstones and carbonates, while the crude oil is generally
high-gravity and low in sulphur. One out of two basins produces
I~LIL~Y-P*I~C9~ .... .- ^_Y-i -~ il~P IYI~ ~I~)~_UL
202
hydrocarbons and one out of two producing basins contains giants.
Type 3 basins with giant fields are fairly rich, averaging 140,000
barrels of oil or gas-equivalent per mi3 of sediments. Evaporites or
thick shale sequences often act as basinwide caprock to trap any oil
generated below them. Many of these basins contain almost entirely
gas, others mainly oil. Facies appear to control hydrocarbon type. On
average, the four largest fields in this type of basin contain from 10
to 20 percent of the basin's total reserves. A high success rato is
experienced in these basins, of which four of the six have been found
since World War II.
Some Type 3 basins appear to be superimposed as a third cycle on
large Type 2 basins. An example is the Mesozoic-Tertiary graben system
superimposed on the North Sea Type 2 basins. This graben system
predates the opening of the North Atlantic.
In general, most cratonic basins contain high-gravity crude. They
are estimated to contain over three-quarters of the world's gas
reserves and 90 percent of total Paleozoic hydrocarbons. They are more
predictable in recoverable reserves than are the intermediate crustal
basins.
INTERMEDIATE CRUSTAL BASINS (Mobile Zone)
The intermediate crustal zone covers less than a quarter of the
land area of the world, but it accounts for more than half of the
hydrocarbons. Most intermediate crustal basins appear to be related to
the postulated tectonics of sea-floor spreading. Nearly all their
203
reserves are Mesozoic and Tertiary--in other words, formed during the
period of theoretical post-Permian sea-floor spreading.
Type 4 Basins
Type 4 extracontinental basins (Fig. 12-6) downwarp into small
ocean basins. Some extend all the way to offshore land masses (Type
4A), as in the Tethyan realm of the Middle East Arabian/Iranian basin
and in Eastern Venezuela; others are open and appear simply to submerge
offshore (type 4C) as in the Gulf Coast, North Slope, and East Asia.
Still others, often termed "foredeeps", are present along the narrow
portions of Tethys, such as the Molasse trough, the Indus basin, and
Assam (Type 4B). In this basin type the statistics are skewed because
of the super-rich Arabian/Iranian basin. Twelve of these basins have
105 giant fields and 50 percent of the world's reserves.
Reservoirs in 4A and 4B types are mainly Mesozoic and are
dominantly carbonate, whereas 4C basins are mainly sandstone. They
appear to contain average amount of gas, except for the high gas
content in the 4B foredeep subdivision, and intermediate-gravity crude
oil with intermediate to high sulphur content.
The risk of exploring in these basins historically appears to
entail a 50 percent chance of finding commercial production and a
one-in-three chance of finding a giant field.
Type 5 Basins
Type 5 pull-apart basins (fig. 12-7) may be the end phase of a
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Type 3 cratonic-rift basin which has been separated by distances of
oceanic scale. It is difficult to determine the time and rate of
spreading of some Type 3 rifts if they have passed into Type 5
pull-apart basins. For example, tens of miles of separation are
reparted to occur in the Red Sea rift, hundreds in the Davis Strait,
and thousands in Coastal West Africa and eastern South America.
Pull-apart basins are located on both sides of the Atlantic and Indian
Oceans and include only four or five giants, located in the offshore
lower Congo basin and off the Northwest shel-f of Australia. They
generally form linear coastal basins characterized by down-to-the-sea
tilted fault-block structures containing Mesozoic and Tertiary
sediments: these apepar to lie along what many marine geologists
believe to be the separated margins of continental plates.
The statistical experience factor with these basins does not permit
much speculation. To date, the success ratio in significant commerical
discovery is about one in three.
There appear to be at least two subtypes of pull-apart basins. One
is the parallel pull-apart type of basin, which has often resulted in
salt deposition along linear rifts during early stages of develoment.
Mesozoic salt is found offshore in eastern Canada, the United States,
Brazil, and west and south-west Africa. The other subtype appears to
have been formed by the motion of the east-west transform movements
during sea-floor spreading, which formed the basins between northern
Brazil in South America and Liberia to Dahomey in Africa. This type
seems to lack salt deposition and often displays a different tectonic
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framework. In addition, many of these basins combine both Type 3 rift
and Type 5 pull-apart characteristics as, for example, in the Grand
Banks off Newfoundland there appears to be a combination of Mesozoic
rift-like horst and grabens overlain by an Upper Cretaceous and
Tertiary seaward-dipping fan of sediments. Dependent on influx of
clastic sediments, these basins contain either dominantly sandstone and
shale or almost entirely carbonate banks.
Types 6 and 7 Basins
Types 6 and 7 second-cycle intermontane basins (Fig. 12-8) parallel
the subduction zones between the continents and ocean basins. They are
small, second-cycle Tertiary basins located either transverse to, or
along the strike of older deformed eugenosynclines formed previously at
the continental margin. Typical of these basins are multi-pay zones of
interbedded sand and shale or basal carbonate reefs. Thirteen of these
basins contain 40 giant fields and represent 10 percent of the world's
reserves. These small, rich basins consist predominately of Tertiary
clastics, with evaporites generally absent. Traps are either
combination type or anticlinal uplifts above active basement blocks,
formed in what has often been termed rhombochasms located in the
crushed zone of actively-moving plates along subduction zones.
Generally, the gas content of these basins is below average and their
crude oil, although variable, tends toward low to intermediate
gravity. Recovery of hydrocarbons, as in the case of other
intermediate crustal basins, is highly variable, ranging from small
nl~ll ___ ~1 ^~_ __^I_*_P____^____LIUC~I .I;Y--Y~I~
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amounts to 4 x 106 barrel per mi3 of siddments. Offshore extension
of production in these basins has occurred in the Caspian Sea off Baku,
in the Java Sea, off the Los Angeles and Ventura basins, off Peru, and
in the Cook Inlet.
Before World War I, four out of five such basins yielded
hydrocarbons in commerical quantities; this ratio is now one out of
five. About one out of two of the basins have giant fields.
Type 8 Basins
Type 8 late Tertiary delta basins (Fig. 12-9) with commercial
production include the Niger, Mississippi, and Mahakan deltas, to which
the Nile delta and portions of the Mackenzie delta appear to be new
additions. Discoveries have been made recently in the offshore portion
of the Rangoon, Amazon, and Mekong deltas. Statistics are not firm,
but there is a remarkable correlation between the Niger and Mississippi
basins. In these, there is a tendency for the largest fields to
represent less than about 5 percent of the basin's total reserves, and
they appear to have three times as much gas as normal. Roll-over
structures and flowage structures act as traps.
About one out of two explored deltas has commercial production and
all appear to have a few giants. The giants represent much less than
75 percent of the basin reserves.
OCEANIC BASINS
Oceanic basins of the continental rise and abyssal-plains (Fig.
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12-10) are estimated to contain half of the world's marine sediments
(Emory 1974) and in many deep-water areas the sedimentary section
reaches a substantial thickness, conducive to oil generaion, with
evidence of structural traps providing areas for accumulation.
Deep-ocean basins are untested with regard to petroleum; however,
organic-rich sediments have been recovered in some of the Joides
deep-sea drilling project cores. The greatest unanswered concern is
whether deep-ocean basins develop reservoir rocks.
There now is insufficient evidence to evaluate the resources of
these basins and an estimate at this time would be unsatisfactory.
When sufficeint data are forthcoming and future drilling furnishes the
industry with one or more analogs of these basin types, resource
estimates may be attempted. A truly worldwide estimate of petroleum
resources must remain incomplete until more data are available.
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Appendix C - Geology and Structure of the
Brazilian Sedimentary Basins
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Maranhao Basin
The Maranhao Basin is located entirely within the Brazilian shield.
Sedimentation has been controlled by vertical differential movements of
Precambrian basement blocks. Although the current coastline is on the
northeast of the basin, the Paleozoic coastline was to the
west-northwest. From the Silurian to the Carboniferous five episodes of
highly constructive deltas have been recognized (Carozzi, 1980). Late
Devonian icesheets interfered with the delta formation producing
glacio-deltaic deposits. Thoeleitic maginas were introduced in the form
of numerous sills and dikes in the Mesozoic (200-120 Ma).
Exploration in the Maranhao has been in two distinct phases. The
first phase was a search for structural traps undertaken in the 1950's as
a joint study of the Middle Amazon and Maranhao basins. There appears to
have been only mild deformation of Ordovician and pre-Jurassic strata.
Two regions were discussed as having oil potential (Mesner (1964)). The
first region is in the southwestern corner of the basin where deformation
was moderate and little diabase intrusions have occurred. Oil may be
trapped in structures in this region. The second region has a potential
only for stratigraphic traps related to the deltas. Of particular
interest is the Cabecas sandstones that overlie the shales in the
Pimenteiras formation.
The second major phase of exploration has been from 1970 to the
present. Carozzi (1980) states that there are no significant results
from the search for structural traps in the 50's and 60's in the Maranhao
or Middle Amazon basins. His work concentrates on the potential for
delta related stratigraphic traps. Among the three major sandstone
systems, the best potential is in the south and southeast part of the
217
basin. However, two of the sandstone systems have their reservoir
properties reduced by diagenetic cementation. This leaves the third
(Cabecas formation) the best target for exploration. The best potential
is in southwerstern areas of the basin where sandstones under the lower
distributary to the delta interfinger with shales of the underlying
Pimenteiras formation. The area of the region of interest is calculated
to be approaxiately 70,000 km2 . The age and heat due to diabase
intrusions indicate that any original oil had a high probability of being
turned into gas. If we assume an average subsidence rate of 1Om/Ma
beginning in the Silurian, the peak oil generation would occur at 280 Ma
and gas generation after 360Ma, or Late Cretaceous time (figures from
Tissot 1980). The additional heat added during the early Mesozoic (due
to diabase intrusions) would most likely increase the rate of gas
generation.
Parana basin
The Parana has a similar history to that of the other interior
basins. The base of the Parana, however, is compcsed of black, .arine
related lacustrine bituminous shales of lower Devonian age. These are
overlain by successive cycles of lower Pennsylvania glacial deposits.
Glacial cover was extensive at that time. Five distinct glacial advances
and minor maritime transgressions have been recognized (Sanford 1960).
Extensive diabase and basalt flows were formed in the Triassic and
Jurassic.
Only very small oil shows have been found in the Parana basin. There
are several major factors which imply this basin is an unfavorable one
for oil occurrence. There is no record of compression forces or
anticlines since the Devonian. Regional dips are low (10). There is an
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overabundance of coarse clasticsand few good marine shales. There exists
a possibility that small oil or gas deposits remain in some fault traps
along the eastern hingeline of the basin. If some oil existed prior to
the basalt intrusions it could have migrated after the basalt overburden
and trapped by fault block. The overall prospects are not favorable and
seismic exploration is hampered by basalt flows. Using a map of possible
oil locations long the eastern hingeline by Sanford (1960) a prospective
area of 145,000 km2 was calculated.
Amazon basin
In most ways the Amazon basin developed in the same fashion as the
Parnaiba basin except that the sedimentary cycles were incomplete in the
Amazon. Deltas in the Amazon basin were small and dispersed along the
coastline by longshore currents. There is verying little interfingering
of various delatic members. The marine transgression came from the west
in the upper Amazon and from the east in the middle Amazon. Glaciation
was less dramatic in the Amazon basin than in the Maranhao basin. There
are extensive Mesozoic basalt flows in the Amazon which may have been a
failed rift system during the opening of the Atlantic (Bally 1980). The
Amazon basin has an enormous area. The search for structural traps
has produced no significant results. The best potential appears to be in
the central middle Amazon with oil or gas deposits related to small
deltaic structures. The middle and upper Amazon basins have prospective
areas of 270,000 km2 based on the general region where small
stratigraphic and delatic reservoirs might be found.
Summary of onshore basin potential
All major cratonic basins have the same general history. Initial
subsidence was in the pre-Paleozoic or early Paleozoic with subsidence
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along Precambrian lines of weakness. Basin fill consists large of
continental clastics and some deltaic deposits (best delta formations
were the Maranhao). Extensive glaciation followed. Basaltic dikes,
sills and flows were formed in the Mesozoic as old rift zones were
reactivated. All basins have few compressional features and the search
for structural traps has produced no significant results.
Other cratonic basins around the world which contain giant oil fields
have structural traps (e.g., Illinois basin) and giant fields, if they
occur, are just barely over 500 million barrels (the definition of a
giant field). The field size distributions in such basins are skewed
with 40 percent of reserves in one field. If there appear to be no
significant structural traps and only stratigraphic (or delta related)
deposits, then the field size distribution should follow a much less
skewed distribution with no giant fields and the largest field containing
9 percent of play reserves. This latter case is the one that appears to
be the case in Brazil. Brazilian cratonic basins appear to have a much
lower potential than the "average" cratonic basin defined by Kelmme.
Thus exploration in the onshore basins represents a two-stage exploration
problem. The first stage was an initial survey for structural traps and
the current exploration effort is concentrating on stratigraphic traps.
If we believe that the basins have been fully explored for giant fields
(which are in structural traps), as is implied by Carozzi (1980), then
the posterior on exploration efficiency is calculated to 12 or larger1
1 B 555,000 kmexpl. eff. for play = e555,000 km 2 12(.63)(360 km )(200 wells)
ef = expl. eff. of field within a play (at the 90 percent confidence
level )
I~Y~_i~
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(up to 25 df most all of the basin area is considered prospective area).
This exploration efficiency is the multiple of the target size exhausted
by an exploration wildcat. If we believe that it is very likely that
only stratigraphic deposits exist in the onshore basins, then the
probabilities assessed by Klemme (.2 for a giant-field play and .3 for a
commercial-field play) for an average cratonic basin are too high.
Reasonable estimates might be .25 chance of a commercial field-play (gas
or oil) and 0 (or very low) chance of a giant-field play, since only
deltaic type field distributions would be present. Also, due to the old
age and high heat flow in these basins it is likely that only gas
deposits may exist. Since 80 percent of Paleozoic hydrocarbons are gas,
we will use this as the probability of gas vs. oil.
Continential Margin basins
The continential margin basins of Brazil consist of basically seven
semi-connected basins which are partly onshore but mostly offshore, and
also one rift type basin which is completely onshore (Reconcavo). These
basins were formed in four stages as South America was pulled apart from
Africa. The four stages are the pre-rift arch stage, intracratonic
rift-valley stage, restricted marine stage and continental margin stage.
The first stage was simple arching and uplifting of a north-south segment
where rifting begins with the subsidence of a north-south trough. This
occurred in the Jurassic. The second stage is a rift valley system
filled with continential sediments or associated with extrusion of large
amounts of basaltic lava in the cratonic basisn. This occured in the
Late Cretaceous and resembled the present day rift valley in Africa.
Transform faulting began on the northeast coast. The restricted marine
environment occurred when there was still partial blockage of ocean water
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flow into the rift valley along the east coast. This allowed thick
evaporites to form. The last stage was the open-marine stage, where
platform carbonate gave way to continental margin sediments and a
progressive seaward tilting of the margin. See Figure c-I for an
idealized cross-section of the margin.
Five systems have been identified in the continental margin basins.
These are shown in Figures with types of oil fields, trap, reservoir
rock and source rock. One of the major systems is when upthrown blocks
pushed Jurassic sandstones into contact with overlying Necomian shales.
Some of the largest fields formed this way, particularly in the Reconcavo
basin. The second system consists of anticlinal structure with deltaic
sandstones as reservoirs and lacustrine shales. The Aptian system is
composed of sandstone reservoirs over fault blocks and transitional shale
source rocks. Field sizes are from 30 to 170 million bbls. The fourth
system is the Albian-Santonian system consisting of Garoupa and Navrado
fields (130 and 260 mill. bbls. respectively). Reservoirs are calcarenite
or sand. The last system is the Late Cretaceous-Tertiary system with
turbidity sandstone reservoirs and slope shale source rocks. These field
are small, .5 to 20 million bbls in size. Very detailed descriptions of
fields and basins have been written by Ponte (1977).
The important aspects of the geology in these basins are those that
relate to the model parameters in this study. These are prior
probability of giant and commercial fields, field size distribution in
plays and basin prospective areas. Since there has been incomplete
exploration worldwide of continental margin basins it is hard to judge
whether Brazilian basins are average. They do not appear particularly
prolific but have three fair-sized commercial-field plays. It is
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Fig. C Idealized geologic cross-section of the Brazilian continental margin, with the main charac-
teristics of the petroleum habitats.
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Fig. C1 Distribution of the main oil fields in the five Brazilian petroleum provinces, classified accord-
ing to the three main petroleum habitats.
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interesting to note that by matching Brazilian basins with the west coast
of Africa the author found that oil plays in Brazil filled in the gaps in
the oil occurrences in Africa--Brazil has fewer plays, which may have
derived from asymmetric seafloor spreading in the Atlantic (Gray 1980).
More of the rift valley floor may have been left attached to Africa. For
lack of better prior probabilities for continental margin basins,
Klemme's probabilities have been used with a sensitivity analysis. In
light of the deposit sizes worldwide in this type of basin, however, it
seems as though the probability of giant fields (.2) is an unusually
large fraction of the probability of commercial fields (.3). Giant field
plays are less frequent and a probability of .1 seems more likely based
on Known basins worldwide. Field size distributions within plays for
these types of basins fit well with Klemme's observations. The largest
field contains 40-50 percent of play reserves. Prospective areas are
defined as all those areas less than 200 m of mater where sediments are
thick enough to possibly contain oil. Those areas with very thin cover
or areas with shallow volcanic cover were eliminated. Total prospective
area is calculated to be 158,000 km2
Amazon Delta
Oil traps in deltas are usually sand deltas, structure related to
diapirs or rollover structures. Young deltas tend to be gas prone. The
Amazon delta began to form after the Mesozoic rifting event. In the
Miocene the uplift of the Andes initiated heavy influx (60-fold increase)
of terrigenous sediment onto the delta. During glacial periods with low
sea level the sediment is emptied directly onto the outer margin. During
high sea level stands (as today) sediment is transported along the inner
shelf. This delta contains few rollover structures and productive plays
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would most likely involve clastic reservoirs and diapir related
reservoirs. A large portion of the fan is in very deep water. Of the
portion which is in water less than 200 m 57 wells have been drilled in
an area of 31,500 km2. According to Klemme there is a 50 percent
chance that an average delta contains oil. If it does, the largest field
contains only 9 percent of play reserves. The likelihood of drilling 65
dry wells and finding no deposits if approximately 10 exist (each about
65 million bbls) is only .11. This gives an expected amount of oil of 72
mmb (see Annex 14). Deltas require a considerable number of wells to
determine whether or not oil is present.
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Offshore Campos Basin Map
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Fig. 18. Potiguar basin: geologic map and cross section
Fig. 17. Barreirinhas basin: basement structural framework, geologic cross section, and composite geologic column.d
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5-1. Method of Estimating the Economic Return, NPV and Variance of
Future Exploration Programs
The previous chapter developed a model of oil exploration which
estimates probability of play discovery as a function of future
exploration wells drilled. Multiplying the probabilities of discovery
by the amount of oil found in an average play (of that basin type) gave
the expected amount of oil to be found with a given level of
exploration effort. In a similar manner the net present value of an
oil play can be multiplied by the probabilities to get an expected
value of oil to be discovered. Once discounted exploration costs are
subtracted the net present value of various oil exploration programs
can be found. We will assume that a specific number of oil exploration
wells (100 or 200 or 300 ... ) are planned over a 5 year period. There
are lags between initial exploration and discovery and lags between
discovery and production.
If a block of exploration wells are drilled each year in equal
numbers over the next 5 years, some plays may be discovered early and
some later. On the average it is reasonable to model the play
discovery early in the 5 year period since there are diminishing
discoveries with additional wells. We will use the probabilities of
discovery (Tables 4-11, 4-12, 4-13) for a certain number of wells (say
200 wells drilled over 5 years) and multiply these probabilities by the
net present value of an oil play assuming that if a play is discovered,
it is discovered on average in about 2 years.
The net present value of the play should also take into account the
delay between discovery and initial production. This delay is
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estimated to be 2 to 5 years for "giant field" plays and 2 to 4 years
for "commercial field" plays (based on data from fields offshore Brazil
- see Annex 5-1). This is based on delays observed for plays already
found offshore Brazil. The delay between initial exploration and
initial production is therefore estimated to be about 5 years.
Development expenditures are assumed to be made on average at the
midpoint (2-3 years) of this interval. Once the expected value of the
oil is calculated, the discounted costs of drilling the exploration
wells (i.e. type I wells searching for oil plays) over 5 years is
subtracted. The result is the net present value of the exploration
program. The variance of the outcome can be calculated using the
proDaoilities of discovery. Analysis of the exploration program can be
from the viewpoint of exploration by Petrobras or from the perspective
of exploration by the multinational oil company. The exploration risk
contract terms for foreign oil companies in Brazil will be used for
exploration programs involving multinational oil companies.
5-2. Net Present Value of an Oil Play
The goal of this section is to calculate the net present value of a
hypothetical "giant field" play and a "commercial field" play. The
major emphasis will be calculating NPV's for plays offshore Brazil.
This offshore region is the area of greatest exploration activity and
greatest expected oil potential. Analagous calculations will be made
later for the Amazon delta and onshore basins.
The net present value of a play is the present value of the oil
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produced minus costs. As described earlier in chapter 3 the NPV of a
block of oil reserves can be calculated as:
NPV - P  I (eq. 5-1)
a+r
This assumaes a constant future oil price. For our purposes, we need to
make a few changes in this simple formulation to give a more accurate
estimate of NPV of a play. First, the price of oil need not remain
constant over time. Second, costs involve development costs, operating
costs and cost of drilling type 2 exploration wells to delineate fields
in tne play. A revised formula used to calcualte NPV of an oil play is
give- in Table 5-1. The delay between initial exploration and the
initial production of the first field is d (5 years for large plays, 4
years for small plays). If plays are discovered, they are assumed to
be discovered realitvely early in the 5 year exploration program. It
is assumed that on average development expenditures and expenditures to
find remaining fields in the play are mde at 2 to 3 years after initial
exploration and thus 2 to 3 years before initial production. Thus, in
order to get the net present value of a play today, we need to discount
the value of the oil and operating costs at l/(l+r) d , and discount
the development cost and exploration costs (to find remaining fields)
at 1/((l+r) d / 2 . The oil price is assumed to grow from the present at
at g (0, 3 percent and 5 percent per year), from a base of $30/bbl.
2.A. Offshore Marginal Basins
The plays offshore are assumed to be in 250 to 350 feet of water,
the average depth of water in the offshore prospective areas. The
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Table 5-1
Method of Calculating Net Present Value of an Oil Play
PQ
NPV = PQ P - I for constant future oil price
a+r
(1 + g)d p I IEE (OC)Q (a+r)
NPV = -- -I_ IE 2 (eq.5-2)
(1 + r)d(a + r - g) (1 + r)d/2 (1 + r) d/ 2  (1 + r)d(r)
Net Value of Oil Investment Cost of Operating
Present Produced Cost Exploration Cost
Value Wells to Find
Fields in Play
P = oil price ($1979)
g = growth rate of oil price (per year)
r = discount rate, a = decline rate
Qp = peak production (mill bbl/yr)
I = developmient investment (million $1979)
d = delay between initial exploration and initial production,
investments made at time d/2, initial production starts at d
years
OC = operating costs ($ per bbl, OC constant per well)
IEE = number of wildcats to find and delineate 90 percent of oil in
fields of play.
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capital coefficients are estimated from coefficients of known offshore
plays in 250-350 ft. of water (Chapter 3). The capital coefficient of
small play (275 mmb) is taken to be $9000/bbl per day. For large play
(1330 mmb) the capital coefficient is estimated to be $7000/bbl per day.
Application of the NPV foriula developed here (shown in Table 5-1)
was used to estimate the sensitivity of NPV to oil price and discount
rate. As can be seen the net present value of a "giant field" play
(table 5-2) and a "commercial field" play (table 5-3) show wide
variations when different oil prices and different discount rates are
used. The exact parameters used to calculate these NPV's are given in
Annex 5-2 (large play parameters) and Annex 5-3 (small play parameters).
These play NPV's are approximations only, and in some sense can be
considered optimistic or best case estimates since longer delays on
difficult development conditions would decrease the NPV somewhat.
The decline rate (a) for NPV calculations was taken to be 0.12, based
on plans for offshore Brazil and other offshore areas (examples in
Adelman and Paddock, 1980). Investment is an increasing function of the
depletion rate since there are diminishing physical returns as more wells
are drilled to pump oil faster. Although we feel it is reasonable to
assume that our estimated capital coefficient ($7000/bbl per day of a
play containing 1330 mill bbls) corresponds to a depletion rate of 0.12,
it is important to do a sensitivity analysis to see the effect of
different depletion rates and capital coefficients on the NPV of the oil
play. The optimal depletion rates to maximize NPV is given in Adelman
and Paddock (1980).
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Table 5-2
Net Present Value of a Giant Field Play
Containing 1330 million bbls Offshore Brazil
(NPV in billion $1979, PV of oil produced in parenthesis)
Real Annual Real Increase in Oil Price
Discount (from a Base of $30/bbl, 1979)
Rate 0% 1.5% 3% 5%
3% 22.9 29.5 38.3 54.9
5% 18.1 23.1 29.5 41.2
(22) (27) (33.5) (45.2)
8% 12.8 16.2 20.5 27.9
(16.3) (20) (24) (31.5)
10% 10.3 13.0 16.3 22.0
(13.5) (16.3) (19.5) (25.3)
12% 8.3 10.5 13.1 17.6
(11.3) (13.57) (16.1) (20.68)
15% 6.0 7.6 9.6 12.8
20% 3.5 4.6 5.8 7.8
251 2.0 2.8 3.5 4.8
2.0 3.01.630% 1.1
241
Table 5-3
Net Present Value of a Commercial Field Play
Containing 275 million bbls Offshore Brazil
(NPV in billion $1979, PV of oil produced in parenthesis)
Real Annual Real Increase in Oil Price
Discount (from a Base of $30/bbl, 1979)
Rate 0% 1.5% 3% 5%
3% 4.2 5.6 7.3 10.6
5% 3.3 4.7 5.6 7.9
(4.4) (5.4) (6.7) (9.04)
8% 2.3 3.3 3.8 5.3
(3.3) (4.0) (4.8) (6.3)
10% 1.7 2.3 2.9 4.1)
(2.7) (3.25) (3.9) (5.06)
12% 1.4 1.8 2.3 3.2
(2.26) (2.7) (3.22) (4.14)
15% 0.9 1.2 1.6 2.3
20% 0.47 0.67 0.92 1.2
25% 0.18 0.32 0.45 0.8
0.23 0.4130% 0.02 0.1
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NPV P Q  - I
a+r
setting d NPV= 0 and P = marginal cost
optimal depletion rate = a* = (Pr/(dI/dQ))/2 - r (eq. 5-3)
For the project as a whole I/Q = dI/dQ, but if we assume investment
is an increasing function of a (I=Ka n, K is a constant), then it can
be shown that dI/dQ=(I/Q)n. Regression studies by Smith (1980)
estimate that n=1.95, for onshore areas. Since an estimate of
$7000/bbl per day is an average for the project as a whole, the
marginal capital coefficient is 1.95 times the average if we apply
Smith's estimate to our offshore region. Using this marginal capital
coefficient in eq. 5-3 we can iterate to get an optimal decline rate of
0.17 (P=$30/bbl, r=.12). Using this optimal depletion rate for our
estimated capital coefficient ($7000/bbl per day), the NPV of a giant
play was calculated to be only 2-3% greater than with the assumed
depletion rate (0.12). In this analysis here we will use depletion
rate of 0.12 because it apparently makes little difference as compared
to using the optimal rate. In addition, even if the target depletion
rate is 0.17, it is likely that technical factors of offshore
development may slow down optimal development to a depletion rate
closer to 0.12.
Available exploration well costs for offshore and onshore Brazil
are given in Annexes 5-4 and 5-5. The depth of these wells is usually
between 8,000 to 11,000 feet according to Petroconsultants Brazil Field
Records. The costs are somewhat higher for those offshore wells
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drilled by major oil companies as compared to those offshore wells
drilled by Petrobras. Some of the quoted costs for the wells drilled
by Petrobras are expected costs of future wells (3-4 million/well). As
there have been real cost increases in the last several years and
Petrobras cost quotes may have been understated, the average cost of
new offshore wells searching for plays is probably somewhat higher ($5
million/well). The well costs quoted for the major oil companies may
be the tail end of the range and may be somewhat overstated (7-10
million/well) so that the companies could fulfill contracted minimum
exploration commitments with fewer wells. An average well cost of $5
million/offshore well will be used for the purposes of evaluating
various levels of exploration. The net present cost of drilling 100
wells at 5 million/well over 5 years is $481 million (at a discount
rate of 10%).
The NPV for various levels of exploration were calculated using the
probabilities of discovery of offshore oil plays (Table 4-11), the NPV
of oil plays (tables 5-2, 5-3), and well costs discussed above. The
results are shown in in the next Table (5-4).
The net present present values shown in Table 5-4 are the
difference between diminishing returns to exploration and linearly
increasing costs of cumulative exploration. The optimal point to stop
exploration is not where total cost equals total benefit (NPV=O on
Table 5-4). The optimal exploration program is where the marginal
benefit equals marginal cost shown by the maximum NPV on Table 5-4. At
a 10 percent real discount rate the maximum NPV is at 100 wells ($340
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Table 5-4
Net Present Value of Offshore Oil Exploration Programs by PETROBRAS
as a Function of Exploration Wells Drilled
(NPV in millions of $1979)
U percent
Real Increase in Oil Price per
(from $30/bbl in $1979)
S1.5 percent 3 percent
Year
5 percent
A. (r=.l 0)
50
100
200
300
400
500
B. (r=.12)
50
100
200
300
400
500
C. (IRR
100
200
300
194
340
250
0
-400
-800
122
200
0
-270
-610
-1 ,070
- percent)
Note: A
B
C
- real discount
- real discount
- Internal rate
rate of 10 percent
reate of 12 percent
of return
Wells are type 1 exploration wells searching for new oil
plays. All wells drilled by PETROBRAS, none by risk
contractors.
Wells
610
650
400
160
-280
380
310
0
-280
-720
890
1 ,070
890
690
270
600
640
400
140
-290
1,400
1,800
1,800
1,700
1,300
1 ,000
1,270
1,130
950
540
22
19
18
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million) if oil prices are expected to stay constant in real terms.
For real increasing oil prices maximum NPV occurs at 200 wells. This
implies that it is not profitable to explore for the last 50-100
million bbls, expected returns are too small.
2.B. Amazon Delta and Onshore Cratonic Basins
An evaluation of exploration programs for the offshore Amazon delta
was made using probabilities of oil discovery (Table 4-13) and cost
parameters similar to those used above for small offshore plays. At
discount rates of 10 or 12 percent all exploration programs have
negative NPVs. The internal rate of return for 50 wells drilled in the
Amazon delta is calculated to be 1% if oil prices remain constant and
4.5% if oil prices increase at 5%/yr. Thus according to this model,
exploration in the offshore Amazon delta appears uneconomic.
Returns from exploration in the onshore cratonic basins are
somewhat more difficult to asssess with this model, than returns from
exploration in the offshore basins. This is because past discoveries
in the basins allowed one to calibrate the exploration efficiency.
With no discoveries in the onshore cratonic basins the exploration
efficiency cannot be estimated endogenously. The probabilities of oil
play discovery calculated in Table 4-12 assume an exploration
efficiency of 3. If these results are used, expected NPV peaks with
the next 100 to 500 exploration wells. NPV varies from $150 to $400
million, depending if the oil price increases at 0 or 5 percent/yr,
respectively. These estimates were made assuming play capital
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coefficients of $5000/bbl per day (small play containing 250 mmb) and
$2500/bbl per day (large play containing 1000 mmb), along with cost
estimate of 1 million per exploration well drilled. These estimates
should be considered an upper bound for several reasons. As discussed
in the Annex to Chapter 4, exploration efficiency for the large plays
in these onshore basins may have been very much higher than 3, possibly
up to 12. This would imply that the chance of finding a large play
("giant field play") is quite remote. If one assumes only small plays
remain, the NPV of a 100 well exploration program drops to -$50 million
(oil prices up at O%/yr) and is $160 million (if oil price increases
5%/yr). NPV's could even be lower than this if the thick layers of
hard basalt increase drilling costs substantially. It appears that
large-scale exploration in these basins is expected to be profitable
only if oil prices increase very rapidly. This is confirmed by the
fact that PETROBRAS has allocated only 4 percent of its exploration
budget to these basins over the next 5 years. Since oil exploration
has the highest expected profitability in the marginal offshore basins,
the remainder of this chapter will concentrate on exploration by
PETRO3RAS on foreign companies in these basins.
5.3. PETROBRAS Exploration Plans
PETROBRAS plans to spend $3.64 billion ($1980) on exploration over
the five year period from 1981 to 1985 (according to "Brazil Energy"
8/24/80 and OGJ 2/16/81). Plans call for 1,781 exploratory wells.
Seventy five percent of its expenditure ($2.8 billion) will be on 806
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offshore exploration wells. About 300 wells will be drilled in the
Campos basin (i.e. type 2 wells to find fields in the Campos basin
play). The remaining 506 exploration wells will be drilled in other
areas (i.e. most all are type 1 wells looking for new plays). Average
drilling depth is expected to be 12,000 ft. in average water depth of
330 ft.
Onshore exploration plans call for 975 exploration wells at a cost
of $832 million. About 85 percent of the wells will be drilled in the
coastal basins (260 in the mature Reconcavo basin and 560 in other
coastal basins). The remaining 155 wells are planned for the three
large onshore cratonic basins.
5.4 Exploration Service Contracts
In October 1975 Brazil diverged from its policy of a Brazilian-only
exploration program. PETROBRAS offered exploration service contracts
to foreign oil companies to accelerate petroleum exploration in
particularly difficult regions. Three rounds of international bidding
were completed by late 1979, and 128 contracts have been signed with
foreign oil companies (24 for offshore blocks and 4 for onshore blocks
in the Amazon). Exploration contract terms are described below based
on a brochure published by PETROBRAS.
Under the terms of these contracts the oil company pays a fee for
the available geologic data. PETROBRAS then offers certain areas for
which companies bid to provide exploration as a contract service to
PETROBRAS. The contractor bears the "risk" of exploration. If there
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are no discoveries, the contractor is not reimbursed for his expenses
and the contract is cancelled. Until mid-1979 the contracts contained
a pre-agreed upon minimum investment commitment and minimum number of
wells to be drilled for the three year exploration period. But in 1979
a second type of contract was offered which provided the companies with
the option of drilling wildcats after the pre-agreed investment in
seismic surveys was made. A bank letter of guarantee insures that the
minimum inevestment will be made. The letter is used to guarantee
payment to PETROBRAS of any shortfall between actual investment and
minimum investment.
In the event of a commercial discovery, the contractor is
responsible, technically and financially, for development. The
contractor is reimbursed for exploration and appraisal expenses without
interest, and for development expenses with interest. Furthermore, the
contractor is entitled to remuneration proportional to oil production
from the fields found and developed by him, which must be at the
"maximum efficient rate". The term of remuneration from oil produced
are set during contract negotiations. A proportion of the total oil
produced in any quarter is multiplied by the price of crude oil to
arrive at a quarterly remuneration to the contractors (in US dollars).
The minumum and maximum shares for foreign oil companies are 20 and 35
percent (according to Brazil Energy Dec. 5, 1979). The price of crude
oil is set by PETROBRAS to equal the worldwide long term contract crude
oil sale price at the time of production. The contractor has an option
to buy back oil at the same price during the following quarter unless a
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crisis in petroleum supply is declared by the Brazilian Government.
The contractor is required to pay Brazilian income tax on his net
taxable income (25% or as arranged by existing tax treaties).
PETROBRAS is committed to make capital payments only up to the amount
of net income from the fields in any quarter.
In the first round of bidding, 10 offshore blocks were offered and
4 were contracted. In the second round, 25 offshore blocks were
offered and 13 contracted. The third round results were somewhat
disappointing, 21 offshore blocks and 21 onshore blocks being offered
but only 11 being contracted.
Minimum investment commitment is US$296 million and total
investment by August 1979 has been US$298 million. Planned total
investment for the first three rounds is US$343.7 million. Minimum
seismic exploration committed is 31,210 km., with 41,580 km. already
completed (costing US$17 million). The minimum number of wells to be
drilled is 53. Twenty six have been drilled (all offshore), but no
commercial discoveries have been made. The cost of the wells already
completed was US$200 million.
In the beginning of the fourth round 124 blocks were offered (104
onshore, 20 offshore). But in January 1980 PETROBRAS eased the
contract ternns. Now complete basins are offered for bidding rather
than blocks. If oil is discovered, payment will be made in oil rather
than in dollar equivalent. Incentives are also provided for smaller
private Brazilian companies to take up risk contracts, with assistance
from PETROBRAS. The contracted company will now be allowed to
~Y1~_11 _~jL 1__1 _~_4__1___11_
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participate in the evaluation of the field and in the production
stage. The new terms were applicable in the fourth round which ended
April 9, 1980.
Details of a recent risk contract signed between PETROBRAS and
Paulipetro, a consortium of CESP (Sao Paulo Energy Company) and IPT
(Sao Paulo Institute for Technological Research) were released January
1980. Paulipetro signed contracts for oil exploration in 17 onshore
blocks in the Parana basin. The contract requires investment of 1.5 to
2 million US$ per block over the next three years for seismic work
before deciding whether or not to drill or give up the area.
Paulipetro will receive 37% of the value of any oil and gas discovered
in cruzeiros equivalent to the world market price and will also be
eligible for up to 13% of net profits from oil and gas discovered.
When the field enters operation it is turned over the PETROBRAS.
Paulipetro is building up a staff of 600 and subcontracting the seismic
exploration. Cooperation from PETROBRAS is expected to be greater than
with risk contracts between PETROBRAS and foreign companies.
We can use this information on current exploration service
contracts to construct a simple model of the split of NPV between the
oil companies and PETROBRAS. We will use the probabilities of
discovery, the present value and present cost of oil produced and risk
contract terms to calculate the NPV of exploration by a company and the
share going to PETROBRAS. For a given block of exploration wells the
fraction drilled by the foreign oil companies is denoted as f. If all
exploration is done by the companies, f=l. The split of NPV is
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calculated as follows:
For a given block of exploration wells:
NPVTOTAL = NPVOIL COMPANY + NPVPETROBRAS
4
NPVOIL COMPANY = x(l-t)(l (f? )Vi ) -fpl(IE)
i=2
4
NPV ETROBS p.(f(l-x)V.i - Ci - IE)+ tfXV
i=2 1 1
+ (1-f)(V iC)) - (1-f) IE
Pi' i=2 to 4 = probability that oil in state i will be discovered
Pl = probability that no oil will be discovered
Vi  = present value of oil produced
C i  = present costs of oil play development
IE = present cost of oil exploration wells (wells exploring for
plays)
X = contracted fraction of oil going to oil company (30 percent on
average)
f = fraction of block of oil wells drilled by oil company (if f=O
all exploration is by Petrobras)
t = tax rate on corporate income in Brazil (25 percent)
NPVOIL COMPANIES is calculated net of Brazilian tax but betore U.S.
or other tax.
Using this fonnulation above the NPV of an exploration program of
wells drilled by the foreign oil companies is calculated (as shown in
Table 5-5). The maximum NPV gives the optimal exploration level for
the companies, given that PETROBRAS drills no exploration wells (i.e.
252
Table 5-5
Net Present Value of Offshore Oil Exploration Programs
with all Exploration Drilling by Foreign Oil Companies(NPV in millions $1979)
Wells
A. (r=.10)
50
100
200
300
0 percent
-32
-47
Real Increase in Oil Price per Year
(from $30/bbl in $1979)
1.5 percent 3 percent 5 per
0
10
-155
183
-56
rcent
197
237
125
30400
B. (r=.12)
50
100
200
300
-60
-90
-35
46 102
-160
-37
A. real discount rate is 10 percent.
B. real discount rate is 12 percent.
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type 1 exploration wells). Optimal exploration by the foreign oil
companies stops short (about 100 wells) of the optimal exploration plan
from the point of view of PETROBRAS.
The decision by the oil companies to explore in Brazil is dependent
not only on the terms offered but on the amount of exploration
undertaken simultaneously by PETROBRAS. An example using the model
developed here helps show this point. If PETROBRAS does no
exploration, oil prices increase 1.5 percent per year and a discount
rate of 10 percent is used, the optimal exploration program for the oil
companies will be to drill 100 wells with an expected NPV of +10
million $1979 (political risks ignored for the moment). However, if
PETROBRAS decides to drill 400 wells and the oil companies are planning
to drill 100 wells (both programs drill wells over 5 years), the
expected NPV of the oil company drops to -81 million $1979. This is
due to the fact that large scale extensive exploration by PETROBRAS
resolves uncertainty in the resource base and quickly drives down the
returns to exploration so that, on the average, the oil company program
becomes less profitable.
Since optimal exploration by foreign oil companies is not optimal
from the viewpoint of Brazil it is very useful to calculate how much
Brazil would give up (in NPV tens) by letting foreign oil companies do
all the exploration. These key results are shown in Table 5-6 (real
discount rate r = 10 percent) and Table 5-7 (r = .12). For oil price
increasing at a real rate of 0 or 5 percent per year, the loss the
Brazil is estimated to be $48 to $440 million, respectively (regardless
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Table 5-6
Comparison of the NPV of Exploration by PETROBRAS and
Exploration by Foreign Oil Companies
(NPV in millions $1979, Real Discount Rate is 10 percent)
Real Annual Percentage Increase in Oil Price
(base of $30/bbl, $1979)
0 percent 1.5 percent 3 percent 5 percent
1 .Optimal Exploration
by PETROBRAS
340 650
(100 wells) (200 w)
1,070
(200 w)
2,000
(200 to 250 w)
2.All Exploration
by Foreign Oil Comp.
a.Optimal Oil Comp.
Exploration
b.PETROBRAS Share
3.Difference btw. PETROBRAS
Share and Optimal
Exploration by PETROBRAS
(2b.-l.)
4. PI anned Exploration
by PETROBRAS
5. Difference btw Planned
and Optimum Exploration
by PETROBRAS (4.-1.)
6.Benefit of Exploration
by Companies Compared
to Current Plan (2b.-5)
0 10 183
(0 w) (100 w) (100 w)
0
-340
600
-50
600
-1 80
-800 -280 270
(500 w) (500 w) (500 w)
-1140
+800
-930
+800
-800
+330
Wells
(r .10)
237
(200 w)
1,560
-440
1,300
(500 w)
-700
+260
255
Table 5-7
Comparison of the NPV of Exploration by PETROBRAS and
Exploration by Foreign Oil Companies
(NPV in millions $1979, Real Discount Rate is 12 percent)
Real Annual Percentage Increase in Oil Price
(base of $30/bbl, $1979)
0 percent 1.5 percent 3 percent 5 percent
S.Optimal Exploration
by PETROBRAS
200
(100 wells)
380 640(100 w) (200 w)
2.All Exploration
by Foreign Oil Comp.
a.Optimal Oil Comp.
Exploration
b.PETRUBRAS Share
3.Difference btw. PETROBRAS
Share and Optimal
Exploration by PETROBRAS(2b.-l.)
4.Planned Exploration
by PETROBRAS
5. Di fference btw Planned
and Optimum Exploration
by PETROBRAS (4.-1.)
6.Benefit of Exploration
by Companies Compared
to Current Plan (2b.-5)
0
(0 w)
0
-200
0 9 10 2
(0 w) (100 w) (200 w)
0
-380
-1,070 -720
(500 w) (500 w)
-1 ,270
+1 ,070
-1 ,100
+720
592
-48
-290
(500 w)
-930
+882
Wells
(r .12)
1,270
(200 w)
898
-372
540
(500 w)
-730
+358
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of whether the discount rate is 10 or 12 percent). PETROBRAS could
maximize NPV if it were to continue to explore up to the optimum point
(100 to 200 wells). However, if PETROBRAS continues with current plans
to drill at least 500 wells offshore searching for new plays, the
result based on this model would be an expected present value loss of
$700 million to $1,200 million ($1979), depending on whether the oil
price increases at 0 or 5 percent in real terms. These results are
approximately the same whether the real discount rate is 10 or 12
percent. If average exploration costs were lowered, NPV would be
higher. On the other hand, if oil plays are found in deep water or
delays greater than expected, NPV would be lower. In order for the NPV
of current plans to become positive, one must assume oil price
increasing rapidly, much lower exploration costs and oil found in
relatively shallow water. Much lower discount rates (less than 7
percent) would also raise NPV. Since these conditions are possible but
rather unlikely, the conclusion that can be drawn is that Petrobras
should seriously question such ambitious exploration plans and revise
plans in light of results obtained with the next 100-200 wells.
It is particularly difficult for an institution such as PETROBRAS
to institute policies to wind down the rate of exploration once the
optimum number of wells have been drilled. It is difficult from a
technical and geologic viewpoint to determine the optimum level, and it
is difficult for a state owned enterprise to do so from an
institutional standpoint (as PETROBRAS has almost a complete monopoly
on oil activities and easy access to the government budget). If it is
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difficult to prevent "over exploration", a preferable choice may be to
let the oil companies do the exploration and accept the lesser of two
evils. According to the results of this model the reduction in lost
NPV that would occur by switching from current plans to exploration by
the foreign oil companies is estimated to be between $1,000 million
$1979 (if oil prices stay constant) and $300 million (if oil prices
rise 5 percent per year in real terms). These results are roughly the
same whether r = .1 and r = .12. It is important at this point to
discuss in more detail the discount rate and differences between social
project evaluation and private project evaluation.
5.5 Social vs. Private Project Evaluation
As discussed in Chapter 2 a social project evaluation (the
viewpoint of the Brazilian government) differs from the private project
evaluation (in this case, the viewpoint of the foreign companies) in
three respects. These three differences are the value of oil, the
value of foreign exchange and the discount rate. A social project
evaluation uses the international price of oil plus a stockpile
premium, the shadow of foreign exchange (to covert the domestic project
components into international units) and the social discount rate.
The difference between social and foreign private evaluations
caused by the first two adjustments (oil price and exchange rate) are
very small. The stockpile premium calculated in Chapter 2 ($1 to $2
per barrel) is only 3 to 5 percent of the international oil price. The
benefits of the oil exploration program to the foreign companies should
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thus be 3 to 5 percent of the international oil price. The benefits of
the oil exploration program to the foreign companies should thus be 3
to 5 percent less than the benefits calculated for the Brazilian
government due to this difference in oil value.
When the shadow exchange rate is used the costs of exploration and
development are 5 to 10 percent lower for PETROBRAS than for the
private oil companies. However, the private foreign companies may be
more efficient than PETROBRAS and have lower costs. These lower costs
may easily offset the difference in costs caused by the shadow price of
foreign exchange adjustment. Thus, the overall difference between
social and private NPV evaluations due to the the stockpile premium and
the shadow price of foreign exchange are assumed to be small,
negligible compared to other factors such as oil price, discovery size,
and discount rate. Differences caused by the divergence of social and
private discount rates may be much more important, however.
A detailed discussion of the CAPM approach to the calculation of
risk-adjusted discount rates for oil exploration and production
projects was completed in Chapter 2. Estimates of the social cost of
capital and the cost of capital for foreign oil companies were both
10U, even though the betas and systematic risk premiums for each were
different. If we believe that 10% reflects the true cost of capital,
then the preceding results using r = .10 are relevant. However, there
are other factors which need to be accounted for which may influence
the choice of discount rate. From the viewpoint of the foreign oil
company political risk of expropriation should be accounted for either
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by adjusting the cash flows or adjusting the discount rate upward.
From the viewpoint of Brazilian society, the discount rate should be
adjusted upward to account for the higher cost of capital induced by
increasing costs of foreign borrowing (country risk premium). These
additional adjustments to the discount rate are discussed in more
detail below.
5.A. Political Risks for Major Oil Companies
The results presented above assume if oil is found by major oil
companies they will be able to appropriate benefits according to the
original contract terms. There always is a small chance that the oil
companies will not get paid their share due to political change, war
etc.( i.e. reasons independent of oil company exploration) or in the
event the oil companies discover a major oil field and Brazil
unilaterally changes the contract termis (i.e. due to events caused by
the actions of the oil companies). To account for this possibility the
cash flows could be adjusted to reflect various possible scenarios. If
we take an example from Table 5-6 where 100 wells are drilled by the
oil companies, 0 wells drilled by PETROBRAS, the discount rate is 10
percent, and oil prices stay constant, then the expected NPV is $-47
million. If we assume that if 1 or 2 small plays are found PETROBRAS
wll not change the contract terms and if one giant play is found
PETROBRAS reduces the benefit to that of 2 small plays, then the
expected NPV drops to $-90 million.
An alternative to adjusting the cash flows is to adjust the
260
discount rate. If the discount rate is adjusted upward 2 percent to
NPV falls to $-90 million, or the same as adjusting the cash flows. It
is more accurate to adjust the cash flows, different scenarios will
lead to different results. Adjustments to the discount rate of
2-4 percent are similar to use and seem to give an spread of changes in
NPV similar to adjusting the cash flows.
5.B. Adjustments Caused by Brazil's Foreign Debt Problem
The previous section discussed reasons why one may expect the
discount rate for oil exploration projects undertaken by oil companies
to be 2-4% higher than the discount rate calculated from the CAPM model
10%. This section discusses reasons why the cash flows (or discount
rate) may need to be adjusted if the project is undertaken by a
Brazilian public institution. In chapter 2 it was pointed out that as
the country risk premium on foreign loans increases the equilibrium
interest rate in the country rises. The country risk premium for
Brazil is estimated to be 1-2 percent. When one institution borrows
foreign funds it drives up the interest rate to all other borrowers.
Thus the marginal cost of borrowing should be reflected in a additional
interest rate premium of twice the country risk premium, or 2-4
percent. As argued by Baldwin, Lessard and Mason (1981), this premium
shifts the risk return line upward. Thus a return on a riskless asset
should be the U.S. riskless rate (2 percent) plus 2 to 4 percent. This
results in a real social discount rate for oil exploration projects of
12 to 14 percent as opposed to 10 percent without this adjustment.
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This adjustment for country risk reflects an additional cost to the
Brazilians for financing oil exploration themselves, as opposed to
letting foreign companies do the exploration. These costs in principle
could be added to the cash flows but in practice it is much simpler to
account for this effect through adjustments in the discount rate as
discussed above.
Thus, the estimated discount rate may rise to 12-14 percent for the
foreign companies (to account for political risks) and to 12-14 percent
for Brazilian public enterprises (to account for the effects of country
risk). Using these adjustments the calculations with a discount rate
of 12 percent may provide more realistic results than those with a 10
percent rate.
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Annexes--Chapter 5
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Annex 5-1
Reservoir Name
(water depth, feet)
Curima (147)
Agulha (60)
Ubarana (40)
Guaricema (82)
Caioba (82)
Dourado (80)
Enchova (383)
Namorado (500)
Garoupa (398)
Panpo (357)
Cherne (390)
Discovery
Basin Year
Northeast 1978
Northeast 1975
Northeast 1973
Sergipe 1968
Sergipe 1970
Sergipe 1970
Campos 1976
Campos 1975
Campos 1974
Campos 1977
Campos 1977
Delay Until Approximate Delay
Initial Until Full
Production (yrs) Production (yrs)
2 3
3 4
3 4
5 6
5 6
6 7
2* 8
4* 9
5* 9
10 10
8 11
Source: Petrobras News, no. 43, July 1980.
*First fields discovered in play
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Annex 5-2
Net Present Value and Field Size Distribution for a
Hypothetical Offshore "Giant-Field" Play
1) Field Size Distribution:
Largest Field (mill bbls.) 700 (50-50% of play reserves)
Average Play Size (mill. bbls) 1330
Productive Area of Play 570 Km2 (high), 380 (medium), 280 (low)
2) Key Cost Parameters:
Largest Field = 700 mill. bbls, Total Play Reserves = 1330 mill bbls = Q
Water Depth = 200-300 ft.
Peak Production of Play = 160 mill. bbls/yr = 430,000 bbl/d = Qp
Decline Rate = 12 percent = .12 = a
Estimated Investment Cost1 for Play = $3100 million ($1979) = I
Estimated Capital Coefficient = $7,000/peak bbl/d = I/Qp
Average Delay (between initial exploration and initial production) =
5 years = d
Operating Costs = $2/bbl ($1979) = OC
Cost per new field wildcat I = $5.0 million
Number new field wildcats (type 2) to find 90 percent
play reserves2 = 100
InvestUient in new field wildcat wells = 100 x 5.0 = $500 million ($1979)
1Investment costs and cost per well have already been adjusted for the
shadow prices of foreign exchange (adjustment factor is .9 for production
investment and .87 for exploration investment).
2Based on experience in the Campos Basin.
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Annex 5-3
Net Present Value and Field Size Distribution for a
Hypothetical Average Offshore "Commercial-Field" Play
1) Field Size Distribution:
Largest Field (mill bbls.) 130 (50-50% of play reserves)
Average Play Size (mill. bbls) 275
Productive Area of Play 570 Km2 (high), 380 (medium), 280 (low)
Productive Area of Play 200 Km2 (high), 170 (medium), 130 (low)
2) Key Cost Parameters:
Largest Field = 130 mill. bbls, Total Play Reserves = 275 mill bbls = Q
Water Depth = 200-300 ft.
Peak Production of Play = 32 mill. bbls/yr = 87,000 bbl/d = Qp
Decline Rate = 12 percent = a
Estimated Investment Cost1 for Play = $800 million ($1979) = I
Estimated Capital Coefficient = $9,000/peak bbl/d = I/Qp
Average Delay = 4 years = d
Operating Costs = $2/bbl ($1979) = OC
Cost per new field wildcat I = $5.0 million ($1979)
Number new field wildcats (type 2) to find 90 percent play reserves = 60
Investment in new field wildcats = 45 x 4.3 = $194 million ($1979)
1Investment costs and cost per well have already been adjusted for the
shadow prices of foreign exchange (adjustment factor is .9 for production
investment and .87 for exploration investment).
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Annex 5-4
Cost of Drilling Wells Offshore Brazil
(All costs in millions US $)
Source
1) $8.5/well ($1979)
2) $7.1/well ($1979)
3) $10/well ($1979)
4) $7/well ($1980)
5) $3/well ($1980)
6) $3.86/well ($1980)
7) $4.0/well ($1980)
8) $3.5/well ($1980)
9) $3.5/well ($1980)
$223/26 wells drilled by
major oil cos.
$314/44 wells committed by
major oil cos.
One well by Hispanoil
13,800 ft.
One deep offshore well
300 in water
5000 in depth
Average cost 165 wells by
Petrobras in 1980
$23.13/6 wells in Campos
Basin
$794 mill Cr$/5 wells 40Cr/$
Basin
Planned $2.8 billion/806 wells
1981 by Petrobras
Funds appropriated for 3 wells
offshore
Brazilian Business
J/J 1980
Brazilian Business
J/J 1980
Brazilian Business
J/J 1980
Brazil Energy, v.1
no. 4, 3/24/80
Petrobras News no.
43, July 1980
Petrobras News no.
43, July 1980
Petrobras News no.
37, Jan., 1980
OGJ v. 79, no. 7
Feb. 16, 1981
Brazil Energy
Dec. 10, 1980
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Annex 5-5
Cost of Drilling Wells Onshore Brazil
(All costs in millions US $)
Source
1) $0.5/well ($
2) $0.38/well (
3) $0.615/well
4) $0.8544/well
(Dec. $1980)
1 980)
$1980)
Average for 45 wells in 1980
One well Rio Grande de Norte
major oil cos.
(31980) 148 mill. Cr$/6 wells in
Amazon (40Cr$/$)
$832 million/975 wells,
plans for '81-85
Petrobras News,
no. 43, July 1980
Petrobras News,
no. 43, July 1980
Petrobras News
no. 37, Jan. 1980
OGJ Feb. 16. 1981
v. 79, no. 7
268
CHAPTER 6 - SHALE OIL POTENTIAL IN BRAZIL
Brazil has the world's second largest shale oil resources which are
calculated to be 842 billion barrels. This chapter is on the geology,
production technology, costs, net present value and indirect costs and
benefits of shale oil production in Brazil.
G-IGeology and Reserves 6of Brazilian Oil Shale
The known resources of shale oil in Brazil are second only to the
United States. According to the United Nations, total resouces of oil
from shale in Brazil are at least 842 bilion barrels (U.S. resources are
at least 1,158 billion barrels of oil).1 There are 8 major
occurrences of oil shale in Brazil (as shown in Annex). The highest
quality deposits are in the Irati formation which winds its way for
1 ,700 km from the State of Sao Paulo to Uruguay. Substantial resources
also occur in the oil shale of Paraiba in the State of Sao Paulo. The
remaining oil shale deposits are mostly small and of lowgrade. These
remaining deposits in north and northeastern Brazil are not likely to be
developed in the foreseeable future.
The shale oil beds of Paraiba (Sao Paulo State) are 35 meters thick
13
and contain 4% to 13% oil (7.5% average). The measured resources
are 119 million barrels of oil (under a 10 km2 area) and inferred
resources of 1.3 billion barrels of oil (under a 115 km2
area).12 Unfortunately, the moisture content of the rock is 37% by
weight in the Paraiba deposits. This poses difficult exploitation
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problems which have focused PETROSIX studies on the Irati formation shale
deposits (where moisture content is only 5%).
The Irati formation outcrops in a great "S" shape for 1,700 km in the
states of Sao Paulo, Paraiba, Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul. In
Parana and Rio Grande do Sul, two distinct beds of oil shale occur
separated by a sequence of shale and limestone. In Santa Catarina and
Sao Paulo the oil shale, shale and dolomite are interbedded throughout
the section.
The most widely accepted hypothesis for the formation of the Irati
shale oil is that the melting of glacial ice in the Late Carboniferous
allowed encroachment of seawater. An intracontinental basin containing
water of reduced salinity allowed growth of vegetation which was
deposited and eventually lead to the formation of kerogen or shale oil.
Although the beds of the Irati formation generally have great lateral
continuity, there are places where the stratigraphic location of the oil
is irregular and places where the two major shale oil beds diverge into
as many as 80 small beds. 13
Three mining sites have been established after drilling grids on
400 m and 800 m spacing. Reserves of these three mining sites total over
1,260 million barrels. Two of the sites are in Rio Grande do Sul (240
million barrels of oil resources are under an area of 84 km2 at Sao
Gabriel and 463 million barrels are under an area of 191 km2 at Dom
Pedrito). The third mining site at Sao Mateus do Sul in Parana
contains 560 million barrels of measured oil reserves in a 4 km by 16 km
mining area (64 km2 )1 3 . See Annex 2. It is here that the
PETROSIX prototype plant is in operation and where the 50,000 barrel/day
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commercial plant is proposed.
The Sao Maeus do Sul site contains two shale oil beds with the upper
1/
bed (6.5 m thick) averaging 6.4% oil content (19 gallons/ton)- and
the lower bed (3.2 m thick) averaging 9.1% oil content (28 gallons/ton).
The overall average oil content is 7.4% (23 gallons/ton)13 or .55
barrels of oil per ton of rock. The two beds are separated by 8.6 m of
shale and limestone. The 4 km width of the proposed mining zone is set
such that overburden in the zone is less than 30 m. This gives a strip
ratio of 1 to 4 (i.e., thickness of overburden plus thickness of waste
rock divided thickness of shale oil beds). Much of the shale oil beds
are covered with only 5 m to 10 m of overburden (strip rato of 2). Oil
reserves are 560 to 600 million barrels along with 10 million tons of
sulfur, 4.5 million tons of LPG and 22 billion cubic meters of light fuel
12
gas.
--12PETROSIX Shale Oil Production Process
The "Superintendencia da Industrializacao do Xisto" (PETROSIX) was
incorporaated into Petrobras in 1954. Initial research concentrated on
th Paraiba Valley oil shale but the superiority of the Irati oil shale,
in addition to economic factors shifted work priority to the Irati oil
shale.
In 1965 Cameron Engineers (now the U.S. firm PACE) was awarded a
contract to help build a small 1,000 barrel/day prototype plant at Sao
Mateus do Sul. Plant design was tailored to the specific characteristics
1/Fischer assay valves; based on 19.6 API oil where gallons/ton = .302
(weight % oil in rock).
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of the Irati oil shale and the plant was first successfully operated in
1972, with a U.S. patent awarded in 1975. The prototype plant uses 2,200
metric tons/day of oil shale, that produces 1,000 barrels of oil, 36,500
cu m of light gas (900 BTU/cu m), 1.7 metric tons of sulfur and 75
barrels of LPG each day.3 The plant is a modified gas cumbustion
retort (similar to the U.S. Paraho process retort). It is an above
ground retorting process which utilizes 19-28 gallon/ton grade oil shale
(U.S. shale oil processes are similar, using 30-35 gallon/ton oil shale,
in-situ production processes are used only for oil shale with less than
10 gallons/ton). 14
Engineering plans have been completed for a commercial shale oil
plant at Sao Mateus do Sul which would produce a net oil output of 45,000
bbls/day and utilizes 112,000 tons/day of oil shale rock.4 A
decision on whether to go ahead with the commercial plant is expected in
mid-1981. If the plant is started in 1985 it is expected to be producing
22,500 bbls/day (net production). In mid-1986 the plant is planned to
run at full capacity production synthetic crude at a rate of 51,137
bbl/day (gross production), which corresponds to 44,690 bbl/day (net
production). In addition to the crude, 890 t/day of sulfur and 520 t/day
of liquified gas will be produced.12 Synthetic crude will be
processed in a nearby refinery, producing approximately 30% gasoline, 30%
diesel , 20% gas-oil and 20% fuel oil.
The PETROSIX process is feasible and on a small scale it is
workable. Shale oil production is a multistage process which involves a
tremendous amount of solid rock handling. The production process is
outlined below312 :
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1) Mining - Topsoil is cleared off and the overburden waste rock is
scraped away with 220 yd3 and 140 yd3 draglines. There
is 321,000 tons/day of waste rock to be moved in order to mine
112,000 tons/day of shale rock. The shale rock is transported
with 18 200-ton trucks to the processing area. The trucks
return with spent shale for dumping at the mine site, which is
then covered wth topsoil.
2) Solid Preparation - The shale rock is then crushed into 6-inch
size pieces. The fine shale dust is briquetted.
3) Retorting - A battery of 18 retorts, of which 16 are in use at
one time, are used to process the shale (for the 50,000 bbl/d
plant). Shale is fed in the top of each of the retorts which
are 36 inches (inside diameter) and produce 4,000 bbls/day
each. As the shale slides down the retort, heated recycle gases
vaporize off the shale oil which is then condensed. Recovery is
95% of the original oil.
4) Upgrading - The shale oil is upgraded or refined producing 30%
gasoline, 30% diesel, 20% gas-oil and 20% fuel oil.
6-3 Production Costs and Evaluation of Shale Oil Investments
The evolution of shale oil production cost estimates in Brazil has
closely paralled the evolution of such estimates in the United States.
Original cost estimates in both countries made 10 years ago were on the
order of a few dollars per barrel. After 10 years of experience with
prototype plants in both countries cost estimates have escalated
five-fold (in real terms). Even after the studies and evaluations of the
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seventies there still remains a great deal of uncertainty over the
ultimate production costs from a full scale plant. In spite of this
uncertainty over production costs, a great deal can be learned about the
differences and similarities between shale oil production in Brazil and
the U.S. through a comparison of recent cost estimates.
The rough breakdown of Brazilian shale oil production costs were
provided in 1971 after an initial evaluation by Cameron engineers.
Updated estimates of the cost breakdown were obtained from Petrobras in
1979. This breakdown of capital costs and operating costs are given in
Table-l. A 50,000 barrel per day plan has estimated capital costs of
2,354 million dollars ($1978). Before these costs can be directly
compared to costs in the United States the distortions due to the
overvalued Brazilain $Cr must be removed. Distortions occur when the
official exchange rate departs from the "free trade exchange rate", or
shadow exchange rate, due to variety of import tariffs and export
subsidies. Calculations based on data in the mid-1970's indicate the $Cr
was overvalued by 30%. The estimated investment costs were made by
Petrobras using the official exchange rate. In order to correct the
distortion due to the overvalued exchange rate the fraction of the cost
which was made originally in foreign exchange must be separated out.
Expenditure in foreign exchange can take place directly through the
purchase of foreign equipment or indirectly through the purchase of
Brazilian equipment (a fracton of which eventually results in the
expenditure of foreign exchange). This latter component (the indirect
foreign exhange component) is estimated to be 20% based on input-output
studies of the Brazilian construction industry (from personal
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communication World Bank Brazil Group). The direct foreign exchange
components are calculated with data from the project evaluation made by
Cameron Engineers. The overall average direct foreign exchange component
is estimated to be 34%, but it is over 50% for mining investment (Annex 6-
provides the breakdown of the components). The fraction of the
investment (measured in $US) which is made only in local currency is
divided by 1.3 (ratio of the shadow exchange rate to the official rate in
$Cr/$US). The capital costs and operating costs were adjusted in this
fashion the results of which are compared to U.S. shale oil production
cost in Table-2.
There are several important differences between Brazilian and U.S.
costs. Shale oil mining in Brazil is all surface mining with overburden
less than 30 meters, thus costs per ton of rock mined are cheaper in
Brazil. These lower costs are more than offset by the larger amounts or
Brazilian shale that must be mined per barrel of oil, since Brazilian
shale is about 60% as rich as U.S. shale. Overall mining capital costs
are $800 million as compared to $300 million estimated in the U.S.
Surface retorting are somewhat higher than the U.S. due to the larger
amount of rock to be processed. Operating cost estimates are lower in
Brazil. This is presumably due to lower labor costs, but could be
revised substantially upward if there is a shortage of skilled labor
during rapid development of shale oil. Costs due to environmental
regulation are low in Brazil and there is no problem of water supply.
Overall, capital costs per daily barrel are calculated to be $49,980/b/d
in Brazil and $25,000 to $32,000/b/d for the U.S. (all in late $1979).
A variety of available cost estimates for the U.S. are compared to
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Brazilian costs in Table-3. Current plans for shale oil estimate a cost
of $22-38/bbl in the U.S. Some recent estimates including projected
cost overruns push the cost per barrel into the $45-62/bbl range ($1979
15% return on all equity). Brazilian estmates without cost overruns are
calculated to be $35-43/bbl.
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Table 1
Investment and Operating Cost Estimates for a
50,000 bbl/day Shale Oil Plant in Brazill
Capital Costs
(million $1978)
Operating Costs
(million $1978/yr)
Mining
Retorting
Solid Prep.
Upgrading
Mis.
Total
Total (Adjusted for Shadow Price
of foreign exchange) 2083($1978) 2/
2260($1979)4/
59($1978)3/
64($1979)4/
1/Based on data from Petobras from engineering plans for Sao Mateus do
Sul plant (51,137 bbl/day gross output, 44,690 bbl/day net output).
(This data is an update of estimates presented at the 8th World Pet.
Congress in 1971 by Bruni.)
2/Based on 34% average direct foreign exchange component (Cameron
Engineers 1970 project appraisal), 20% of Brazilian expenditures
indirectly in foreign exchange (personal communcation with World Bank
Brazil group), and an exchange rate overvalued 30% in the '75-'79 period.
Adj. Factor = .885 = (.5 + (.34 + .2(.66))/1.3)
3/Based on a 20% direct foreign exhange component for operating costs
(from Cameron Engineers 1970 appraisal)
Adj. Factor = .815 = (.2 + .8/1.3)
4/Based on an inflation rate of 8% from 1978 to 1979.
471
706
471
353
353
2354
14.6
29.2
7.3
14.6
3.5
73
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Table 2
Comparison of Brazilian Petrosix and U.S. Shale Oil Cost Estimates
(costs in millions $1978)
Mining and Solida
PreparationS/
Capital Cost
Annual Oper. Cost
Surface Retorting
Capital Cost
Annual oper. Cost
Upgrading
Capital Cost
Annual Oper. Cost
Total
Capital Cost
Annual Oper. Cost
Net Production (bbl/d)
Capital Cost ($ per bb/g)($1979 per bbl/d)D
PETROSIX 1
(51,000 bbl/d)
(112,000 tons/d
surface)
832
19
611
23
293
12
2,083
59
45,000
46,288
(49,980)
Tosco2
(55,000 bbl/d
(66,000 tons/d
underground)
270
38
510
43
210
5.2
1,260
110
43,000
29,300
(31,644)
Paraho3
(100,000 bbl/d)
(157,421 tons/d
underground)
750
97
700
81
460
55
2,105
254
90,000
23,388
(25,260)
1/Based on data from Petrobras shown in Table , original investment cost
estimates have been adjusted using the direct foreign exchange components
derived from Cameron engineers 1970 project appraisal (see Annex).
2/"Shale Oil Economies Update", Nutter and Waitman, Tosco Corp., April 1978.
3/"Shale Oil: Potential Economies of Large Scale Production", Weiss, Ball,
Barbera, MIT-79-012WP, 1979.
4/The Petrosix process uses Brazilian shale (20-23 gallons oil/ton) and the
other technologies process U.S. shale (30-35 gallons oil/ton).
5/Based on an inflation rate of 8% from 1978 to 1979.
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Table 3
Comparison of Capital Costs of Recent
Shale Oil Plant Cost Estimates ($1979)
Cost per barrel
Capital Investment (15% return on
50,000 BDPD plant Investment all equity
U.S. ($ Billion) ($ per bbl/d) investment
1.Underground Minel/
Surface Retort-' 1.2 24,000 22-26
2.Underground Mine 2/
Surface Retort(updated)- 1.44 28,800 28-38
3.0pen Pit Mine 1/
Surface Retort- 1.2 24,000 24-26
4.Modified In Situ (MIS) -  1.0 20,000 15.24
5.Combined MIS/Surfacel- 0.9 18,000 15,21
3/6.Surface Retorting   1.8 36,000
4/7.Surface Retorting4   1.55 31,000 45-62Y
8.Surface Retorting with
estimated 30% real cost 5/
escalation-k' 2.34 54,750
9.Petrosix (Surface Mine/
Surface Retort 46,000 to
45,000 bbl/d)5/  2.2 50,000 35-438/
Note: Estimates numbered 2,6,7 and 8, were originally reported in $1980 and
have been deflated back to $1979 assuming an inflation rate of 10%.
1/"Overview of Synthetic Fuels Potential to 1990," Cameron Eng., 1979
Prepared for Synthetic Fuels Task Force.
2/Updated Tosco Corp. estimate made in mid-1980.
3/Average plant cost reported in 1980, N.Y. Times 8/4/80.
4 /Phillip Robinson, OTA estimate, N.Y. Times 8/4/80
5/Roger Loper (Chevron Oil Shale Company) estimates ultimate cost of 5 to 6
billion dollars in 1988, (Equivalant to 30% real cost overruns and 10%/yr
inflation). N.Y. Times 8/4/80
6 /Per barrel cost estimate of $45 is based on a plant cost of 1.55 billion
(capital costs $16/bbl, operating costs $29/bbl). Estimate of $62/bbl by
Robinson (OTA) - N.Y. Times 8/4/80.
7 /Estimates made in ths study based on Petrobras ita.
8/Capital Recovery Factor (15%) = .15/(1-(1+.15)- ) = .1523 ($49,000 per
F/d)(.1523)/365 = $20.4/bbl Capital Costs
Operating costs per bbl = ((64 million/yr)(30 yr)/45,000 b/d).1523/365 =
$17.8/bbl
Total $38/bbl (20+18); For 10% return $27/bbl(14.5 + 12.5).
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C-+Direct Benefits of a 50,000 bbl/day Shale Oil Plant
Direct benefits of a shale plant in Brazil refer to the value of only
the actual oil output and by product output. Side benefits such as the
value of improved information on costs, etc. are not included. These
side benefits (or costs) will be discussed in the next section. There is
enough oil in the shale at the Sao Mateus do Sul location in Brazil to
support a 50,000 bbl/d plant for 30 years, or 0.548 billion barrels. If
it could be extracted instantly at $30/bbl, it is worth over $16
billion. If investment costs are in the $2-4 billion range, it would
expect a profitable operation, but net present value calculations depend
on the time frame of costs and benefits.
Net present value calculations were completed for the proposed 50,000
bbl/day plant built in 2 stages (first stage is built from 1980 to 1985,
second stage is built from 1982 to 1987). Three scenarios of oil prices
were used: O%/yr, 3%/yr, 5%/yr increase in real terms from a base of
$30/bbl ($1979). At full production 32 mill t/yr of sulfur is to be
produced, worth approximately $32 million. For each bbl of oil 11.6 kg
of LPG is produced. Late 1979 Carribbean prices of LPG are $.28/kg, or
11% of the value of a bbl of oil.
Several cases were run for delays in production and cost overruns
using a range of discount rates. Two types of evaluations were made.
The first is an economic (or social) evalaution with costs adjusted using
the shadow price of foreign exchange and oil valued at international
prices. The second is a financial (or commercial) evaluation which uses
prices "seen" by the private sector. This evalaution uses the official
exchange rate and therefore costs are unadjusted by the shadow price of
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foreign exchange. Also, a commercial operator may not receive the full
value of an imported barrel of oil since domestic prices are held below
international prices. As of January 1980 the ratio of the ex-refinery
price to the Caribbean cargo price was .86 for regular gasoline, 1.39 for
premium gasoline, 1.07 for kerosene, .82 for diesel and .27 for fuel
oil. Using this as a measure of the ratio of domestic to international
prices and weighting by the shale oil output share of each product, the
average domestic sales value is 80% of the international sales value.
Thus, if one assumes the Brazilian product prices will continue to remain
below international levels, commericial shale oil producers will receive
only 80% of the international value. The financial evaluation looks at
the sensitivity of NPV to price of oil valued at 80% of its international
value and with costs unadjusted by the shadow price of foreign exchange.
Net present values and internal rates of return for the 50,000 bbl/d
plant are shown in tablese4 tod . Estimates are based on all equity
financing . Internal rates of return for the base case economic
evaluation (with no cost overruns or delays) are estimated to be 18% or
23% depending on real oil prices increasing 0% or 3% per year,
respectively. As past experience with shale oil cost estimates (as well
as cost estimates with most new technologies) indicate the current
estimates are usually too low. "Cost underruns" are rarely heard of with
the development of new technologies. This base case analysis is thus an
upper bound for return on investment with more likely returns below this
level. A sensitivity analysis was completed for cost overruns of 30% and
50% and with delays in production. For cost of overruns of 30% (both
investment and operating costs) and output cut back 50% for the first 10
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years (after the start of construction) the internal rate of return
declines to 9%, if oil prices rise 9%/yr and 14% if oil prices increase
3%/yr. If there are cost overruns of 50% and the time frame for
investment and production is doubled the internal rate of return drops to
5% (if oil prices increase 0%/yr) and 9% (if oil prices increase 3%/yr).
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Table 6-4
Net Present Value of Brazilian 50,000 bbl/d
Shale Oil Plant in Million $1979 (oil price $30/bbl, up O%/yr)
Economic
Eval uation
Base Case
Costs up 30%
Costs up 50%
Costs up 30%,out-
put 50% for lO0yrs
Costs up 50%,out-
put 50% for 10yrs
IRR
(%)
18
13
11
9
7.5
Costs up 50%
investment and production
delayed (twice as
long as Base Case) 5
Financial Evaluation
Costs up 30%, output
sold at international
parity($30/bbl) 11
Costs up 30%, output
sold at 80% international
parity ($24/bbl) 5
Real Discount Rate
3 5 7 10 15 25
5724
4750
4087
3558
2894
1814
2709
3847
2980
2393
1931
1342
2561
1777
1245
850
317
1317
524
157
-149
224 -548
-363 -1012
-760 -1324
-947 -1361
-618 -1344 -1674
-698 -1202 -1395 -1267
1203 211 -693 -1388 -1693
-596 -1236 -1694 -18171232 123
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Table 6-5
Net Present Value of Brazilian 50,000 bbl/d
Shale Oil Plant in Million $1979 (oil price $30/bbl, up 3%/yr)
Real Discount Rate
7 10 15 25
Base Case
Costs up 30%
Costs up 50%
Costs up 30%,out-
put 50% for lO0yrs
Costs up 50%,out-
put 50% for lO0yrs
Costs up 50% output
12.5
investment and production
delayed twice 9
Financial Evaluation
Costs up 30%, output
sold at international
parity($30/bbl) 12
Costs up 30%, output
sold at 80% international
parity ($24/bbl) 9
10658 7294
9684 6427
9021 5840
8245 5164
7582 4575
6170 2604
7395 4436
5025
4240
3709
3126
2594
818
2487
2868 1016 -271
2174
1709
1246
427 -743
31 -1047
-269 -1149
778 -667 -1461
-415 -1073 -1180
702 - 710 -1480
5205 1841 1303
Economic
Eval ution
IRR
(%)
-82 -1141 -1647
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Table 6-6
Net Present Value of Brazilian 50,000 bbl/d
Shale Oil Plant in Million $1979 (oil price $30/bbl, up 5%/yr)
Economic
Eval uti on
Base Case
IRR
(%)
Costs up 30%
Costs up 50%
Costs up 30%,out-
put 50% for lOyrs
Costs up 50%,out-
put 50% for lOyrs
Costs up 50%,
investment and production
twice as long as
base case 10
Financial Evaluation
Costs up 30%, output
sold at international
parity($30/bbl) 14
Costs up 30%, output
sold at 80% international
parity ($24/bbl) 12
Real Discount Rate
7 10
12465 8700
11491 7834
10828 7246
9862 6404
9197 5814
6880 3141
9012 5675
6132
5348
4816
4087
3555
1229
3448
15 25
3656 1486
2964
2496
1915
1446
898
501 -851
113 -1003
-283 -1315
-136 -919 -1127
1371 -328 -1335
7723 4643 2614
-76
-539
756 -713 -1507
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In order to compare different liquid fuel production options it would
be helpful to have a probability distribution of returns on shale oil
investment. No one really knows the cost of shale oil production and any
estimate of the mean and variance of the returns is somewhat arbitrary.
Petrobras has already included a 10% contingency in the estimates of
shale oil investment cost. Exxon has included a 40% contingency based on
a "process development allowance" for the EDS (Exxon Donor Solvent)
project.6 Roger Loper (Chevron Oil Company, ref. 8) estimates the
ultimate current dollar cost of a 50,000 bbl/d plant to be $5 to 6
billion in 1988. This is equivalent to a 30% real cost overrun assuming
inflation of 10%/yr. With this (admittedly scanty) information the case
of 30% cost overruns with deals in production will be used as the mean,
expected value. If we believe the distribution of returns is
approximately normal and the base case (no cost overruns) is an upper
bound return for a 50,000 bbl/d plant a rough probability distribution of
returns can be created for comparison with other alternative investments.
.Distibution of Returns for 50,000 bbl/d Shale Oil(internal rates of return, in percent)
Real Oil Prices Increasing
U%/yr 3%/yr 5%/yr
Probability
.1 18 23 24
.2 13 18 21
.4 9 14 16.
.2 7.5 12.5 14
.1 5 9 10
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The real cost of capital for a shale oil investment was estimated
earlier to be about 12%. This together with the distribution of returns
indicate that there is a 30% chance the shale oil plant will be economic
if oil prices do not increase in real terms and about a 70% chance that
shale oil will be economic if oil prices increase at 3%/yr to 5%/yr. If
oil prices increase at 3%/yr the expected NPV is 14% with a standard
deviation in IRR of 25%. The variation in possible oucome is relatively
wide. This variation and the large lump-sum investment for a shale oil
plant may cause the managers of the investing firm of PETROBRAS to be
rather risk-averse when considering such a huge, risky investment. While
the total risk of the project may be relevant to PETROBRAS managers, only
a portion of this risk (the non-diversifiable or systematic portion) is
relevant to the Brazilian Planning Ministry. This non-diversifiable risk
is low for energy projects in Brazil. While PETROBRAS may have only
relatively few major projects in its investment portfolio the investment
portfolio of the Planning Ministry is much larger, thus the failure (or
success) of a shale oil plant is less risky in such a large portfolio.
Large-scale investments in shale oil are less risky to Brazilian society
than PETROBRAS, but if the risk could be spread to foreign firms (e.g., a
joint-venture arrangement) the risk of shale oil may be even lower.
Additional factors which may influence the evaluation of the shale
program are discussed below.
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ro-5Indirect Costs and Benfits of Shale Oil
In order to compare the shale oil production option to other liquid
fuel production projects the indirect costs and benefits should be
included. It may be difficult to quantify the indirect components but it
is important at least to identify them qualitatively. Additional costs
not included in the previous section are:
* Environmental costs of water pollution and mining scars on mined
land. Petrobras is currently doing research on the degree of
water pollution caused by shale oil mining. Water supplies are
adequate and the region is not heavily populated. Waste rock
has a larger volume than unmined rock, but the mining site is
small 64 kmL compared to the region as a whole. Although
costs of land reclaimation and water purificaton are expected to
increase the cost of shale oil they are not expected to be a
limiting factor.
Factor price inflation costs are expected to occur once a major
shale oil program is started. Technical labor and certain
industrial components may have very low supply elasticities and
cost very high during initial construction of plants. Since
there has been a tendency for interest in the Brazilian shale
oil program to coincide with U.S. interest in the shale oil
program, then factor price inflation may be a severe worldwide
problem once a commitment to shale oil is made. If Brazil feels
its should pursue shale oil production sooner than other
countries maybe it should start building plant "out of phase"
with other countries to reduce the effects of factor price
inflation.
Probably one of the most important additional costs of the shale
oil program (as compared to other projects) is the cost of not
being able to switch funds from shale to another project in the
future should conditions change. Small alcohol plants and oil
exploration wells are incremental investments which have much
more flexiblity than even one $3 billion shale oil plant.
Conditions that might change are a drop in the oil price,
cheaper alternatives found (e.g. a major oil discovery) or
actual shale oil costs too high relative to the oil price.
There are additional benefits to the shale oil program.
The information value of reducing the variance of the cost of
shale oil production. It is valuable for planning purposes to
know what the costs of shale oil will be. Building a 25,000
bbl/d (or 50,000 bbl/d) commercial plant should be sufficient to
increase knowledge on costs. Although calculation of the
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value of information is dependent on a wide range of assumptions
a rough calculation was made. If starting a plant today would
lead to a 250,000 bbl/d industry by the year 2000 and our
current probabilities on shale oil costs are .3 of $35/bbl, .4
of $45/bbl and .3 of $52/bbl, then the value of starting now and
not waiting 5 years to start production is calculated to be 1.17
billion (with a 10% real discount rate and real oil price up
3%/yr). This assumes the industrial scale plants are built if
shale oil costs are low and no more than one plant built if
costs are too high. The loss due to the extra costs of a small
25,000 bbl/d plant if shale oil is abandoned is calculated to be
-251 million. Thus there is positive information value to
starting now but this conclusion could be reversed with some
different assumptions about future events (e.g. real oil prices
may not go up 3%/yr). Although Brazil may require shale oil
production sooner than other countries, which have cheaper
domestic alteratives, research and development of a capital
intensive shale oil industry is not Brazil's comparative
advantage. Brazil may benefit from waiting until the U.S.
completes the first research on a commercial scale plant and use
the information generated by the U.S. synfuels industry.
Some arguments have been made that shale oil is needed for
national security. The argument is that secure shale oil is
worth more than insecure imported oil supplies (i.e. supplies
subject to disruption). This is a poor argument because during
a disruption a large amount of oil is needed in a short time.
Shale oil production provides a small amount of oil for a long
time. The correct policy to handle a disruption is a sufficient
oil stockpile.
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Annex -I
Foreign Exchange Components of
Shale Oil Production in Brazil
(percent)
Capital Investment
Di rect Indi rect
Operating Cost
Direct Indirect
Mining
Retorting
Solid Prep.
Byproduct Recov.
Misc.
Average
Source: Cameron Engineers 1970 project evaluation of Irati Shale Oil
Plant, Indirect Components are from World Bank Brazil projects
department.
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CHAPTER 7 - ALCOHOL PRODUCTION FROM BIOMASS IN BRAZIL
Brazil has the largest program to produce ethyl alcohol (ethanol)
from biomass in the world. Almost all of the ethanol is produced from
sugarcane. Numerous studies have addressed issues concerning alcohol
production and production costs. The most extensive study has been
completed by the World Bank. This chapter will provide a summary of
important issues and alcohol production cost estimates. The major
emphais will be to use analyses and data from the World Bank study to
estimate the net present value and rate of return of the 5-year
Brazilian Alcohol Program in order to compare the results to oil
exploration and shale oil programs.
7.1 Ethanol Production Technology and Use in Engines
Ethanol can be produced from three types of biomass: (1)
sugar-bearing materials (sugarcane, molasses and sweet sorghum) which
contain carbohydrates in the form of sugar; (2) starches (such as
corn, cassava or potatoes); and (3) celluloses (such as wood and
agricultural residues). Sugar bearing materials have an advantage
over other materials since their carbodyrate material is already in
the fermentable, simiple sugar forms. The sugar is fermented by yeast
in a batch fermentation process and the ethanol distilled off to
produce hydrous (94%) ethanol. Starch and cellulosic materials must
be turned into simple sugars before fermentation. This is done
through the addition of enzymes or acid. The resulting sugar is then
fermented like any other fermentable sugar.
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The production of alcohol through fermentation requires an energy
input for distillation. Sugarcane has an advantage over other crops
(like corn or cassava) since the bagasse (waste cane stalks) can be
burned to provide heat and power for the distillation process.
Ethanol from sugarcane in Brazil shows a positive energy balance
generating 2 to 3 times as much energy as the production process
consumes (according to a World Bank study on Alcohol from Biomass,
1980). This positive energy balance is derived wholly from the
availability of bagasse. Alcohol produced from cassava with wood as
an energy input shows only a slightly positive energy balance. Corn
used to produce alcohol shows a net energy deficit with twice as much
energy consumed in the process as contained in the produced ethanol
(World Bank, 1980). Since sugarcane has advantages for alcohol
production, as compared to other biomass inputs, the Brazilian alcohol
program is based almost entirely on sugarcane.
Anhydrous ethanol can be used with gasoline (gasohol) in
automobiles up to a concentration of 20%. Tests have shown that
gasohol has a slightly higher octane rating than gasoline and that
mileage performance is much the same as with gasoline. Thus the
economic value of anhydrous alcohol when used in gasohol is equivalent
to gasoline. However, straight ethanol (hydrous) has significantly
different combustion properties than gasohol. Engines which run on
straight ethanol require higher compression ratios to make use of the
higher octane rating, and ethanol has a lower energy content than
gasoline. The overall economic value of straight ethanol as motor
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fuel is estimated to be 85% that of gasoline. (More detailed analysis
of ethanol production and use can be found in Noyes, 1979, World Bank,
1980, and Stauffer, 1981, Pode, 1979, Moreira and Goldemberg, 1979).
7-2 Brazilian Ethanol Program
Ethanol production has historically been linked to the Brazilian
sugar industry. Since the 1930's etnanol derived from sugar has been
Llended with gasoline. This policy has been aimed at stabilizing
sugar prices which have historically been highly variable. Depressed
sugar prices from 1976 to 1979 provided a major driving force to
expand the alcohol production program. In fact, sugar prices in 1976
fell to $150/ton compared witn a 1974 peak of $1400/ton. Barzelay
(1980) points out that in late 1975 Ministry of Agriculture officials
initially favored an alcohol production program based on cassava,
since it would have significant positive income distribution effects
(particularly in the poorer northeast Brazil). However, the strong
sugar cooperative (COPERSUCAR) in southeast and south Brazil lobbied
for an incentive program for alcohol production from sugar instead.
The National Alcohol Program was established in 1975 with an initial
goal of 3 billion liters by 1980, produced almost exclusively from
sugarcane.
The 1979 oil price rise provided additional impetus to the program
and a production goal of 10.7 oillion liters was set for 1985. The
auto~obile producers strongly supported this expanded program as
660,000 all-alcohol cars would be required by 1985, since the alcohol
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limit of 20% in gasohol was reached in 1979-1980. Alcohol production
in Brazil increased from 0.5 billion liters in 1975 to 4 billion
liters in 1980. The stated goal of the Brazilian government is to
produce 10.7 billion liters by 1985, 3.5 for alcohol gasoline mixture,
5.7 for straight alcohol engines and 1.5 for chemical feedstocks.
This 1985 goal relies almost completely on sugarcane and will require
approximately 2.7 to 3.1 million ha of land (depending on whether
yields are 3500 I/ha or 3000 I/ha) in addition to the 1.6 million ha
under sugarcane cultivation in 1979.
The rapid increase in alcohol consumption and production are the
direct result of alcohol pricing policies and credit subsidies.
Consumers have been encouraged to use straight alcohol as the pump
price of alcohol in 1980 was 35% below the pump price of gasohol
(adjusting for mileage loss alcohol prices should be only 15% lower
than gasoline). Alcohol producers receive a guaranteed price of
alcohol at the distillery which was 43% of the retail gasohol price in
1980. After alcohol distribution costs are taken into account, the
price paid by the government for the alcohol comes to 56% of the
retail gasohol price which is sold as hydrous alcohol at the pump at
65% of the retail gasoline price. Thus, the government receives a
small margin on hydrous alcohol and a substantial margin on the
anhydrous alcohol sold with gasoline.
The real incentive for alcohol producers comes in the form of
subsidized credit through interest rates on loans which are
substantially below the prevailing inflation rate (about 100% in 1980
1...i_- -r -_Lruer ~~ ua =- --~.
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and 1981). This interest rate subsidy was partially reduced in early
1981, as stated below:
"The National Monetary Council (CMN) this month was
expected to approve a new financing scheme for the
National Alcohol program which would raise subsidized
interest rates for the sector from the prevailing 2% to
6% to new range of 35% to 45%. The lower rates would
prevail in the poorer North/Northeast, the higher rates
in the industrialized South/Southeast."
--"Brazil Energy"--1/24/81
Estimates of the total net subsidy due to the earlier credit program
(i.e., loan rates of 2 to 6%) were reported to be up to 75% of
production costs (Saint, 1980). Thus, the rapid increase in
production is due to credit subsidies and price guarantees while the
rapid increase in consumption is due to favorable retail price
differential s.
Ethanol production is very lucrative from the private distiller's
point of view. The question is whether this program is worthwhile
from a social viewpoint. The rapid expansion of the alcohol program
has led many to seriously question whether the benefits of the program
outweight the negative aspects. The negative aspects of this program
can be summarized as follows:
* Extensive and costly government subsidies
* Displacement of food and export crops and a rise in land
costs and food prices, since sugarcane requires the best
agricultural land.
* Pollution caused by stillage waste (12 liters is produced for
every liter of alcohol).
-.-ri-r.~*i~-r^^~------^-rr rY~II --YP- )-^.XIILUIOIXII~--~*~ - --- --il- /I~L
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* Worsening of income distribution (from concentration of land
ownership in the hands of large landowners and from increased
food costs for the poor who do not benefit from low-cost
motor fuel).
7-3 Ethanol Production Costs
The goal of this section is to compare the financial and economic
costs of ethanol produced from sugarcane as compared with imported
fuel. An estimate of the NPV and economic rate of return on an
average size alcohol plant will be calculated and the sensitivity of
the results to variation in oil prices, sugarcane costs and land costs.
The average size ethanol production plant that uses sugarcane is
120,000 liters per day and the plant operates for 180 days per year.
The investment cost of the plant is 7.6 million dollars ($1979).l
Basic production parameters and capital costs for ethanol plants
according to the World Bank are given in Table 7-1. As can be seen,
each hectare of land can produce 19 bbls of gasoline equivalent
(alcohol at 85% of gasoline value) and that yield per hectare is 46%
higher for sugarcane than cassava.
Several studies have been completed to estimate the cost of
ethanol production from sugarcane (AID, Univ. Sao Paulo, Stanford and
the World Bank). Table 7-2 summarizes the key ethanol production cost
IThis figure has already been adjusted for the shadow price of
foreign exchange. At the official exchange rate and a 75% domestic
cost component the plant cost is $9.2 million (((.75)(9.2)/1.3) +
(.25)9.2 = 7.6)
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Table 7-I
BRAZIL: CAPITAL COSTS OF ALCOHOL PLANTS
(late 1979 prices, in '000 US$)
Capacity
Capacity liters/day 20,000 120,000 240,000
Capacity US gallons/day 5,300 31,700 63,400
Engineering 135 400 680
Process Equipment 950 3,950 6,800
Utilities 220 925 1,620
Freight 60 225 300
Civil Works and Land 270 750 1,250
Erection 135 400 500
Sub-Total 1,770 6,650 11,150
Contingency 230 950 1,350
Installed Cost ,000 ,600 12,500
Source: World Bank, Alcohol Production
Table 2
Ethanol production from different biomass materials
Unit Molasses ugarca Cassava' Corn'
Yields
Ethanol yield/ton of biomass liters/ton 270 70 180 370
Biomass yieldehectare of land 2  tons/hectare ... 50 12 6
Ethanol yield/hectare of land liters/hectare ... 3,500 2,160 2.220
Processing plants
Economic plant size range hters/day 6-240,000 120-240,000 60-120.000 12-240,000
Number of operating days days/year 180 180 275 275
Annual production in 120.000
lters/day plant: - million hters/year 21.6 21.6 33.0 33.0
- million U.S. gallons/year 5.7 5.7 6.9 6.9
- tons/year 17,100 17,100 26.100 26,100
Installed cost of 120.000
liters/day plant in:
Low-cost countries" millions of U.S. dollars 6.8 7.6 9.1 9.1
Medium-cost countries' millions of U.S. dollars 7.6 9.5 11.4 11.4
High-cost countries' milhons of U.S. dollars 11.4 14.3 17.2 17.2
Economics as gasoline additive
Ex-plant biomass raw material cost
for 10 per cent economic rate of return'
At US$31/bbl f.o b. crudes  US$S/ton 62 14 13 -
At US$35/bbl f.o.b. crude' USS/ton 70 16 17 1.26
At USS43/bbl f.o.b. crude' US/ton 85 20 23 1 8'
Ex-plant biomass raw material cost
for 8 per cent economic rate of return'
At US$31/bbl f.o b. crude' USS/ton 65 14 16 -
At US$35/bbl f.o.b. crudes US$/ton 73 17 19 1.4'
At US$43/bbl f.o.b. crude s  US$/ton 90 22 25 2.1'
Source World Bank
- Inckcates negative guree
tIncate data are not relevant. sLnce molasses is a by-product
Based on current plant desegns and luel oil as Wue source
SBased on currenl aveaare yields t braid. except for corn. chas based on U S average
Low cost country data fo sugarcane plants based on Braz costs Medaum-osi counilnes. such as Thailand, re assumed to have costs about 25 per cent higher than low cost countes
Hagh-cost counlnes. such as Sudan. which have very Irited domestc plant construction capabdtte$ are assumed to have apital Costs about 50 per cent hgher than miodum co countres
These cost estmales are general ndcators. and actual plant Costs would depend on iadandual country. mark. and sde factors A costs late-1979 US do ars
For medum-cost ountries
'Assuming ethanol value equal to hat of gasolne in volume terms Gasone prace assumed as 13 knes that of ex-reinery Ight Arabian Crude prce, by volume thas redatonship assumed
to go dumwn wth ncreased r udn paces rude pre asaumed tocrease at 3 per cent per amnum n real lerms. gasokne prce at 2 per cent per anm . ad! raw materal cost at 1 per cent
Sann sh bs ton 394 shum
For com. US&Ushi One bushel weghs 56 bs One ton as equ valert o 394 bshels
--YY--~ -r~u~-i------ lerr~___uiu-- - I--- -I-.~ ~su* Irrirru
in Developing Countries, 1980
.-- .-.1. -_ .
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parameters (US 0/liter) broken down into levelized investment cost,
operating cost, and sugarcane production cost. In all cases the
sugarcane production cost is one-half to two-thirds of the total
alcohol production cost. Costs are for an average size 120,000 liter
per day plant.
Two types of production cost are shown in Table 7-2, financial and
economic. The financial costs use market prices and the official
exchange rate. The only difference in the economic analysis is that
foreign exchange is shadow priced at 30% above the official rate for
the domestic cost component. No adjustments were made for the shadow
price of labor as market prices roughly reflect opportunity costs in
southeast Brazil. For both the financial and economic analysis
by-product credits (or debits), taxes and subsidies were assumed to be
zero, so the distortions caused by Brazil's credit subsidy policies
are not included.
Estimates of the financial cost of ethanol vary from 26 to 34 US
0/liter (in $1979) with estimates based on World Bank data the
lowest. All of these costs are greater than the equivalent
international gasoline price of 22 US i/liter. This equivalent
gasoline price is derived assuming alcohol value is 85% of gasoline
value and oil at $30/bbl. (Annex 7-1 shows the relationship between
oil import price and gasoline economic value.)
The economic cost of alcohol, as calculated from World Bank data,
is slightly less(21l/liter) than the equivalent gasoline economic
value (220/liter). This is due to adjustments for the shadow price of
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Table 7-2 Comparison of Various Estimates of Financial and Economic
Costs of- thanol Produced from Sugarcane in Southeast Brazil
(US cents per liter)
Financial Analysis1 Economic Analysis 6
Univ.
Sao Paulo 3
A. Levelized Investment Cost
4.2 4.6
B. Operating Cost
4.7 8.8
C. Sugarcane Production Cost
17.5
27.3 30.9
($1978) ($1978)
Stan- World
ford4 Bank5
4.4
5.0
16.7
34.0 26.1
($1979). ($1979)
Worl
Bank5
3.6
3.8
13.2
20.6
($1979)
TOTAL US l.1iter ($1979) 7
34 26
Ethanol Economic Value, US e/liter 22(85% of gasoline value, oil $30/bbl)
1Market prices and official exchange rate used.
and taxes assumed to be zero.
Byproduct credits
2From Poole, A., "Ethanol and Methanol as Alternatives for Petroleum
Substitution in Brazil," AID draft working paper, 1979.
3From Moreira, J. and Goldemberg, J., "Alcohol--Its Use, Energy and
Economics--The Brazilian Outlook," Univ. Sao Paulo, IFUSF/P-230, 1979.
4From Barzelay, M., "The Political Economy of Alcohol Energy in
Brazil," Stanford Student Energy Study Series, Series S-3, 1980.
5Estimates based on World Bank data from "Alcohol Production from
Biomass in the Developing Countries," in 1980, and from personal
communication, World Bank.
6 Economic analysis is the same as financial analysis except for
adjustments for the shadow price of foreign exchange (domestic cost
component/l .3).
7Inflation from 1978 to 1979 taken to be 8%.
AID2
(Poole)
18.4
TOTAL
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foreign exchange and the large domestic component of the production
cost. The World Bank used these cost parameters, oil prices and
investment and production patterns to calculate the internal rate of
return and NPV for an average size distiller based on sugarcane. The
internal rate of return was calculated by the World Bank for high,
medium and low cost countries and for a variety of sugarcane costs and
a variety of oil price increases. The detailed results are shown in
Annex 7-1. Brazil is a low-cost country, in tenrms of investment and
operating costs, and has low sugarcane production costs ($10/ton).
The internal rate of return and sensitivity analysis for a sugarcane
base plant in southeast Brazil is shown below:
Base Case Assumptions:
* 120,000 liter/day plant
* Operated 180 days/yr
* Sugarcane cost $10/ton
* Real cost increases:
Oil price 3%/yr
Land rental value 1%/yr
Fertilizer 1.5%/yr
Pesticide 1%/yr
IRR
1. Base Case 19.5%
2. Oil prices up O%/yr 11.0%
3. Oil prices up 5%/yr 26.0%
4. Land value up 30% 19.0%
I - (- i-^rru;*i.xunr-- ~iC~
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5. Land value increasing 5%/yr 19.0%
6. Yields down 20% 17.0%
7. Anhydrous alcohol value 24.0%
8. Sugarcane costs up 20% ($12/ton) 14.0%
9. Sugarcane costs down 20% ($8/ton) 29.0%
10. Oil prices up O%/yr and land
rental value up 30% and yield down 20% 8.0%
(Source: World Bank, see Annex 7-1)
As can be seen the rate of return on an alcohol project is extremely
sensitive to the oil price, a 1%/yr increase in the annual oil price
leads to a 3% decrease in the IRR. The rate of return is quite
sensitive to the raw material cost and yields, but is not very
sensitive to land price increases. The minimum acceptable rate of
return on an alcohol project was estimated in Chapter 2 to be 14%.
This means that alcohol projects do not appear economic if oil prices
rise less than 2%/yr or if sugarcane costs increase 20%.
The NPV of an average size plant with assumptions the same as the
base case is given in Table 7-3. The plant NPV is extremely sensitive
to the assumptions about the rate of increase of the oil price. At a
14% discount rate the NPV is -$2.7 million if oil prices remain
constant in real terms and is positive if oil prices increase at
1.5%/yr. Using the NPV of an average plant and the construction
schedule of plants for the $3.7 billion (5-year) alcohol program we
can get a rough estimate of the NPV of the alcohol program. Currently
319 plants are planned to come on line from 1982 to 1985. These rough
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Table 7-3
Net Present Value of an Ethanol Plant in Southeast Brazil
and Estimated NPV of the 5-Year Brazilian Alcohol Program
I. NPV of 120,000 liter/day alcohol plant using sugarcane, in
millions $1979.
Annual Real Increase in Oil Price
Real Discount Rate
12%
14%
16%
(from $30/bbl)
O%/y r
-0.64
-2.7
-3.11
3%/yr
9.6
6.2
3.6
2. Estimated NPV of alcohol plants to come on stream 1982 to
(average size plants 120,000 liter/day, 180 day/yr)
5%/yr
17.5
13.1
10.7
1985
A. Number of Plants
Total
Year Approved
1980
1981
1982
1983111
319
Year On Stream
1982
1983
1984
1985
B. NPV (in millions of $1979)
Annual Real Increase in Oil Price
Real Discount Rate
12%
14%
16%
O%/yr
-170
-695
-781
(from $30/bbl)
3%/y r
2,557
1,610
916
Source: Estimates from World Bank Data.
5%/yr
4,648
3,398
2,691
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estimates are shown in Table 7-3. At a 14% discount rate the NPV of
the program is very sensitive to the rate of increase in oil prices.
If oil prices go up 0%/yr in real terms the NPV is estimated to be
-$700 million (31979) as compared to a benefit of $3,400 million if
oil prices incrase 5%/yr.
These NPV estimates should be viewed as a lower bound, best case,
for several reasons. The base case assumptions are optimistic with
respect to increases in the cost of stillage disposal, increases in
land rental value and yield level.
Production of I liter of alcohol produces a by-product of 12
liters of liquid stillage waste, currently being expelled into
rivers. By 1985, 128 billion liters of stillage waste must be
processed (possibly as fertilizer) if production goals are met. The
base case assumes that no credit or debit is given for stillage. Two
potential uses are animal feed or fertilizer. It is unlikely that
much stillage will be used as animal feed in large quantities as it is
costly to evaporate the liquids.
Use of stillage as fertilizer on fields near the distillery is
possible but the large quantities of stillage available may lead to
pollution. Much more work needs to be done to deal with this
problem. In order to prevent extensive pollution a net debit for
stillage processing equipment will lead to a lower NPV for the alcohol
program.
The yields used for the base case appear to be relatively
optimistic. Assumptions are that annualized yields in south and
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southeast Brazil are 50 metric tons per hectare. Recent annualized
yields, however, in southand southeast Brazil are reported by
Williamson, 1981 to be between 35 and 45 metric tons per hectare. If
much marginal land is used for sugar production average yields may
even drop slightly. Lower yields will reduce the NPV of the alcohol
program. Lower expected yields will also increase the land area under
sugarcane to 3.1 million ha (from 2.6 million ha), if the 1985 targets
are to be met. This is 10 of all land currently under crops. Whnile
10% is a small fraction of total cropped land, it is a larger
percentage of the good agricultural land.
Expanded pressure on land availability from the simultaneous rapid
expansion of sugarcane and other food crops may raise the rental value
of land. Thus, the NPV of the alcohol program will drop, but this
effect is expected to small as NPV is not very sensitive to the land
rental value.
As the ethanol from biomass program expands beyond 1985,
feedstocks other than sugarcane will have to become more significant
since land suitable for cane will be limited in availability.
Alternative crops are:
. Cassava--It has the benefits of growing on marginal land and
can supplement the income of small farmers, particularly in
the northeast. Disadvantages are that fuel for distillation,
such as wood from firewood plantations, must be obtained.
Also, the capital costs of cassava-based distilleries are
about 30% higher than sugar-based distilleries, as starch
CIL1~ jL_ lyl_ ~ 11/~1___ 1__1-11_-.l_.^_l~rr
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must be converted to sugar.
* Sweet sorghuta--This feedstock is potentially attractive due
to its short growing cycle, amenability to mechanized
farming, fermentable sugar and the presence of sorghum
bagasse.
* fWood--Although wood requires acid hydrolysis before
fermentation, it has several advantages. Eucalyptus
plantations harvested every six years could provide 800
liters of ethanol per hectare per year, as well as a
by-product of 60 tons per hectare per year of charcoal.
Currently 100 to 200 million hectares of unutilized "cerrado"
land might be used as it is unsuitable for sugarcane
(source: pesonal communication, World Bank).
In summary, the current program to produce 10.7 billion liters of
ethanol primarily from sugarcane appears socially profitable only if
oil prices increase at 3 to 5% per year in real terms. The current
rapid expansion of alcohol production and consumption is largely due
to government subsidies. Future large-scale alcohol production from
other biomass materials may be feasible, depending on the rate of
increase of oil prices and the outcome of current research. It should
be noted that sugarcane cultivation has had 100 years of research and
development while there has been only 5 years of intensive research on
crops grown to produce liquid fuels.
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Annex 7-1 ROUGH RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN EX-REFINERY
GASOLINE VALUES AND OIL PRICES
Ex-refinery gasoline value (US$/liter) 0.20 0.25 0.27 0.30 0.35
Ex-refinery gasoline value (US$/gallon) 0.76 0.95 1.02 1.14 1.32
Oil price delivered at
refinery (US$/barrel) a/ 24 31 33 37 46
Oil price f.o.b. Arabian Gulf (US$/barrel) 22 29 31 35 43
a/ Including international freight, port handling, storage and local
transport costs.
ETHANOL PRODUCTION FROM SUGARCANE:
ESTIMATED ECONOMIC RATE OF RETURN
(in percent)
Wholesale Gasoline
Price: US cents/liter
(US cents/US gallon)
Meliun Cost Countries
25 27 30 35
Low Cost Countries
25 27 30 35
High Cost Countries
25 27 30 35
(95)(102) (113)(132)
Base Case at Different
Ex-Distillery Sugarcane Costs
US$ 8/ton
US$10/ton
US$12/ton
US$14/ton
US$16/ton
Sensitivity Analysis
(Sugarcane at $12/ton)
Future Oil Price Increases
at 5% p.a. (in real terms)18
Future Oil Price Increases
at 0% p.a. (in real terms) -
Annual Operating Days:160 8
Annual Operating Days:210 13
Plant Size: 20,000 (Lpd) 3
Plant Size: 240,000 (Lpd) 13
21 26 34
Lpd = Liters per day..
Source: World Bank, Alcohol Production in Developing Countries, 1980
-............... flT~
18
15
11
8
4"
(95)(102)(113) (132) (95)(102)(113)(132)
--.CTB-~.'X~T~TI~--~--~ --~i--~.--~li- 5 r
307
,/
Antex 7-1 LAND REQUIRED TO PRODUCE SUGARCANE OR CASSAVA
FOR ETHANOL PRODUCTION IN VARIOUS REGIONS
Land Requirement
(1000 ha)
Realized 1 Billion Liters 10.7 Billion Liters
Yield1  Annual Yield high low high low
(MT/ha) (MT/ha/year) efficiency 3 efficiency efficiency efficient
SUGARCANE
Southeast 59.5 44.6 235 336 2,519 3,599
Sao Paulo6  66.9 50.2 209 299 2,238 3,197
South 45.5 34.1 308 440 3,295 4,707
Northeast 47.8 35.9 292 418 3,130 4,471
Bahia 38.0 28.5 368 526 3,942 5,632
12 Month 18 Month
CASSAVA aturity Maturity 12 Month Maturity
Southeast 6  15.6 15.6 10.4 401 436 4,287 4,664
South 13.6 13.6 9.1 460 500 4,917 5,350
Northeast 10.5 10.5 7.0 595 648 6,369 6,930
low yielding 8.5 8.5 5.7 735 800 7,868. 8,560
sertao
IBGE (5).
2 Sugarcane fields must be replanted after three cuttings, thereby removing them from
production one of every four years. Cassava can generally be harvested in 12 months but
is often left in the ground for up to 18 months since it is highly perishable crop once
removed.
3 Sugarcane: 10.5 MT/1000 liters ethanol (involves processing of both sugar and
molasses residue). Cassava: 6.25 MT/1000 liters ethanol.
4Sugarcane: 15 MT/1000 liters; Cassava: 6.8 MT/1000 liters.
51985 goal; figures may be different than 10.7 x 1 b. requirement due to rounding
of 1 billion liter number.
6 0r high yielding areas in other parts of country.
71nterior lands, drought potential, little or no fertilizer.
Se(&ce: WdIeQ'..o ~ ,9/
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CHAPTER 8
SUIMMARY AND TENATIVE CONCLUSIONS
8-1 The Current Energy Situation in Brazil
The major problems the Brazilians must deal with when formulating
energy investment policies are: long-term oil import price increases,
short-term disruptions of oil imports, and the current foreign debt
situation. The magnitude of these oil related problems can be seen from
the following facts. Brazil imports 80% of the oil it consumes. The
cost of oil imports increased from only $375 million in 1972 to $11
billion in 1980 (current dollars). The cost of oil imports was 55% of
total export earnings in 1980. The Brazilian economy has not only been
jolted by steep oil price increases but has also experienced the
vulnerability of oil dependence when the Iran-Iraq war cut off 45% of its
oil imports in 1980.
Foreign debt has grown rapidly since the late 1960's, caused in
large part by heavy borrowing to finance oil imports in the mid-1970's.
Total outstanding debt at the end of 1980 was $57 billion. Additional
borrowing has been difficult and costly. Current interest rate premiums
on foreign loans to Brazil have risen to 2.25% over the euromarket LIBOR
rate.
In response to these pressures the Brazilian government has
launched a massive domestic energy investment program, with plans to
invest a total of $60 billion (constant $1979) over the next 5 year
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period, from 1981 through 1985. Sixty percent of this investment is to be
electricity, and a third is earmarked for the liquid fuels sector. Of the
$19 billion planned investment in the liquid fuels sector, one third is
is to expand refining capacity and bring the offshore Campos basin oil
fields into production. dhile these investments will have the effect of
doubling domestic oil production by 1985, as compared with the 1978
level, oil imports in 1985 are expected to be the same, if not somewhat
above, the 1978 level.
The longer term prospects for liquid fuel production depend on the
success of planned investments in oil exploration, shale oil and alcohol
production. Investment plans for these sub-sectors over the five year
period from 1981 through 1985 are ambitious. They include planned
expenditure of $3.7 billion (constant $1979) in oil and gas exploration,
$3.6 billion in alcohol production (95% from sugarcane feedstock), and
$1.1 billion for a 25,000 bbl/day shale plant which will later be
expanded to 50,000 bbl/day.
8-2 Evaluation of Liquid Fuel Investment Options
The topic of this thesis is the economic and financial comparison of
liquid fuel investment options in oil exploration, shale oil and alcohol
from sugarcane. In order to evaluate and compare these options, methods
of analysis were developed that have application not only to analysis of
energy investments in Brazil but also to analysis of energy options in a
variety of countries. New techniques developed here fall into two
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different categories. The first consists of a framework for evaluation
of public energy programs that uses shadow prices and public discount
rates adjusted both for project systematic risk and for risks associated
with international borrowing. The second is the development of a
Bayesian probabilistic oil exploration model that estimates the
probability of future oil discovery and the net present value of various
oil exploration programs. This exploration model allows oil exploration
programs to be compared directly to other, more traditional projects,
evaluations that were used for shale oil and by the World Bank for the
alcohol prograin.
A. Metnodology for Evaluation of Liquid Fuel Investment Options
In order to evaluate the soundness of these ambitious liquid fuel
production programs, it is necessary to state clearly the benefits that
liquid fuel investment programs may provide. These benefits include:
1) Provision of domestic liquid fuel supplies that are competitive
with imported supplies, mainly oil;
2) Reduction in the negative impact of short-term disruptions of
oil imports;
3) Diversification of the country's economic base to reduce the
negative impact of medium-term or long-term oil price increases
on the economy;
4) Reduction in the negative impact of medium-term or long-term oil
price increases on the foreign borrowing postion of the country
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(through reduction in the size and variability of the oil import
bill and debt service payments).
In order to evaluate properly an energy investment program in Brazil, or
in numerous other countries, the methodology used should account for the
benefits listed above. The four benefits will be considered in order
below.
To evaluate the competitiveness of domestic liquid fuel supplies, a
net present value approach (and in certain cases the internal rate of
return method) was used to evaluate the economic viability of the
investment programs. In order to complete a public project evaluation
certain adjustments must be made to account for distortions that may
cause opportunity costs for public projects to diverge from those
observed in the market place. Adjustments that need to be made for all
public projects, regardless of the type of project, are the application
of shadow price of foreign exchange and the shadow price of labor, the
use of international values for traded inputs and traded outputs, and an
upward adjustment to the public discount rate to account for country
borrowing risk. Project specific adjustments include changes in the
public discount rate to account for systematic risk, and adjustments to
account for specific project characteristics that may decrease or
increase country borrowing risk. This fraiaework will be related to the
major benefits of liquid fuel investment programs.
A frequently stated benefit of domestic energy production is to
minimize the impact of short-term disruptions in oil imports. The
solution to a short-term oil import disruption is a project (such as an
312
oil stockpile) that can provide a large amount of oil in a short period
of time (weeks or months). Large scale liquid fuel investments provide
small amounts of oil over a long period of time. Thus, the objective of
long-term energy production should not be to handle snort-term
disruptions. The most cost effective method of dealing with oil import
disruptions is a stockpile program. The cost of this prograin can be
considered as "disruption insurance" that should be added to the cost of
imported oil in order to compare "insecure" imported oil to more "secure"
domestic liquid fuel sources. In this study a rough estimate of the cost
of this "disruption insurance" (or stockpile premium) was made by
dividing the cost of maintaining a 90-day stockpile by the current oil
import level. The result is a premium of $1 to $2 per barrel of imported
oil. The cost of an imported barrel of oil plus the stockpile premium
(togetner a total of about $30/bD1, $1979) is thus the shadow value of a
barrel of domestic liquid fuel. If perceptions of the expected length of
an oil import disruption are longer than 90 days, say 180 days, the
"stockpile premium" is higher, $3-4/bbl.
An additional benefit of energy investment programs may be the
diversification of the country's economic base to increase the share of
energy in the economy and thus reduce the negative economic impact of
future increases in the price of imported oil. If the economy is
completely diversified or if decision makers are not risk averse, then
diversification would not be an objective of energy investment. However,
in the case of Brazil (and other developing countries) the economy is not
completely diversified and risk spreading through the public sector is
Im*YIYll~l~lb)jll~_YL~-~( YYIII~L-PL
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not complete. Also, decision makers are risk averse since their
decisions affect a large segment of the general public that prefers a
smooth , as opposed to a highly variable, flow of income. Thus, in a
situation of high oil import dependence, such as Brazil's current
situation, a project that reduces dependence on oil imports provides an
additional "diversification" benefit. The size of this benefit is a
function of the expected variance of future oil prices. While in
principle the "diversification" benefit of a liquid fuel project could be
accounted for through adjustments to the cash flows of a project, in
practice this benefit is most easily accounted for through adjustments to
the project discount rate. Thus, liquid fuel projects that reduce the
negative impact on the economy caused by potential oil price increases
should be discounted at a lower rate than projects similar to those
already in the economy. The use of these risk adjusted discount rates
accounts for the systematic risk of the energy project relative to the
rest of the economy. It appears that in many cases, if economic planners
perceive the "diversification" benefit of an energy project, the reaction
may well be to do the project regardless of cost. One strong point in
favor of the risk adjusted discount rate approach recommended here is
that it tells the planner whether or not to do a specific project (i.e.
if the NPV is less than 0 at the appropriate risk adjusted rate) while
accounting for the "diversification" benefit of the project.
Considering this precarious debt position in which Brazil is caught,
an additional benefit of domestic liquid fuel investments may be to
reduce the negative impact of future oil price increases on the foreign
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borrowing position of the country. In a country which is heavily in
debt, a rapid rise in oil prices will not only have a negative impact on
the economy, but also may well increase the size of the foreign debt and
sharply increase the costs of further borrowing. Thus a liquid fuel
project that reduces the level of oil imports will also reduce the oil
import bill in the long-run. This may have the effect of reducing the
risk which bankers perceive when lending to Brazil and lead to reduced
real costs of borrowing. However, borrowing costs in the short-run are
likley to increase as Brazilian institutions borrow to finance energy
projects. The tradeoff to be analyzed is the additional costs of
borrowing today to finance energy projects, which may lead to reduced
costs of borrowing in the future if their energy investments are
successful, as opposed to reduced costs of borrowing today and higher oil
import bills in the future.
An additional cost of an investment program is the increased cost of
foreign borrowing resulting from project expenditure. In order to get an
estimate of the magnitude of the impact of Brazil's foreign borrowing on
project evaluation, this study draws on previous work on the effects of
country risk (Harberger,1976, and Baldwin, Lessard, and Mason,1981). As
a country's foreign debt increases, the higher probability of default
perceived by foreign lenders is likely to result in higher interest
rates. The country risk premium is an additional cost of foreign
borrowing that results from the inability of foreign lenders to enforce
international contracts (somewhat analagous to bankruptcy costs within a
country). Brazil is currently charged one of the highest premiums on
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loans, 2.25% over the floating euromarket LIBOR rate. The country risk
premium added to the discount rate is a rough measure of the effect of
increased borrowing costs to finance new energy investments. The
measurement of the benefit of an energy project on future reduced
borrowing costs is much more difficult, whether accounted for through
adjustments to the cash flows or through adjustments to the discount
rate. The magnitude of this benefit is determined by the effect of
sharply higher oil prices on the behavior of the euromarket LIBOR
interest rate and the risk of default perceived by bankers (i.e. their
reaction by increasing the country risk premium or outright credit
rationing). Uncertainty about these events makes the calculation of this
benefit very nard to make. A thorough analysis of this issue is beyond
tne scope of this study, but preliminary analysis indicate that overall
macroeconomic policies have a much more important effect on country risk
than specific energy investment policies. As a first approximation, to
adjust for this effect we will assume that externalities associated with
additional liquid fuel investments (i.e. increased costs to other
Brazilian borrowers) are offset by longer-run reduced costs of borrowing
due to effect of energy projects on reduction of the oil import bill.
This implies that the discount rate should be adjusted upward by the
average country risk premium (2 percent), not the estimated marginal
premium (4 percent).
In order to evaluate liquid fuel investments from the point of view
of a Brazilian public institution, the project cash flows were
discounted at the social risk adjusted cost of capital, investment cash
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flows are adjusted for the shadow price of foreign exchange (i.e. the
Brazilian domestic component of investment should be divided by 1.3, as
the Brazilian Cr is estmated to be overvalued by 30%), and the value of a
barrel of domestic fuel is valued at the international price plus the
stockpile premium. However, if the projects are to be undertaken by
private foreign companies and the analysis to be done from their point of
view, the project cash flows are discounted at the firm cost of capital
(relative to the U.S. market) with necessary adjustments for perceived
political risk. Also, in the private case the official exchange rate and
the international oil price, without the stockpile premium, are used. A
summary of the estmates of the risk adjusted cost of capital for liquid
fuel projects in Brazil are shown below:
Risk
Social Cost of Free
Capital Risk Rate
12.0 2
12.0 2
14.0 2
Multinational Risk
inn Cost of Free
Capital Rate
12-14 1.3
Other
Risk
Premi ums
2
2
2
Political
Risk
Premium
2-4
Beta
.7
.7
.84
Beta
.95
This gives results when discount rate (not cash flows)
for borrowing and political risks.
Social
Risk
PTemium
12
12
Risk
PTemium on
Market
8.8
are adjusted
Proj ect
Oil
Shal e
Al cohol
Proj ec t
Oil
- l~---li--l-- 'L lxi -lrre^r~r -- ~ --lua~~
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The estimated social cost of capital is 12% (real rate) for the oil
exploration and shale oil programs. This is lower that an average
project in the Brazilian economy which has an estimated social cost of
capital of 18% (calculated using a beta of 1 and a country risk premium
of 4%). This difference is a signal that a lower rate of return on oil
projects should be accepted since they provide a benefit to the
diversification of the economy and the foreign debt position.
The cost of capital to a multinational firm for an oil project in
irazil is also estimated to be 12%. Ahile the risk premium on the U.S.
market is lower, this is offset by oil project systematic risk that is
higner to tne companies that to Brazil. nhen political risk is included
in the discount rate the final estimate is 12%.
ahile the estimation of these discount rates is are rough and
subject to revision, this method brings important factors into the
evaluation which are not accounted for with simpler social cost of
capital calculations.
B. Methodology for Evaluation of Oil Exploration Programs
Uncertainty in the resource base and the wide range of outcomes of
an exploration program has made the evaluation of oil exploration
programs more difficult than other projects which have less variable
costs and benefits. A detailed Bayesian probabilistic oil exploration
model was developed to estimate the probabilities that a certain level of
oil resources exist, the probabilities of future discovery and the net
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present value of various oil exploration programs.
The basic outlines of the methodology are:
1) Initial prior probabilities that each basin contains oil plays
witn giant fields and oil plays with coimmlercial fields is
established. These priors are estimated for each type of sedimenatry
basin in the country (marginal basins, deltas, and cratonic basins),
based on previous worldwide studies of oil resources in various basin
types.
2) An initial prior probability on the efficiency of the oil
exploration process is established based on efficiencies estimated
for exploration in other regions.
3) Initial prior probabilities of resource state and exploration
efficiency are both simultaneously updated in a two stage process
using a discovery likelihood function based on past drilling data.
The result is a revised estimate of the resource state, revised
estimate of exploration efficiency and probabilities of future oil
play discovery.
4) The updated probabilities on the resource state and discovery
rate are multiplied by the expected NPV of potential oil plays to get
an expected NPV of various exploration programs.
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8-3 Summary of Results
I. The model results indicate that a relatively small amount of oil
remains to be found in Brazil. Cumulative production by June 1979 was
1051 mmb, and remaining proved recoverable reserves were 1467 mmb. The
expected amount of oil to be found in known oil plays is 150 to 200 mmb
(most all in the Campos basin). Table 8-1 gives a summary of oil
reserves and resources. Expected amount of oil to be found in new plays
is estimated to be 500 mmb, with one half of this in offshore marginal
basins. lhile the expected value in these basins is 250 mmb, the range
of outcomes varies from a 48 percent chance of 0 mmb to a 5 percent
chance of 1600 mmb. Results compare favorably, within several percent,
to industry assesments.
2. Tne most profitable place to drill is in the Campos basin. Returns
to exploration in the other offshore marginal basins are high for the
next 100 to 200 wells and diminish rapidly thereafter. The rate of
discovery of oil in the onshore cratonic basins is expected to be low,
due to the low potential and enormous prospective areas. (Exploration
only for oil, not gas, was modelled.) Additional exploration in the
offshore Amazon delta is not expected to be profitable due to very low
probabilities of finding large fields and the high production cost if
small fields are eventually discovered. See Table 8-2.
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Table 8-1 Summary of Production, Reserve and Resource Data for Brazil
(million bbls)
Cumu-
lative
Production
6/79Region
Proved
Recover-
able
Reserves
6/79
Remaining
Proved +
Probable
Recoverable
Reserves
Estimate of
Resources
in Fields
in Known
Plays
Estimate of
Resources in
in Undis-
covered
Plays
Reconcavo
(onshore)
Segipe-Al agoas
onshore
offshore
Northeast Basin
(oofshore)
Campos Basin
870
129
41
5
6
445
141
50
49
541
475
150
95
87
660
5
6
45
120
Other
Continental Margin Basins
(offshore)
Amazon Delta (offshore)
.48 chance of 0
.33 chance of 275
.13 chance of 550
.05 chance of 1605
E(V) = 245
.89 chance of 0
.11 chance of 650
E(V) = 67
.75 chance of 0
.15 chance of 250
.10 chance of 1400
E(V) = 188
Onshore Cratonic Basins
Total s
Total
Production,
Reserves
and Resources
1051
3194
1226 1467 176 500
onshore-1817
offshore 1377
Source: Cumulative production and proved reserves from Petrobras; proved
and probable reserves from IIASA world oil database based on
Petroconsultants data; resource estimates calculated in this study.
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Table 8-2 Summary of Expected Amount of Oil (million bbls) to be
Discovered as a Function of Wildcat Exploration Wells
(cumulative'wells and cumulative amounts)
1. Offshore - Continental Margin Basins
Undiscovered Plays1
Wells(type 1) Amount(nnb)
50
100
200
500
64
125
176
237
Undiscovered Fields in Known Plays2
Wells(type 2) Amount(mmb)
30 72
60 112
80 133
2. Offshore - Amazon Delta
Undiscovered Plays
Wells(type 1) Amount(mmb)
50
100
200
300
3. Onshore - Cratonic Basins
Undiscovered
Wells(type 2)
100
500
1000
1200
1Plays
Amount(mmb)
47
130
170
180
1From Tables 4-11, 4-12, 4-13.
290 percent in Campos Basin, 10 percent in Northeast and S-A Basin.
Calculated from discovery rate trends in Figure 4-9.
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3. The results indicate that exploration by PETROBRAS has been
relatively efficient and the majority of offshore oil has been found.
PETROBRAS is in a dilemma if it claims to have been efficient in oil
exploration and simultaneously claims that large undiscovered fields
remain to be found. The large scale exploration effort undertaken by
PETROBRAS has reduced uncertainty in the resource base and thus reduced
Brazil's bargaining strength with the major oil companies.
4. If all future exploration in the offshore marginal basins (outside the
Campos basin) is undertaken by PETROBRAS the optimum exploration-level is
expected to be 200 wells or less. Beyond this level expected diminishing
marginal benefits of exploration are greater than marginal exploration
cost. This implies that it is not profitable to explore for the last
50-100 mmb in these basins as expected returns are too small. The NPV to
Brazil of exploration for new oil plays in the offshore marginal basins
varies from about $300 million ($1979) to over $1 billion, depending on
whether real oil prices increase at 0 or 5 percent per year in real terms.
5. The difference in NVP of the extensive exploration program planned by
PETROBRAS in the offshore marginal basins and the optimal program is an
expected present value loss of $700 million to $1,200 million, depending
if the oil price increases in real terms at 5 or 0 percent per year. The
model also indicates that the extensive PETROBRAS exploration program
reduces the potential NPV of the exploration undertaken by foreign oil
companies.
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6. If all exploration for new oil plays in offshore marginal basins were
undertaken by the oil companies with current exploration service contract
terms, the optimal level of exploration stops short (about 100 wells
short) of the optimal exploration level from the viewpoint of PETROBRAS.
For real oil prices increasing at 0 or 5 percent per year the NPV loss to
Brazil is estimated to be $38 million to $440 million. This represents
the difference between the optimal exploration level of PETROBRAS and the
expected PETROBRAS share of discoveries if foreign companies follow their
optimum plan.
7. It appears particularly difficult for an institution such as
PETROBRAS to institute policies to wind down the rate of exploration once
the optiumi number of wells have been drilled. It is difficult from a
technical and geologic viewpoint to determine the optimum level, and it
is difficult for a state-owned enterprise to do so from an institutional
standpoint (as PETROBRAS has almost a complete monopoly on oil activities
and easy access to the government budget). If it is difficult to prevent
"over exploration", a preferable choice may be to let the foreign
companies do the exploration and accept the lesser of two evils.
According to the results of this model the reduction is lost NPV that
would occur by switching from current plans to exploration by the foreign
oil companies is estimated to be between $1,000 million $1979 (if oil
prices stay constant) and $300 million (if oil prices rise 5 percent/yr
in real tenns). These calculations assume that PETROBRAS and the foreign
oil companies have the same efficiency. If the oil companies are more
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efficient and have lower costs, the benefits to Brazil of utilizing the
oil companies is greater.
8. Results here indicate that investment in a 50,000 bbl/day shale oil
plant would only be feasible if oil prices are expected to increase at 3
to 5 percent per year and cost overruns are kept to less than 30 percent
of current estimates. This assumes a base oil price of $30/bbl and costs
adjusted for the shadow price of foreign exchange.
9. The rate of return on alcohol from sugar is very sensitive to the oil
price. Given potential additional costs of stillage waste disposal,
slightly lower yields on new lands and moderate rises in land costs,
alcohol programs have low profitability unless oil prices rise at 3 to 5
percent/yr in real terms. These results are based on an economic
analysis with a base price of $30/bbl and costs adjusted for the shadow
price of foreign exchange.
A suimmnary of the estimated NPV calculations is given in Table 8-3
and the relevant rates of return in Table 8-4. As can be seen, if oil
prices increase at less than 3%/yr, the planned programs are estimated to
have a negative NPV. If one believes that oil prices are going to
increase at O%/yr , then the current investment programs are justified
only if; 1) the value of a marginal barrel of domestic oil is about
$10/bbl above the current import cost ($28/bbl), or 2) the benefits of
the liquid fuel projects to the diversification of the economy and to the
I-^-I-- i -i-- - ~tl(-*rl -ar--- ^xrrrrrin~ rr~ -( i-L --r- ~ rc_-u r*--- --IIITIIIPYI~^
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foreign debt position are perceived to be large enough to accept a rate
of return of 6 to 8%, or 10 to 12% lower than and average project (beta
of I and discount rate of 18%). The implict beta of liquid fuel projects
would then be .1 to .3. If oil prices do increase at 3 to 5%/yr, the
investment projects appear to be socially profitable.
It is important to consider alternative policies with regard to oil
exploration in order to guard against possible "over exploration". Such
policies could be to allocate more acreage to foreign oil companies
and/or to contract out exploration drilling activities, so that winding
down exploration, when necessary, would be easier. The expansion of
foreign participation in oil exploration and in shale oil would help
reduce the risk of such investments to PETROBRAS.
A rough summary of the expected contribution of the 5-year liquid
fuel investment plan is shown in Table 8-5. Onshore production from
known fields is expected to decline to half of the 1980 value by 1990,
but Campos basin production, whichl will peak in the late 1980's, will add
substantially to the 1990 supply. Expected contribution of the oil
exploration program is small, but there is a wide variation in possible
levels. The difference between expected production of the planned
program and the optimal program is very small, but the optimal program is
substantially less expensive. Expected production from known reserves
and the expected production from the 1980-1985 program are likely to
triple production as compared to the 1980 production level.
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Table 8-3
Summary--Net Present Value of Liquid Fuel Production Programs in Brazil
(millions constant $1979)
Program
1. Oil Exploration l
A. Planned wells
Real
Discount
Rate
(percent)
Expected
Real Annual Oil Price Increase
(from a base of $30/bbl)
0%/yr %%/r7
12 -1,070
B. Opti mal 200
-290
640
540
1,270
C. All Exploration by
Foreign Oil Companies
i) Oil Comp. Share
ii) Petrobras Share
9
592
1 02
898
2. Shale Oil (50,000 bbl/day)
A. No cost increase
8. Costs up 30%,
output 1/2 for 10 yrs.
C. Costs up 50%, Invest-
ment and Production
Delayed
889
-390
12 -1,292
3. Alcohol Program
A. Base case, straight
alcohol from sugarcane
-170
-695
-781
1Exploration in offshore marginal basins.
1,950
690
-635
2,500
1,010
-380
2,557
1,610
916
4,648
3,398
2,691
-.~iQ~I--LI~
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Table 8-4
Real Internal Rates of Return on Liquid Fuel Projects in Brazil
(in percent)
Annual Real Increase in Oil Price (base of $30/bbl.)
Exploration
by Petrobras
100 wells
200 wells
300 wells
Shale Oil
Base case
Costs up 30%
Costs up 30%--output
1/2 10 yrs
Costs up 50%--
costs delayed
5%
14
12
10
18
13
19
16
15
23
18
14
Alcohol from
Sugarcane
Base case
Capital Investment Costs ($1979/bbl/day)
Known Offshore Oil
- Shallow
- Deept (300-400 ft.)
- Brazil
- (US)
6,000
14,000
49,000
(23,000-30,000)
Alcohol
25,000-31,000
Shale Oil
- Sugarcane
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Table 8-5
Contribution of Expected Liquid Fuel Production to Total Domestic
Supply in 1990
(Million Barrels Oil Equivalent per Year)
1980 1990
Known Onshore Oil 40 20
Known Offshore Oil (mainly Campos) 20 130
Alcohol Capacity (in place 1980) 23 23
Expected Contribution of 1980-1985
Liquid Fuel Investment Program (cost,
billion $1979)
* Oil Exploration
-Planned ($3.5 to 4.5)
-Optimal ($2 to 3)
* Shale Oil (31.2 to 2.5)
* Alcohol ($4)
Total Production
Total Consumption
25 1
20 2
9 to 18 3
34 4
83 270+ 5
385 450-520?
1Expected production, range is from 0 to a small chance of 100.
2Expected production if PETROBRAS stops at NPV maximum.
3 Lower values for 25,000 bbl/d plant, higher for 50,000 bbl/d plant.
4Alcohol valued at 85% of oil equivalent.
5No contribution from additional investnents from 1985 to 1990.
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